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Foreword
The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process was designed in 1996 to
bring Asia and Europe closer together. In this, it has been most success-
ful. With remarkable regularity, every two years, heads of state and gov-
ernment from the two regions have met, shared their views on world
developments and cultivated their relationship.
This book is a testimony of the eighth summit of Asian and Eur-
opean leaders. It was held on 4-5 October 2010 in Brussels, in the Royal
Palace, by the gracious courtesy of His Majesty King Albert II. It was,
by all accounts, a good summit. European and Asian leaders engaged
with each other in confidential sessions and on many informal occa-
sions. They underscored how much the ASEM framework for dialogue
and cooperation constitutes a common strategic asset for both regions.
As a matter of course, you will find in this book the results of the dis-
cussions, in particular, the chair statement and the declaration ‘Towards
more effective global economic governance’.
Yet you will also find much more. In this book, renowned academics
and observers of Asia-Europe relations have teamed together to research
the issues that the heads of state and government addressed. The
authors describe the geopolitical background against which ASEM 8
took place. They provide essential insights into the discussions (at times
delicate) that took place. All these contributions make for fascinating
reading. They give a good picture of Asia-Europe convergences and dis-
parities and help understand how they are dealt with through political
dialogue.
In addition, you will find insider information on the preparation of
the summit and on how ASEM 8 was run. You will further learn about
the ‘other summits’, i.e. those held in parallel by members of parlia-
ment, business communities and civil society, as well as about the expo-
sition ‘A Passage to Asia’ organised by BOZAR, Belgium’s federal insti-
tution for cultural exhibitions, together with the Asian ASEM members.
Finally, you will be introduced to the inner life of ASEM: its working
methods, its new members and the challenges of continuing enlarge-
ment for the ASEM cooperation framework.
The book in your hands is a true account of an important event, one
that brought Asians and Europeans once again closer to each other. Bel-
gium had the honour and the privilege to host it. We look back with a
sense of fulfilment to these moments of mutual respect and apprecia-
tion, when leaders addressed the challenges of our changing world,
with the overarching theme of the summit in their mind: ‘greater well-
being and more dignity for all citizens’.
I wish you a pleasant discovery of contemporary European-Asian af-
fairs.
Steven Vanackere
Vice-prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
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1 The Asia-Europe Meeting: Contributing to a
New Global Governance Architecture
Sebastian Bersick and Paul van der Velde
The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) held its first summit in 1996 in
Thailand’s capital Bangkok. ASEM is an inter-regional process of coop-
eration and dialogue consisting of 48 members, namely the ten mem-
ber states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the
27 European Union (EU) member states, Australia, China, India, Japan,
Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Russia and South Korea. In addition
to these 46 countries, the European Commission and the ASEAN
Secretariat also participate in their own right. The ASEM process, which
has so far been loosely organised, addresses political and economic is-
sues as well as security, education and culture.
In general, the parties involved credit the process with developing
and strengthening EU-Asia relations. This is deemed necessary in order
to increase ASEM’s capacity to contribute to regional and inter-regional
governance and to complement and even contribute to global govern-
ance. In the 15 years of its existence, the ASEM process has successfully
facilitated the strengthening of ties between Asia and Europe at all
levels of society. At the same time, the increasing economic and politi-
cal importance of Asia – in particular the emerging economies such as
China and India as well as regional organisations like ASEAN – is indi-
cative of the paradigm shift and qualitative change that the end of sys-
temic bipolarity has brought about in the international system.
Especially Asia’s quest for regional solutions to indigenous and exter-
nal threats to development demonstrates the new dynamics in interna-
tional relations and the ineffectiveness of those global governance insti-
tutions and organisations that predate the end of the Cold War. It is
evident that, though the cold war is long over and the international poli-
tical economy has become ever more interdependent, its actors have yet
to establish a global governance architecture that allows for common
policy choices and their effective implementation. Against this structur-
al deficiency of the international system, European and Asian state and
non-state actors have long pointed to the potential of ASEM for enhan-
cing problem-solving capacities in the political, economic, security,
social and cultural realms.
Previous volumes on ASEM
This book is a sequel to other books that we have edited in the past:
ASEM The Asia-Europe Meeting. A Window of Opportunity (London,
1999); Asian-European Perspectives: Developing the ASEM Process (London,
2001); The Eurasian Space: Far More Than Two Continents (Singapore,
2004) and Multiregionalism and Multilateralism: Asian-European Relations
in a Global Context (Amsterdam, 2006). In the 1999 volume, we took a
look at the politicians' view of ASEM and the possibilities to improve
mutual contact between Asia and Europe, addressing the challenges and
problem areas in an effort to map out the probable future of ASEM. In
the 2001 volume, contributors answered questions of a more practical
nature or reflected on the ideas the Asia-Europe Vision Group (AEVG)
had developed. How can the ASEM potential be realised? How can we
create a usable ASEM vocabulary? How can we create a Eurasian
research culture? The 2004 volume examined levels of engagement
between Asia and Europe, throwing light on how the ASEM process has
been directly or indirectly useful in enhancing ties between various
Asian and European countries, and in contributing to the general devel-
opment of new approaches to international cooperation. The focus of the
2006 volume was on the institutionalisation of intra-regional and inter-
regional cooperation in the international system. The chapters analyse
the EU’s impact on the financial architecture in East Asia, the changing
foreign policy between the EU and China in the area of trade and politi-
cal economy, China’s relations with Latin America and India’s foreign
policy stance on closer regional cooperation with both Asia and Europe.
The contributions to these books are written by Asian, European and
American academics, diplomats, politicians, businessmen and journal-
ists. They bear testimony to the fact that there is a growing demand for
governance in international relations and to the corresponding impor-
tance of comprehensively linking Europe and Asia. The contributions to
the present volume represent a selection from the main topics of the
ASEM 8 summit in Brussels. The chapters focus on four policy areas
that have been identified by ASEM members as pivotal to their task of
contributing to the development of a new global governance architec-
ture: the Brussels summit, financial and economic governance, security
governance and the enlargement of ASEM.
The Brussels summit
The Brussels summit section contains four articles. Three of them are
written by Belgian diplomats who were actively involved in the framing
and organisation of the summit. Their contributions and the accompa-
16 SEBASTIAN BERSICK AND PAUL VAN DER VELDE
nying annexes of this book provide us with important insiders’ perspec-
tives and analysis of ASEM summitry, its inherent logic, limits and
comparative advantages. The head of the ASEM unit of the Belgian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bertrand de Crombrugghe, brings us up to
speed on the intricacies of organising an ASEM summit in his chapter
on the Negotiation History and the Summit Texts. De Crombrugghe
starts from the premise that leaders from Asia and Europe are keen to
periodically confront their perceptions of world developments and as-
sess the “state of the art of Asia-Europe relations”.
The Belgian Prime Minister, Yves Leterme, suggested that the real
added value of gatherings like the ASEM 8 Summit is in the influence
they could exert on future multilateral meetings such as the G20. It
was the stated ambition of the Belgian government as host of ASEM 8
to reach for higher levels of cooperation and to ensure the relevance of
the ASEM process for the daily life of citizens. De Crombrugghe con-
cludes with informed and detailed comments and reflections on the
agreed summit texts, which make a welcome contribution to the devel-
opment of a common ASEM vocabulary. The latter is seen by one of
the founders of ASEM, former Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok
Tong, as a precondition for the flowering of a Eurasian frame of mind.
Paul Lambert, deputy head of the above-mentioned ASEM unit, pro-
vides us in his chapter with a factual overview of both the Brussels
summit and the events organised concomitantly. This does not preclude
an insider’s view regarding the substance and practical arrangements at
the summit, of which the main event was of course the gathering of the
heads of state and government at Brussels’ Royal Palace. In parallel, an
ASEM Parliamentary Forum, an ASEM People’s Forum and an ASEM
Business Forum were held, as has become the usual format of ASEM
summits.
In addition to these quasi-institutionalised ASEM events, a Connect-
ing Civil Societies Conference was held just before the beginning of the
summit in Brussels. The conference was organised by the Europe-Asia
Policy Forum (EUforAsia) which is subsidised by the European Com-
mission. EUforAsia is a collaborative effort of the International Institute
for Asian Studies (IIAS, Leiden and Amsterdam), the European Policy
Centre (EPC, Brussels), the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF, Singapore),
and the Singapore Institute for International Affairs (SIIA, Singapore).
Tom Vandenkendelaere, who also works at the Belgian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, focuses in his chapter, ‘ASEM Working Methods Re-
form: An Identity Issue’, not only on the working methods of ASEM
but also on the discussions that took place in the run-up to and during
the Brussels ASEM summit. Important stakes were at play. The issues
focused on how to better organise ASEM and make practical use of the
wide array of initiatives; how to ensure progress and concrete results
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over time; how to address the long-standing perception that ASEM
needs some kind of secretarial support; and how to ensure the improve-
ment of the global visibility of ASEM.
This section of the book concludes with a chapter by Sebastian Bersick
and Tanja Bauer entitled ‘Perception and ASEM Visibility in the Eur-
opean Media’. The chapter presents the first results of a still ongoing
international research project (named Asia in the Eyes of Europe) on
the perceptions that Europeans hold of Asia and of ASEM affairs. It
measures Europe’s cognitive outlook in eight EU member states by
using, inter alia, a media analysis of major print and TV media outlets
in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Romania and
the United Kingdom (UK). The research project is the European part of
the broader Asia-Europe Perception Project and complements the work
that is being done in the framework of the ‘EU in the Eyes of Asia’ re-
search project. A conclusion drawn from the research is that ASEM is
mainly perceived as a political actor. Its visibility varies considerably be-
tween the sample set of countries and the European level, which was
also analysed. Hardly any attention is given to ASEM affairs as such. If
the ASEM 8 summit had not taken place, ASEM would have been lar-
gely invisible to the European public.
Financial and economic governance
In his chapter ‘IMF: The Road from Rescue to Reform’, J. Thomas
Lindblad sketches the historical background of the present search for
reform at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He stresses the les-
sons the IMF drew from the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s.
From it, the IMF learned that it had to account for its actions and mend
its shortcomings. In the past decade a wide range of reform measures,
accompanied by a great deal of soul-searching at the IMF headquarters,
has been put into place. These measures, alongside new constructive
IMF initiatives, were endorsed by the Asian and European leaders at
ASEM 8 in Brussels.
Jörn-Carsten Gottwald focuses in his chapter ‘In Search of a New
Global Financial Architecture: China, the G20 and ASEM’ on the role
of China in reforming the global governance architecture. According to
Gottwald, relations between Asia and Europe have matured enough for
them to address the crucial issue of reforming the global financial ar-
chitecture. Due to the emergence of China as one of the key actors in
the policymaking framework, the playing field has changed consider-
ably at the same time that China’s involvement in ASEM has gained
the support of its members. China is aware that the rule-making that is
now going on will define the future global financial system. There are
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still no comprehensive proposals on the table, but according to Gott-
wald it is safe to infer that, with China embedded in an inter-regional
and global governance architecture, Beijing will have a strong influence
on the development of the new global financial architecture.
In ‘Banking Regulations at a Crossroads’, Bram de Roos puts into
perspective the statement in the ASEM 8 declaration about the resolve
to strengthen the resilience and transparency of the global financial sys-
tem and to reform the financial sector. He points to what went well dur-
ing financial crises and draws lessons from them. De Roos specifically
points to the Asian crisis of 1997, which spurred a wave of regulatory
reform aimed at protecting the affected countries against future external
shocks. These new regulations contributed to the most recent crisis hav-
ing a less severe impact on Asian countries than other parts of the
world. While European countries needed unprecedented bailouts to
prop up their financial systems and are still coping with the fallout,
many Asian countries were only affected by the crisis because of a de-
cline in international trade. Using datasets on government intervention,
economic growth, financial regulations and the stability of banks, De
Roos explores new directions in the search for an improved regulatory
framework. According to his analysis, ASEM is well positioned to facili-
tate an exchange of knowledge based on the experiences of its members
in order to help develop guidelines that can contribute to a more stable
financial system.
Security governance
In ‘Asia and Europe: Meeting Future Energy Security Challenges’,
Christopher M. Dent zooms in on one of the major global challenges of
the 21st century: namely energy security, which is directly linked to
other key challenges such as global poverty and climate change. Dent
examines how these relationships have developed on the inter-regional
scale, paying particular attention to the ASEM process. There is much
to be gained from this cooperation. While Europe is the birthplace of
both the Industrial Revolution and many important developments in
energy infrastructure and technologies, it has also played a key role in
shaping the world’s energy systems and practices. Asia is having an in-
creasingly profound impact on global energy security with its energy
consumption levels having risen fivefold over the period 1970 to 2009.
It is estimated that Asia’s share in the global energy consumption
will rise to 40 percent by 2030. While competition over access to fuels
is expected to intensify, there will be a concurrent realisation that more
international cooperation is required due to the interdependent nature
of many energy security predicaments. Energy security is also inextric-
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ably linked to climate change and global environmental security. Dent
refers to this as the energy-environment-security nexus. This all lends
greater imperative to ASEM members to collaboratively foster ways to
mitigate their structural dependences on carbon fuel-based energy sys-
tems.
Susanne Kamerling and Frans-Paul van der Putten reflect on the
ASEM 8 chair statement, listing piracy at sea as one of the global focus
issues of ASEM, in their contribution ‘Enhancing Maritime Security
Governance: European and Asian Naval Missions against Somali Pi-
racy’. The statement specifically mentions piracy off the coast of Soma-
lia as a current threat to the freedom and security of the seas. The Gulf
of Aden and the western Indian Ocean – the waters where Somali pi-
rates roam – are major thoroughfares of maritime trade between Eur-
ope and Asia. Since 2008, a large number of countries have contributed
to naval missions against Somali piracy. The great majority of these
countries is either European or Asian. The fact that so many nations
are involved in addressing Somali piracy constitutes an important op-
portunity to strengthen security governance on maritime piracy. How-
ever, even when facing a common threat, it is not easy for such a large
number of countries to work together when there is little experience in
doing so. This is particularly true when the military assets of competing
great powers are involved in a maritime region that is of major strategic
importance.
Kamerling and Van der Putten address the question of how Asian
and European countries that are active in naval operations against
Somali piracy can contribute to more effective maritime security gov-
ernance. They argue that the European Union, especially when sup-
ported by Asian governments, is in a strategic position to help over-
come geopolitical impediments to greater international cooperation. In
this, ASEM has an important role to play.
The enlargement of ASEM
David Capie explores how Australia and New Zealand came to join
ASEM in his chapter entitled ‘Bridging Asia and Europe? Australia and
New Zealand Membership in ASEM’. Since the 1970s, Australia has
come to realise that its economic destiny lies more in the Asia-Pacific
region and less in the Atlantic world. It has become a member of practi-
cally every regional and multilateral organisation in the Asian and Paci-
fic theatre. When Kevin Rudd became prime minister, relations with
Asia were further deepened while ties with Europe were rejuvenated.
Rudd also pushed for Australian membership of the reinvented G20,
the first meeting of which was discussed in detail at ASEM 7 (2008) in
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Beijing. In order to play a key role in the international response to the
global financial crisis, it was clear that Australia would have to become
an ASEM member.
This had a direct impact on New Zealand which, similar to Australia,
experienced an economic shift away from Europe and towards Asia as
its main trading partner. This was also reflected in the development of
closer political ties with Asia. New Zealand also began participating in
many regional institutions, whether organised on an East Asian or
Asia-Pacific basis. Membership or affiliation in all these organisations
was already stretching the country’s diplomatic resources, which was
one of the reasons why New Zealand never actively lobbied for ASEM
membership. Once Australia applied for membership, however, New
Zealand was quick to follow because it would otherwise have become
the only non-ASEM member of the East Asia Summit (EAS). This could
have undermined Auckland’s position as an active participant in the de-
veloping East Asian regional architecture.
It is clear that both countries perceive ASEM first and foremost as a
forum for dialogue with Asian and European leaders. Nevertheless,
Australia’s interest in ASEM seems to be much greater than that of
New Zealand, which is primarily focused on the political interactions
around summits and ministerial meetings.
The accession of Australia, New Zealand and the Russian Federation
eventually triggered the creation of a so-called temporary third category
within ASEM alongside the Asian and European ASEM groups. In the
closing chapter of this book ‘ASEM’s Future Enlargement: The Way For-
ward’, Bertrand De Combrugghe analyses the history of enlargement
and its future. He recounts how the accession of the three new ASEM
members was brought about with cautious diplomatic manoeuvring.
He also argues for the use of the term ‘middle members’ rather than
‘third category’ members. According to De Crombrugghe, all new mem-
bers should be given the opportunity to partake fully and on an equal
basis with the other ASEM members, because this would give new po-
tential to the ASEM agenda. The ASEM coordinators are tasked with
stimulating and coordinating the ASEM agenda, but they do so with
few means. A technical support team or an ASEM secretariat would be
more effective in ensuring neutral and objective service to all ASEM
members.
Conclusion
The practical importance of international institutions that can con-
tribute to regional, inter-regional and global governance is increasing. It
comes as no surprise, then, that ASEM’s agenda has continuously been
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enlarged since the first summit in 1996 took place. The chapters on se-
curity, economic and financial governance as well as the insiders’ views
on the advantages and limitations of contemporary ASEM affairs clearly
demonstrate the contribution of the ASEM process, and of ASEM 8 in
particular, to the development of a new global governance architecture.
ASEM affairs are, however, not only driven by issues but also by the
need to reform. The question of ASEM membership and enlargement
played an important role during the ASEM 8 summit in Brussels and
continues to do so. More than anything else, the accession of Russia
poses a challenge to ASEM’s inter-regional institutional and ideational
structure. The accession of India and Pakistan in 2008 and possibly
Bangladesh in 2012, as well as the continued deepening of European
integration (via the Lisbon Treaty), has furthermore contributed to an
inter-regional asymmetry. As a result, ASEM-Europe has increased its
unity while ASEM-Asia has increased its diversity. How Asians and Eur-
opeans react to and manage these changes as well as the challenges for
governance they pose in their respective regions and inter-regionally
will largely determine the problem-solving capacity of ASEM and the
further impact that ASEM has on the development of a new global gov-
ernance architecture.
We would argue that it is important for ASEM to enhance its inclu-
sive and open style. There is a risk that the needed bidirectional and
reflexive approach will be undermined by a potential inability of ASEM
to integrate all its participants as full and equal members on either the
European or the Asian side. The recent ASEM enlargement demon-
strates how ASEM affairs and the development of a regional architec-
ture in Asia also impact on Europe’s regional architecture. Decisions
taken among ASEM members highlight the issue of who is Europe and
who belongs to Europe and to what extent the EU represents Europe.
ASEM clearly adds to the dynamics of regional architectures not only
with respect to Asia but also in relation to Europe. This is a new devel-
opment, as the accession of Russia to ASEM requires a decision on
whether Russia belongs to the European or the Asian region of ASEM.
Whether the creation of a temporary third category will help to mitigate
the identity crisis that ASEM is in remains to be seen. Apart from
Bangladesh, European countries such as Norway and Switzerland are
also keen to join the ASEM process. Its enlargement is indicative of
ASEM’s increasing role as a constituent of the developing new global
governance architecture.




2 ASEM 8 Summit Texts – The Negotiation
History
Bertrand de Crombrugghe*
Perhaps the most remarkable feature about ASEM is the punctual man-
ner in which Asian and European leaders have met at the summit level.
They have gathered with the regularity of a Swiss clock, every two years
since 1996. There were neither institutional constraints nor compelling
agenda requirements forcing them to do so. Nor can it be said that
these meetings were always self-evident and easygoing. Quite the con-
trary in fact. What this demonstrates, then, is that leaders from Asia
and Europe are keen to periodically confront their perceptions of world
developments and to review the state of Asia-Europe relations. The reg-
ularity of ASEM summits, it can be said, is itself a statement.
The eighth of these encounters took place in Brussels on 4-5 October
2010. As host country, Belgium could rely on this political capital and
set out to build further on it. And as before, there were circumstances
driving the two regions closer to each other. As will be remembered,
both Asia and Europe suffered huge losses in the summer of 2008 as a
consequence of the meltdown of the global financial markets. In Octo-
ber of that year, as the crisis was still unfolding, the ASEM 7 summit
gathered in Beijing. Against this dramatic background, European and
Asian leaders had one of the richest and most interactive discussions in
a long time. And they developed a heightened sense of common pur-
pose, which found expression at the G20 summit on 15 November
2008 in Washington, then the first meeting of its kind. Belgian Prime
Minister Yves Leterme, who delivered the closing speech in Beijing as
upcoming summit host, captured the dominating spirit when he said
that the ASEM summit “in this delicate period of turmoil in the world
economy, contributed to a necessary understanding” and further stated
that “the array of concrete proposals bodes well for a successful summit
in Washington, and I am convinced that these proposals deserve to be
taken on board.” (Closing speech of Yves Leterme, seventh ASEM sum-
mit, Beijing, 24-25 October 2008)
Thus, he expressed his belief that ASEM provided an outstanding op-
portunity for consultations among Europeans and Asians and that
ASEM’s real added value is in the influence it could exert on major
multilateral gatherings. By doing so, he reflected a widespread opinion
that this was ASEM at its best. Confident that Belgium had inherited an
ASEM that was in very good health, Leterme then went on to express
the ambition he coveted for ASEM 8 as follows: “There is just one
world, because there is just one human race. Fundamentally, what is at
stake is the future of that one world, the future of that one human
family we all belong to. We share the same dream: greater well-being
and more dignity for all our citizens. We might start thinking already of
ways and means of bringing our cooperation to a higher level, we
should dare to broaden our scope of exchanges into new territories, pos-
sibly even looking at organizational and procedural opportunities not
only to structure our interactions in a more systematic way, but also to
bring the whole ASEM process closer to our peoples.” (Closing speech
of Leterme, seventh ASEM summit, Beijing, 24-25 October 2008)
With these words, he not only coined the main theme to inspire
ASEM 8 – greater well-being and more dignity for all citizens – he also
expressed his determination to pursue the qualitative leap initiated in
Beijing and to reach for a higher level of cooperation. At the same time,
he voiced the ambition to ensure that the ASEM process would be rele-
vant for the daily life of its citizens. These elements would naturally in-
spire the preparation process of the Brussels summit.
The initial preparations
Preparations for ASEM 8 started in earnest at the ASEM meeting of for-
eign ministers in Hanoi in May 2009. On that occasion, Belgium
pledged to work closely with all delegations to develop a substantive
content for the ASEM 8 summit that would meet the expectations of all
ASEM members. Indeed, the kind of interaction and engagement wit-
nessed in Beijing could only be obtained again if the expectations of
summit participants were first and foremost put at the centre of the
prospective summit agenda. Developing a sense of common ownership
on the part of ASEM members was considered paramount. ASEM 8
would have to demonstrate that it genuinely was the summit of all
ASEM participants.
This was the mandate of the Belgian ASEM 8 task force, which was
set up in Brussels in June 2009 within the Belgian Federal Public Ser-
vice for Foreign Affairs in order to coordinate the summit preparations.
It underpinned the words with action and embarked on a programme
of consultations that would involve exploratory talks in Brussels as well
as abroad. European partners were consulted regularly through the coor-
dination mechanisms existing in the European Union framework and
through occasional visits to capitals. Asian partners were consulted
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through their representatives in Brussels and through a very exhaustive
schedule of country visits conducted between July 2009 and April 2010.
The consultation process was further supported by the circulation of
papers. Papers help to stabilise ideas and can conveniently trigger coun-
terproposals and alternative suggestions. Thus, they help to move the
thinking forward. The ASEM partners engaged very actively in this pro-
cess. Through their written contributions, it proved possible to gradu-
ally identify the issues at hand, to circumscribe them with reasonable
certainty and to develop an agenda for the summit that would cover the
concerns that exist in ASEM capitals.
The first such paper was titled ‘non-paper’ and was issued on 15 Oc-
tober 2009 (see Annex 4). True to the overarching theme announced by
Leterme in Beijing and to initial signals received from ASEM partners,
it proposed to examine how to promote a development path that would
balance out quantitative and qualitative factors of wellbeing. It further
proposed to address three main challenges: the international financial
crisis, the Millennium Development Goals and the threat of climate
change. Energy and a range of global issues requiring cross-border co-
operation were mentioned as well. Regional issues such as Myanmar,
the Korean Peninsula, Iran and the Horn of Africa were identified as
probable points of discussion. As is customary in preparations for
ASEM summits, attention was also drawn to the variety of initiatives de-
signed to develop further people-to-people contacts.
One of the specific proposals figuring in the non-paper was to re-
energise trade and investment relations between the two regions. Sev-
eral Asian and European partners indeed felt that this would help their
economies grow their way out of the crisis. They recalled that in the
early years, a trade facilitation action plan and an investment promotion
action plan had been developed within the ASEM context. They also re-
called that no meeting of the ASEM economic ministers had taken
place since 2005.
Building on the many comments received on the non-paper, a follow-
up paper was distributed on 8 January 2010. It was labelled ‘concept
paper’ because, in addition to operating choices among themes and
subjects, it attempted to organise them in a coherent structure (see An-
nex 5). It put forward two main themes. One was more effective world
governance structures, which meant to address the economic and finan-
cial crisis in all its immediate aspects. The other was advancing on the
path of sustainable development, which brought under a single heading
the range of longer-term development issues raised by ASEM partners.
The three dimensions of sustainable development were recognisable in
the proposed structure. The economic development section covered
trade, investments, innovation, transportation and food security issues.
The social development section covered labour standards, social dialo-
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gue, inclusive labour markets, social security systems and ageing socie-
ties. The environmental protection section covered climate change, en-
ergy issues, other environmental issues, civil society involvement, chan-
ging production and consumption patterns and green growth strategies.
Separately and as a third theme, the concept paper proposed to
address a single global issue that threatens the common interest of Eur-
opeans and Asians: fighting piracy at sea in order to secure maritime
trade routes. This was a rather novel field of work for ASEM, one that
would require extensive preparations. A fourth chapter was reserved for
regional issues but, at the request of some partners, explicit references
to the countries figuring in the non-paper had been dropped. The peo-
ple-to-people chapter focused on one main message: the encouragement
of higher education exchanges between Asia and Europe, involving aca-
demics, researchers and students.
The concept paper was presented at the ASEM senior officials’ meet-
ing of 25 January 2010 in Madrid. It was well received and accepted as
a basis for further work. A period for written contributions and com-
ments was opened that ran to the end of March. ASEM partners overall
confirmed the two main themes put forward for the summit. While
they supported the idea of addressing piracy at sea, they asked for the
inclusion of a number of additional global issues such as the fight
against terrorism and organised crime, disaster prevention and relief,
promotion of human security, and the non-proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. They also expressed a view on what the follow-up pre-
paratory document should be. They requested an annotated agenda clar-
ifying how leaders would address the various themes and subjects.
Thus, a third document titled ‘annotated agenda’ was issued on 15
April 2010. It partitioned the various agenda items over the working
sessions that would structure the work of the summit. At the same
time, it refined the orientations and indicated the level of ambition that
could be pursued on each of them. In addition, a couple of novelties
were introduced.
One was the suggestion that leaders devote specific time to discuss
the recommendations from the parallel dialogues, which parliamentar-
ians, business people and non-governmental organisations were sched-
uled to hold on the margins of ASEM 8. There were several reasons for
this. Leterme had said in Beijing that he wished to “bring the whole
ASEM process closer to our people”. Likewise, the organisers and stake-
holders of these parallel dialogues took a keen interest in ASEM 8 and
underscored the relevance of the leaders’ meeting in the pursuit of their
objectives. Also, the founding text of ASEM required it to “go beyond
governments in order to promote dialogue and cooperation between
business/private sectors of the two regions and, no less importantly, be-
tween the peoples of the two regions” (Asia-Europe Cooperation Frame-
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work, § 8 fine, adopted at the third ASEM summit, Seoul, 20-21 October
2000, to be referred to as AECF 2000). Therefore, it appeared only logi-
cal to propose a step that would have the clear effect of further encoura-
ging and stimulating the exchanges in the parallel dialogues.
Another novelty was the suggestion that leaders take action on devel-
oping the working methods of ASEM. ASEM cooperation indeed faced
efficiency challenges. In the past few years, it had expanded from 26 to
45 members, and three more – the Russian Federation, Australia and
New-Zealand – were set to join (see Vandenkendelaere in this volume).
Exploratory discussions had been held on this issue within a group of
Asian and European representatives, experts and academics. This
occurred during the ASEM outlook seminar which ASEF (the ASEM
Foundation) makes a tradition of organising in advance of each sum-
mit. It took place in Brussels on 14-15 April 2010 and had as its main
theme the working methods of an enlarged ASEM.
The annotated agenda was discussed at the ASEM senior officials’
meeting in Phnom Penh on 5-6 May 2010. It was well received but also
attracted a number of useful remarks. On form, the main recommenda-
tion was to cluster the subjects and issues further so as to have only as
many themes as there would be sessions during the summit itself, i.e.
four actual sessions, a working dinner and a working lunch. On sub-
stance, the senior officials endorsed the range of issues with a few
amendments. The convergence on the topics was remarkable. The sig-
nal was given that the development of language reflecting the common
views of Asians and Europeans could now start.
By way of outcome of the Phnom Penh meeting, a revised annotated
agenda was issued on 2 June 2010 (see Annex 6). The items relating to
the parallel dialogues, the people-to-people contacts, ASEM’s visibility
and the future of ASEM were all brought together under one general
heading. Furthermore, as was agreed in Phnom Penh, the issue of fu-
ture ASEM enlargements (see chapter 12), on which the ASEM foreign
ministers had requested further work at their meeting in Hanoi in May
2009, was dropped from the agenda. It was deemed not ready for con-
sideration at the summit level. The revised annotated agenda came to
be recognised as reflecting the consensus view. From the moment of its
issuance, four months ahead of the ASEM 8 summit, it would conveni-
ently guide and orient all delegations in their preparations.
Developing a common language
In developing the substance of the summit, i.e. the language reflecting
the common views of Asians and Europeans on the agenda issues, the
Belgian host still faced a number of challenges. First, the structure of
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the texts had to be defined. By tradition, ASEM summits agree a chair
statement and possibly one or two separate declarations. There is a
slight difference in status between the two kinds of documents. A de-
claration normally requires the formal approval of all ASEM partners
(“We, the leaders, declare…”). A chair statement, on the other hand, is
traditionally issued under the responsibility of the chair (“Leaders
said…”). Still, as other summit hosts before it, Belgium took the stance
that the chair would not want to make statements that colleague leaders
would not approve. Therefore, in view of the Brussels summit and for
all practical purposes, it decided that all documents would be negotiated
together in a single package. One more reason to act in this manner
was that ASEM members had not yet given an indication of how the
summit texts should be structured, whether and how many declarations
should be envisaged and how the themes and subjects would be appor-
tioned among them.
Second, most of the issues identified in the annotated agenda were
‘living subjects’. The economic and financial crisis was receiving con-
stant attention from the G20, the international financial institutions, re-
gional bodies and other negotiation fora. Everyday, new responses
emerged that had to be further developed and coordinated. The EU
itself was grappling with the sovereign debt crisis of a number of its
members and was confronted with the instability of the euro currency
itself. These issues were likely to have a major impact on the key mes-
sages, which leaders would want the October summit to issue. Hence,
draft summit language could reasonably be proposed only after the
Communiqué of the Toronto G20 became available, i.e. only after 29
June 2010. A similar constraint applied with regard to the sensitive
regional issues. They were too prone to last-minute developments, and
wrong timing could play havoc. Hence, the development and negotia-
tion of appropriate political messages on regional issues were deliber-
ately postponed to mid-September, closer to the summit date.
A third challenge consisted of preparing language thoroughly and
transparently on issues sensed as being either complex or novel. One
such complex issue was the chapter on sustainable development. It cov-
ered a wide array of themes such as trade, investments, innovation,
technology transfers, food security, social cohesion, climate change,
energy, biodiversity, the green economy and the like. At the same time,
many of these subjects were being negotiated in already scheduled
multilateral negotiations such as the Doha Development Agenda, the
Millennium Development Goals (UN High Level Plenary, September
2010, New York) and the Climate Conference (UNFCCC, December
2010, Cancun). In addition, particular account had to be taken of dis-
cussions occurring among Asian and European representatives on so-
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cial issues on the margin of the ILO International Labour Conference
in mid-June 2010 in Geneva.
Drafting suggestions relating to the above subjects was bound to test
the dividing lines among ASEM members. Hence, there was a need to
handle these issues carefully and, at a minimum, to engage at an early
stage with the delegations. Such an occasion presented itself during the
ASEM conference on sustainable development held at the initiative of
the European Commission at the end of May 2010 in Yogyakarta, Indo-
nesia. Many aspects of sustainable development were explored, includ-
ing the role of assistance in the context of a rapidly evolving Asian con-
tinent. Still, an event more particularly geared towards the preparation
of the ASEM summit and its wide-ranging agenda was required. For
this reason, an advance intergovernmental negotiation was organised in
Brussels on 23-24 June 2010. It brought together the necessary exper-
tise from the various capitals and greatly helped to identify the lines of
convergence that leaders would eventually endorse in their summit
statement.
An issue requiring specific attention because of its novelty was piracy
at sea. Two steps were devised in order to gradually develop the com-
mon view of the ASEM community. An exploratory seminar was orga-
nised in Brussels on 4-5 May 2010, gathering maritime experts from a
representative number of European and Asian members. It produced a
chair’s summary which conveniently and accurately documented the
shared security interests. Thereafter, also in Brussels on 24-25 June
2010 (back to back with the sustainable development event), the semi-
nar results were subjected to an advance intergovernmental negotiation.
More political in nature, this event resulted in four pages of agreed text,
which reflected the essential messages that ASEM members appeared
ready to submit to their leaders. Key elements were commitments to ef-
fectively prosecute pirates, continue assistance to regional initiatives,
provide more support for naval efforts, cooperate with the private sector
and develop a more sustainable long-term strategy.
Draft summit texts
All of the above contributions to common Asian and European mes-
sages were timed to flow in by the end of June 2010. Thus, a first set of
proposals for summit texts could be tabled on 8 July 2010. This was
three months ahead of the summit, allowing reasonable time for con-
sideration by ASEM partners. The proposals consisted of a main base
text with two annexes. The main base text contained a chapter on more
effective global and financial governance, paragraphs on the array of
global issues retained in the annotated agenda and a final chapter on
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people-to-people contacts and on other issues clustered with it. The first
annex contained the draft issued from the negotiation session on sus-
tainable development. The other annex contained the draft issued from
the negotiation session on piracy at sea. As explained, the language
relating to regional issues was reserved for later. Also, the structure of
the summit texts was left open for decision: annexes could become se-
parate declarations, stay annexes, move back into the main base text or
vice versa.
The negotiation on these drafts started in earnest at the ASEM senior
officials’ meeting of 14-15 July 2010 in Brussels. During those two days,
the texts were reviewed paragraph by paragraph. Partners were able to
share their comments at length on the substance of the proposals and
in the true spirit of dialogue. The two days were most instructive. They
allowed delegations to hear each other’s arguments, and they provided
essential indications to the summit host on where divergences arose
and how they could possibly be overcome. The drafting process then
continued over the summer by written procedure. New versions were
distributed on 16 August and on 13 September 2010, each time taking
into account the written comments collected in between. On 27 Sep-
tember 2010, a week before the actual summit, a last version was
issued. The coordinators’ meeting held in Seoul on 6-7 September
2010 constituted an important moment in the drafting process. It
brought together Cambodia and South Korea (the Asian coordinators)
and the European Commission and Belgium (the European coordina-
tors). It proceeded through the draft text (the 17 August version) and,
with the benefit of both the European and Asian perspectives, examined
and discussed in detail the written amendments received up to then.
This was a most useful exercise. It allowed the following version (the 13
September version) to approximate more closely the expectations of
ASEM partners, since it had taken into account the contributions from
qualified representatives of both sides. In addition, the coordinators’
meeting had been held in ‘open format’, meaning that all ASEM mem-
bers were in attendance in the form of observers. They could follow the
discussion and hence understand the reasons for the formulations
being incorporated in the ensuing version of the summit texts.
The July senior officials’ meeting in Brussels had already provided
indications, but the coordinators’ meeting in Seoul eventually agreed on
it: the summit would produce a separate declaration titled ‘Towards
more effective global economic governance’ (the first topic on the agen-
da). All other subjects would be brought under a single chair statement.
A final ASEM senior officials’ meeting took place in Brussels on 3 Octo-
ber 2010, on the eve of the ASEM summit itself. It reviewed once more
the summit texts (the 27 September version). Also, it finally approved
the language on the time-sensitive regional issues comprising Iran,
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Afghanistan, Myanmar and the Korean Peninsula. Over the summer,
the Middle East peace process was added as a fifth item. On these, the
summit host had circulated written proposals around mid-September.
Some were submitted to individual partners first and then discussed in
restricted circles in order to facilitate the gradual building of a consen-
sus. It is to the credit of the ASEM delegations that on all details of the
summit texts, including the regional issues, satisfactory language was
found by 8 pm of the same day.
Results
The following two sections describe in more detail the results of the
negotiations, including, where applicable, the sticking points encoun-
tered when finalising the documents. The paragraph numbers refer to
the numbers used in the publicised version of the summit texts (see
Annex 1 and 2).
Declaration ‘Towards more effective global economic governance’
The key messages of this declaration had already been identified in July
2010, but the exact sequence and formulations were stabilised only at
the last minute. The title purposely avoids the word ‘crisis’. Instead, it
emphasises the positive perspective of improving governance. It also
talks about economic rather than financial governance. This reflects the
view that the financial crisis had become an economic one and that the
response had to be all-encompassing.
§ 1 This paragraph has a ‘chapeau’ function. Still, it expresses Eur-
ope’s and Asia’s “resolve to give new momentum to their cooperation”.
It also announces the subjects, which are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
§ 2 Leaders commit to strong sustainable and balanced growth, to
inclusive economies and to structural adjustment. There was a shared
sense that the weaknesses (read: imbalances) of the past were the root
causes of the crisis of 2008 and that they should be avoided in the
future. But it proved quite difficult to list these weaknesses. Besides ex-
cessive public deficits, non-sustainable debts and development gaps, glo-
bal imbalances were also initially mentioned. The words ‘global imbal-
ances’, however, caused difficulty. They were taken to mean structural
trade deficits and surpluses rather than capital accounts or savings rate
disparities. Eventually, the word ‘imbalance’ was moved to the last sen-
tence among the factors to take account of in policy actions. Other im-
portant messages include the ideas of ‘moving together’, ‘taking spill
over effects of one’s actions into account’ and ‘sharing responsibility’.
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§ 3 Leaders here commit to supporting the ongoing recovery and re-
storing confidence, but there is a clear recognition of the different situa-
tions in which Asia and Europe find themselves. Asia is commended
for its strong economic growth and for acting against inflation. The di-
lemma facing the Europeans of pursuing fiscal consolidation without
endangering growth is duly explained, also because of the impact of
European policies on world markets, and hence on confidence. The
final sentence, arguing that structural adjustment would eventually
ease fiscal consolidation, is also important.
§ 4 This section is about building resilience into the world system
by making available borrowing facilities – or, in other words, financial
safety nets – an idea figuring in the Toronto G20 communiqué. Asians
know the worth of this from their experience with the 1997-1998
financial crisis. More recently, with investors shunning Greek sover-
eign debt, the euro zone was confronted with similar difficulties. Both
regions have set up their own mechanisms in response. With this
background in mind, it made sense to balance out multilateral (IMF)
and regional funding solutions. However, a number of ASEM partners
were averse to promoting financial safety nets so clearly. They would
have rather insisted on the fundamental requirement of sound macro-
economic and financial policies. Thus, a balance had to be struck be-
tween preventive discipline and remedial facilities.
§ 5 The kind and purpose of new financial regulations are described
in some detail at the request of Asian as well as European partners.
Clearly, the agenda of the G20 was still transpiring. There is an obli-
que reference to “non-cooperative jurisdictions” requested by a number
of European countries. The European side also wished to mention the
possibility of taxes and levies on banking institutions as a way of ensur-
ing fair burden-sharing for financial meltdowns and to preserve the
global ‘level playing field’. The Asian side rejected this, leaving only a
very general sentence stating that “a number of possible policy ap-
proaches regarding financial sector contributions” exist.
§ 6-9 This section concerns the IMF and the World Bank. The IMF’s
role in overall surveillance is reaffirmed (§6). A key passage is the pro-
mise of quota reform in the IMF, about which the G20 of Pittsburgh
made a promise, to be fulfilled by the G20 in Seoul of early November
2010. It eventually was. About the other governance issues, there was a
discussion on whether they needed to be settled in the same time
frame. The words ‘in parallel’ provided the solution.
§ 10 This paragraph is specifically dedicated to developing countries
with an approach that is more trade than aid. It was introduced in the
context of ideas emerging among G20 countries to intensify outreach
activities and to elaborate a development agenda with multi-year action
plans.
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§ 11 This section begins with the Doha Round. A reminder of the ob-
jective of concluding by the end of 2010 did not make it into the de-
claration, as preference was given to language closer to real prospects.
Also on the other idea – namely regional integration – the language re-
mains cautious, reflecting the fact that each region wishes to move at
its own pace.
§ 12 The declaration concludes with a promise to cooperate with the
G20. At the SOM in Brussels, there was a fierce debate on whether to
mention the G20 at all in this declaration. Some ASEM members
argued that since they were not members of the G20, all references
should be deleted. However, since 12 ASEM members are part of the
G20, totally ignoring the new coordination mechanism would make
the declaration irrelevant. The compromise consisted in expressing a
readiness to cooperate with the G20 but with a reminder that actual
decision-making must remain within the appropriate multilateral insti-
tutions.
Chair statement
In true ASEM tradition, the chair statement covers the wide variety of
subjects in the order in which they figure on the prepared agenda.
Since the topic relating to global economic governance has become the
object of a separate declaration, the first theme of substance is the one
relating to sustainable development.
Opening
This section contains formal information but departs in some respects
from traditional language.
§ 1 The number of European and Asian members attending is not
detailed. Only a global figure is given. This covers up the undecided
issue on where the three newcomers – Russia, Australia and New Zea-
land – presently classified as ‘third category’, actually belong.
§ 2 Conforming with the Lisbon Treaty, the chair of the summit in
Europe is no longer the rotating presidency of the EU but the Presi-
dent of the European Council. Initially, the Asian side had reservations
about this.
§ 3 ASEM rules prescribe that heads of state/government admit
new members by consensus. The language adopted makes explicit that
this consensus existed. Also, in order to display inclusiveness, it was
decided against a formal agenda point relating to accession that would
have delayed the entrance of the new members into the summit room.
§ 4 This reflects the list of ministerial meetings that took place since
the Beijing summit in 2008. At their September Seoul meeting, coor-
dinators agreed not to mention in the body of the chair statement any
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initiative below the ministerial level. There are too many of them, and
they would have overburdened the already lengthy text.
Advance on the path of sustainable development
This entire section is the one most akin to the overarching theme of the
summit: ‘more prosperity and more dignity for all citizens or, in short,
quality of life’. It is built on the familiar triptych through which sustain-
able development is pursued, with attention given to equality in length
between the three subsections.
§§ 7-9 The interdependence of the three dimensions is recalled. Major
events such as the MDG High Level Plenary and the Rio+20 Confer-
ence are mentioned up front. They frame the subject and lay out the
wider perspective.
Economic development
§§ 10-14 In recent years, ASEM has hardly dealt with economic issues
in comparison with the early days when considerable work was devoted
to trade facilitation and investment promotion. These paragraphs rep-
resent an attempt to rebalance the agenda. The reference to the WTO
Doha Development Agenda was meant to constitute a firm message,
but it had to remain realistic (§11).
As a consequence, the focus shifted to the more upstream and maybe
more political issue of how trade and investments flows could better
contribute to the objective of sustainable development (§ 13). In this de-
bate, the availability of technologies has always been ‘front and centre’.
Taking the view that technologies travel through trade and investments,
the idea here is to develop initiatives aimed at exploring how trade and
investment barriers and market-distorting mechanisms hamper the
deployment of new environmentally friendly, resource-efficient, clean
products and technologies. In the same context, it was suggested that
possible new incentives that may widen their use be examined. The in-
itiative is expected to create a better environment for the spreading of
green products and technologies to everyone’s benefit, constituting a
sort of contemporary, green version of the trade facilitation and invest-
ment promotion efforts of the early years of ASEM. The necessity of in-
volving business communities appeared evident to everyone, but ASEM
members still have to agree on how.
The possible resumption of the meetings of the ministers for econo-
my and trade written into the text also has a political meaning. It would
heal the acrimony over the failure of the last such meeting which was
scheduled in 2005 but was suspended because of a dispute about parti-
cipation.
§§ 15-18 address different sectors of cooperation. The financial markets
of Europe and Asia could be more integrated, as was emphasised by
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the Business Forum taking place the day before the summit. The trans-
portation sector should benefit from the accession of Russia to ASEM,
which opens promising perspectives for the sector. Information and
communication technologies are recognised as drivers of sustainable
development. The language on connectivity reflects an important con-
cept currently being developed in Southeast Asia under the leadership
of ASEAN.
§ 19 was one of the more disputed passages. The food price hikes of
2007-2008 and again in 2010 made food security a compelling issue.
However, opinions diverged widely on whether subsidies and agricul-
tural market protection played a beneficial or negative role. The words
‘responsible investment’ are meant to implicitly condemn investments
in bio-fuels. Some considered them a factor inflating food prices.
Others see bio-fuels as a promising export item.
§ 20 reflects specific regional initiatives where European and Asian
partners have reached a high degree of ‘in the field’ cooperation.
Social cohesion
The title is derived from the Beijing Statement on Sustainable Develop-
ment.
§§ 21-23 reminds all ASEM members of fundamental ILO standards.
There was vigilance not to move beyond actual commitments.
§ 24 is about the sensitive subject of migration. The discussion re-
volved around ‘mobility partnerships in order to develop shared bene-
fits of legal migration among ASEM partners’. In the end, ASEM
members settled for more modest language about sharing best prac-
tices and exploring comprehensive approaches.
§§ 25-26 The iteration on the usefulness of social dialogue was not in
dispute. Nor was corporate responsibility, which oddly enough seemed
to be understood as an issue of relevance to Europe primarily, despite
the geographically neutral language.
§ 27 Two concepts clashed in this paragraph: affordable discretionary
social safety nets versus more expensive, entitlement-based social se-
curity systems. The Social Protection Floor concept developed in the
framework of the UN was perceived as more akin to the latter and
therefore was only ‘taken note of with interest’. The main supporting
argument was that it would fight persistent poverty more effectively,
but the unwarranted cost of the so far poorly defined concept appeared
a major obstacle to its endorsement.
§§ 28-30 The inclusiveness of labour markets is to be promoted
through education and training. The more structural message is that
workers should not prepare themselves for a specific job but for shift-
ing professional opportunities, as labour markets evolve fast. This
proved to be the view in Europe as much as in Asia.
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§§ 29 and 30 contain a balance in that they describe the very different
challenges of young versus ageing societies.
§ 31 The labour ministerial scheduled for 13-14 December 2010 took
place in the meanwhile. At the Brussels summit, ASEM 8 members
were keen to entrust it with a comprehensive mandate, including a dia-
logue among social partners and the involvement of civil society.
Environmental protection
§§ 32-34 These sections are about climate change and were only
settled on at the very end. The Cancun conference was only two
months away. ASEM partners kept on trying to skew it in the direction
of a simple prorogation of the Kyoto Protocol system with duties only
for Annex I countries, or on the contrary in the direction of laying
everything flat and introducing new obligations including for develop-
ing countries. Who should cut emissions, as well as what commit-
ments could be expected from developing countries in exchange for
mitigation and adaptation financing from developed countries were
also long in dispute.
§§ 35-36 These paragraphs address energy security, both in the context
of climate change and in the context of market and transit policies.
There was little dispute about them.
§ 37 This section identifies the proper management of forest and
water resources as priorities. China’s initiative of a water development
centre aroused considerable interest, as did the forest-related action
plan of the EU.
§ 38 This displays a good level of ambition for the other major envir-
onment-related event, the October 2010 Nagoya Conference on bio-
diversity. As was known at the time of writing, the conference concluded
successfully.
§§ 39-40 The emphasis here is on a theme that is gaining attention:
the ethics of production and consumption behaviour, where the invol-
vement of people is paramount. To the concept of ‘green growth’,
others opposed the UN terminology of ‘green economy’, the latter
expressing some apprehension about moving in overdrive into new
technologies. The two are reconciled in this paragraph, which also has
operational language about the sharing of technologies.
The future of Asia-Europe sustainable development cooperation
§§ 41-43 The language stems from the conclusions of the Yogyakarta
sustainable development conference of May 2010. It is about moving
beyond aid: breaking away from the strictly intergovernmental frame-
work, exploiting new forms of triangular cooperation and increasing
the leverage of financial means by blending aid and loans, which is
possible in a dynamic region such as Asia. In § 43, ownership and re-
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sponsibility on the part of both donor and recipient countries are
stressed. Care had to be taken that the text would not be biased against
recipient countries.
Global issues in focus
This section groups a number of issues that were promoted by one or
more ASEM members. There is no suggestion of any connection link-
ing them. The subjects also are meant to be geographically neutral.
§ 44-49 Piracy at sea
This theme united Europe and Asia: goods traded between them travel
by necessity over seas and often cross the Gulf of Aden, the Straits of
Malacca and the South China Sea where pirates are active. Yet there
was concern about international encroachment on national security
interests. Hence, an early emphasis on the preservation of national
sovereignty needed to be introduced. Another issue concerned the de-
nunciation of the US Executive Order sanctioning companies that pay
ransoms to pirates. Some ASEM members insisted on clear language,
but others were fearful of encouraging the payment of ransoms. The
sentence in § 46 about the unacceptability of unilateral measures ham-
pering efforts to free hostages is a compromise.
The suggestion of a long-term strategy in § 49 was uncertain right up
to the end. There was a reluctance to engage on this, even though it is
quite clear that the present military engagement is not sustainable over
time. There was also reluctance to point so clearly to the need to
address the political instability in Somalia. The fact that these two ele-
ments nevertheless figure in the final text is a revealing sign of the or-
ientation that the ASEM community is taking.
§ 50-51 Fighting terrorism and organised crime
The main issue in § 50 was how to reflect the requirement to respect
human rights obligations while fighting terrorism. Under organised
crime (§ 51), the trafficking of persons was handled more as an irregular
migration issue than as an issue about the protection of human beings.
§ 52-53 Disaster prevention and disaster relief
Major floods in several ASEM member countries caused an expansion
of this subsection. However, ASEM traditions discourage the mention-
ing of a particular country, even when it is about assistance. Therefore,
no specific countries are mentioned.
§ 54 Human security
This theme was efficiently promoted by one ASEM member.
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§ 55-56 Human rights and democracy
One issue was how to reflect the commitment to respect human rights:
as a legal obligation confined to the language of the UN Charter and to
a strict interpretation of international law or in ‘mind and spirit’.
Another issue was how to word the shared desire to establish coopera-
tion with ASEAN’s new Intergovernmental Commission on Human
Rights while still observing the strict independence and specificities of
the respective institutions.
§ 57 Dialogue of cultures and civilisations
The original language for this paragraph was placed in the ‘people-to-
people’ section. The argument was accepted that this type of dialogue is
foremost a government affair.
§ 58 Reform of the UN system
A number of ASEM members pursued this issue vigorously. The focus
was on the reform of the UN Security Council, which for some should
outpace the rest and for others should be explicitly about ‘expansion’ of
membership. For still others, there was no urgency. The final text was
simple and neutral.
The issue of a more appropriate speaking right for the EU in the UN
General Assembly was not raised on this occasion, as the ASEM plenary
was not considered a suitable forum to address it.
§ 59-64 Non-proliferation and disarmament
These paragraphs grew in length over time as they attracted ever more
controversy. ASEM comprises members who are not party to the non-
proliferation treaty while it also comprises members who press for uni-
versal respect of its provisions as party to the treaty. Even among parties
to the treaty there were tensions: some wished to highlight specifically
those treaty provisions that commit nuclear states to relinquish nuclear
weapons. The paragraph on the US-Russia New Start Agreement trig-
gered the suggestion of ‘balancing’ drives such as a call for cutting stra-
tegic arms even further.
Regional issues
§ 65 Cooperation within each region and between Europe and Asia is
the subject of this paragraph. It was simple enough to mutually
encourage each other’s integration processes. The challenge was to
reflect this in the text processes, which are different in nature and
proceed at different speeds, and to do so without any hint of value
judgment.
§ 66 ASEM members generally recognise the pioneering role of
ASEAN. European, Asian and new members all agreed to emphasise
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the centrality of ASEAN in regional cooperation in Asia. The ASEAN
Regional Forum very concretely testifies to this, and so does the sum-
mit text.
§ 67 The entry into force of the Third Protocol amending the Treaty
on Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia would allow the EU as a
regional organisation to accede to it. A commitment to work proactively
towards this result was agreed, but this was only one of three issues
that were discussed in this context. The two others concerned the de-
sire of the EU to take part in the East Asia Summit and the wish of the
European Commission to become an observer in the Arctic Council.
These two were not mature at the time of finalisation.
§ 68 On the subject of Iran, the discussion revolved around the ‘sanc-
tions or negotiations’ approach.
§ 69 On the subject of Afghanistan, there was overall support for the
pacification and reconstruction effort, but several ASEM members
wished their specific area of concern to be reflected in the text.
§ 70-72 On the subject of the Middle East peace process, the level of
detail of the final text reflects the strong engagement of ASEM mem-
bers on the issue. Israel’s settlement policy and the situation in Gaza
were argued about in great length.
§ 73 On the subject of Myanmar, ASEM members eventually found
common language qualifying the process leading to the elections of 7
November 2010. A balance had to be found between the hard ‘denun-
ciation’ approach of some and the soft ‘encouragement’ approach of
others.
§ 74 On the subject of the Korean Peninsula, the consequences of
the 2009 nuclear explosion and missile firings as well as the 2010
sinking of the Cheonan vessel lingered on. Issues were the qualifica-
tion of the act causing the loss of the Cheonan, the reiteration of North
Korea’s existing obligations under the 2005 Joint Statement and the
perspective of resuming Six Party Talks.
People-to-people, visibility and future of ASEM
§§ 75-82 People-to-people contacts were from the very beginning of
ASEM recognised as important for the future of the relationship. They
are part of the patient approach to building a relationship of trust and
confidence over time. The text recognises ongoing initiatives and calls
for more. It was from the outset very consensual. An original feature
already commented upon above figures in § 76: for the first time, lead-
ers formally acknowledge recommendations and resolutions produced
by the parallel parliamentarian, business, people and civil society dialo-
gues. They task senior officials with taking them into consideration
and, where relevant, suggesting appropriate action.
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Another paragraph (§ 82) concerns ASEF, the Foundation of ASEM. To
recall one’s own obligation of timely financial contribution felt strange
to some ASEM members.
§ 83 Visibility is a recurrent issue. An encouragement to hold on to
one single logo is a small step to take, but potentially a useful one.
§ 84 ASEM now has 48 members but still operates via largely un-
chartered procedures. The ties among members are becoming danger-
ously loose, and there is an increasing risk that ASEM will lose track of
the activities conducted under its label. As mentioned earlier, an out-
look seminar was devoted specifically to the subject in April 2010. As a
consequence, a majority of ASEM members have become convinced
that something had to be done. Yet the fear of creeping institutionalisa-
tion is equally strong. The result is a simple but unambiguous request
for senior officials to come up with proposals for adoption at the next
meeting of the foreign ministers in 2011. One proposal, namely to have
the next summit host become part of the coordination mechanism,
was agreed.
Conclusion
The negotiation history of ASEM 8 testifies to a smooth and orderly
process. This process started well on time, i.e. a year before the sched-
uled date of the summit. It gave due consideration to the result of the
preceding summit. It took care to collect first the views and opinions of
the ASEM members. And it showed throughout that the summit
belonged to them collectively and not to any one of the members in par-
ticular, least of all the summit host. This cultivated a sense of owner-
ship that became evident in the closing negotiations on the eve of
ASEM 8. There was enough in the final proposals for each participant
to agree on the ultimate contributions that eventually assured the over-
all successful outcome.
In fact, the preparations of the summit followed a number of useful
principles.
One was the adoption of a transparent method. The rules and prac-
tices of ASEM were rigorously followed, in particular the requirement
of a consensus-based framework associating participants of equal sover-
eignty and importance. Each member had been individually consulted
and had equal opportunity to participate. Every information, proposal,
suggestion had been shared with every participant at the same time and
in advance of decision-making moments. The coordinators had been
duly respected in their roles. Transparency had at all times been
ensured, not the least through the practice of debriefings and of ‘open’
coordinators’ meetings.
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Another principle was predictability. Care was taken to clarify in ad-
vance how the host of the summit would proceed, what the next step
would be or what deadlines would be observed. Even more, before these
were defined, an opportunity was created for ASEM members to com-
ment on and steer the procedure. This ensured that the steps taken
were perceived as resulting from a concerted approach defined collec-
tively rather than as unilateral decisions taken by the summit host.
A third important principle related to the even-handed consideration
of all suggestions, amendments and proposals made by partners. When
drafting papers and draft texts, a sincere and genuine effort was made
to integrate all the priorities and sensitivities as expressed by each and
every partner. When the judgement made at the moment of drafting
proved to be imperfect, it was corrected in the following version. This
was the advantage of the layered approach. Moving from a non-paper to
an annotated agenda and then from an initial draft text to a fourth ver-
sion of it allowed ASEM members to close in gradually on the right
subjects, tones and messages.
Finally, the negotiation process had been constructed so as to pre-
figure the dialogue that the heads of state and government would have
on the day of the summit. Thus, it was considered paramount that, in
the course of the preparations, delegations would have opportunities to
meet and confront their ideas and opinions. Out of the exchange, parti-
cipants could figure out where the other delegations stood on a particu-
lar issue and, as a consequence, would realise the kind of negotiation
that would become necessary in order to arrive at agreed texts. This en-
couraged a cooperative attitude as well as an understanding of the chal-
lenge faced by the summit host in steering the negotiation process to a
successful end.
* The opinions expressed in this article are the personal considerations of the author
and do not reflect official policy of the Belgian Government nor can they be attributed
to it.
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3 ASEM 8: The Narrative
Paul Lambert*
ASEM summits do not stand on their own. Though the meeting of the
heads of state and government at the Royal Palace in Brussels in early
October 2010 was the main event, ASEM 8 also provided the stage for
three further constituent parts of the ASEM ‘family’. An ASEM parlia-
mentary forum (the Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership, ASEP), an
ASEM People’s Forum (AEPF) and an ASEM Business Forum (AEBF)
were held in parallel to the gathering of the leaders. In addition, the
Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) – ASEM’s only permanent institution –
organised a Connecting Civil Societies Conference including an editors’
round table on the margins of the summit. Finally, the Centre for Fine
Arts (BOZAR) set up an art exhibition in conjunction with the ASEM
summit. This chapter chronologically recounts the events that took
place before, during and immediately after the actual summit. Taken to-
gether, they shaped the Brussels message and the narrative of ASEM 8.
The Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership
Within ASEM, the Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership (ASEP) plays
an important role in promoting mutual understanding among the peo-
ple and countries of Asia and Europe. It adds parliamentary diplomacy
to an ASEM process otherwise dominated by intergovernmental meet-
ings. Like the summit, it now meets every two years. As one of its ob-
jectives is to influence the agenda of ASEM leaders, it usually convenes
shortly before in the capital where the summit is hosted. Former ASEP
meetings were held in a good and constructive spirit and always had a
significant turnout.
The sixth Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership (ASEP6) took place
in the Belgian federal parliament on 26-28 September 2010, just a week
ahead of the summit. This allowed ASEP6 recommendations to be fed
into the summit proceedings in a timely fashion. The approximately
120 participants included national as well as European parliamentar-
ians, guests and observers.1 Myanmar, which did not have an estab-
lished parliament at the time, was not present. Following the November
2010 elections, one might see a parliamentary delegation from Myan-
mar taking part in ASEP7.
Steven Vanackere, Belgium’s deputy prime minister and minister of
foreign affairs, and Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European
Council, delivered keynote speeches as host and chair of ASEM 8, re-
spectively.2 The former stressed that parliamentarians, elected by the
people, contribute to shaping perceptions and enjoy natural attention
and visibility. The latter set high hopes for establishing a shared sense
of direction, creating synergies between the different actors in ASEM,
maintaining reciprocity and striving for mutual benefits.
The conference adopted a final declaration, which espouses the struc-
ture of the prepared agenda of ASEM 8.3 ASEP6 first debated on how
to improve the effectiveness of global financial and economic govern-
ance structures. It then tackled the issues of sustainable development
efforts (social progress, economic development and environmental pro-
tection), piracy at sea, and people-to-people relations (in particular, edu-
cation and interreligious dialogue).
The Asia-Europe People’s Forum
The Asia-Europe People’s Forum (AEPF) constitutes the people’s
equivalent of the meeting of the heads of state and government of the
ASEM partners. Over the years, the AEPF had striven to gain more of
an equal footing with the Business Forum. At AEPF 8, special attention
was given to ensure sufficient ‘linkage’ with the actual summit. The
host country Belgium also provided substantial financial support. The
forum kicked off on 1 October 2010 with a trade union’s day, a first
within the AEPF’s history. It was organised with the participation of the
European and International Trade Union Confederations ETUC and
ITUC and counted about 90 participants, of which 30 were Asian and
60 European (half of which were Belgian).
In his keynote speech,4 Vanackere stressed the importance of solid
non-governmental structures, like in Belgium, with its strong trade un-
ion tradition. Complimenting the organisers, the minister said that
among the various parallel dialogues taking place on the occasion of the
ASEM summit, the gathering of trade union representatives was one of
the more focused, more structured and more relevant ones. In their
statement,5 trade unions called upon leaders to commit themselves to
involve the social partners in the planning, execution and evaluation of
ASEM cooperation projects and in the establishment of an Asia-Europe
Labour Forum that could provide an institutional presence in ASEM for
the representatives of ASEM’s working people. The statement was di-
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rected at ASEM 8 as well as at the third ASEM labour and employment
ministers’ meeting in Leiden, the Netherlands, in December 2010.
Up to the fifth of October, other events took place that were managed
by the international organising committee (IOC) of the AEPF6. The IOC
included three organisations on the European side – led by the Transna-
tional Institute (TNI) in Amsterdam – and three organisations on the
Asian side – led by the Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD) in the
Philippines. In order to help the IOC organise the AEPF 8 in Brussels
as well as to assure a clear link with the ASEM 8 host country, a Belgian
national organising committee (NOC) was set up. The umbrella organi-
sation, Centre National pour la Coopération au Développement (a Bel-
gian francophone NGO), with the support of the 11.11.11. Noord-Zuid
Beweging (its Flemish counterpart), took on the leading role, while the
Belgian trade unions acted as co-chairs. This synergy between NGOs
and trade unions has its origin, at least in Belgium, in the existence of
an earlier coalition for ‘decent work’ which was to become a major
theme during the People’s Forum. The close cooperation between
NGOs and trade unions was further driven by the prospect of the
upcoming third ASEM labour and employment ministers’ meeting.
The People’s Forum focused on four major themes treated in parallel
workshops: (1) trade and development (the Millenium Development
Goals), (2) decent work – decent life for all (the International Labour
Organisation Jobs Pact), (3) food sovereignty (agriculture and regional
markets), and (4) climate change. ‘Open spaces’ were held where ana-
lysts and commentators from around the world – 500 participants in
all, with about 170 Asian participants – discussed various topics related
to the ongoing economic and financial crisis and suggested alternatives
to existing development models. The large number of stakeholders, all
wanting their particular point to be reflected, did to some extent affect
the overall legibility and structure of the consensual declaration.
Well tuned to the prepared agenda of the summit (e.g. the discussion
at the first plenary of the impact of the crisis on Asia and Europe),
AEPF 8 reached out to political leaders, inviting them for debate and
dialogue sessions. To highlight the link between the People’s Forum
and ASEM 8, Belgium’s prime minister, Yves Leterme, participated in
one debate. He did not deliver a speech but instead engaged with the
plenary, giving his views on the various themes of the parallel work-
shops.7 For his consideration and that of ASEM 8 leaders, he was
handed the declaration of the People’s Forum, which broadly covers
sustainable solutions to the economic and financial crisis, support for a
just trade and investment system, the accountability of corporations to
citizens, the protection of the right to food and water, climate justice
and decent work.8
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Asia-Europe Foundation events
The Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) organised a threefold series of
events consisting of an ASEM outlook workshop, a conference with civil
societies and an editor’s roundtable, to which Belgium contributed
financially. While the outlook workshop was held half a year prior to
the summit (see Vandenkendelaere in this volume), the two other ASEF
events took place on the margins of the summit. All were held in Brus-
sels.
The fourth Connecting Civil Societies Conference (CCS4)9 took place
on 2-3 October and was co-organised by ASEF and its partners in the
Europe-Asia Policy Forum (‘EU for Asia’)10. The conference tackled
questions such as: ‘What should ASEM’s priorities be for the next two
years?’ and ‘What are the most pressing concerns shared by govern-
ments and civil societies in Asia and Europe, especially those that could
benefit from concerted policy attention and sustained ground action
from citizens?’ Participants took stock of and analysed some of the cur-
rent trends and issues that define the Asia-Europe dialogue to date.
They identified the most constructive areas for civil society cooperation
and forecast emerging issues that could have an impact on future
ASEM dialogue and directions. Held at Square, the Brussels meeting
centre, the two-day conference facilitated seven concurrent thematic
workshops and one panel discussion entitled ‘Views from the ASEM
Community’. The closed-door workshops and the panel were framed
with an opening and a closing plenary featuring keynote addresses, one
of which was by Vanackere.
CCS4 succeeded in its two main objectives. The first was to articulate
recommendations and messages from the ASEM community with a
view to bringing them to the attention of ASEM summit leaders. The
other was to attract attention from the media and the public for the day-
to-day work accomplished under ASEM and for the ASEM summit in
general. The conference also served as a platform for the 150 members
of civil society who regularly cooperate with ASEF. CCS4 furthermore
delivered a focused report.
In addition, ASEF organised the fifth Asia-Europe editors’ roundtable
on 3 October in partnership with Chatham House and with the support
of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.11 The ‘Roundtable Asia and
Europe: Engaging for a Post-Crisis World’ brought together 17 eminent
editors and senior journalists from Asia and Europe in a focused dis-
cussion. The subject was international mechanisms and institutions
and how to evolve towards more credible and effective global govern-
ance. Participants reflected on the lessons from the euro zone crisis for
Asia and Europe, as well as on areas for more Asia-Europe cooperation
aimed at the long-term stability of the international financial architec-
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ture. With its proceedings finding their way into the national and inter-
national media, it presented yet another occasion to familiarise the
wider public with the themes and issues figuring on the agenda of
ASEM leaders. Vanackere took an active part in the roundtable. He
departed from his prepared speech, engaging on a personal basis with
the editors, journalists and other participants from the media.12 He ob-
served that since the value of declarations and decisions depended on
their implementation, there was a role for the press to monitor and en-
sure day-to-day accountability. In another observation, he expressed the
hope that one day an ASEM summit would clearly state that human
rights do matter, first and foremost on economic grounds.
The Asia-Europe Business Forum
The Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF) brings together business lead-
ers who share the goal of strengthening trade and investment relations
between Asia and Europe. An annual event in the early years, the AEBF
now traditionally convenes in parallel with the ASEM summit. It is first
and foremost a business-driven event with a leading role for employers’
organisations. The AEBF develops recommendations addressed to
Asian and European leaders and aims to enhance economic cooperation
between the two continents based on the experience and knowledge of
their business leaders.
The twelfth AEBF dealt with the overarching theme of ‘Financial Ser-
vices Industry: Opportunities and Challenges for Asia and Europe’ and
was organised by the Federation of Belgian Enterprises with the support
of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.13 A committee of business-
people and civil servants had carefully defined the theme. This was to
recognise the role the financial sector plays in the restoration of credit
and investment flows between the two regions and in the financing of
innovative products and services. The level of financial integration be-
tween Europe and Asia is relatively low. The core objective was there-
fore to encourage the intensification of economic and financial connec-
tions.
The opening of AEBF 12 was attended by Prince Philip of Belgium.
Lim Hwee Hua, Singapore’s Minister of Finance and Manpower, ad-
dressed the Business Forum at the opening session. In his speech,
Vanackere stressed the need for improving the financial linkages be-
tween Asia and Europe.14 Thereafter, two plenary sessions were held,
one on restoring financial stability and another entitled ‘Towards an In-
tegrated Market for Financial Services’. The afternoon session consisted
of a well-considered mix of testimonies on the growing role of Asia on
the world financial stage, keynote speeches (e.g. on the importance of
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an efficient capital market from a user’s perspective) and three parallel
breakout sessions.
Virtually all ASEM partners were represented by financial business
leaders (bankers, insurers, fund managers, brokers and consultants) to-
talling 185 delegates participating in the plenary and breakout sessions.
It made AEBF12 an open, creative and network-oriented forum for ex-
pression and debate on the margins of ASEM 8. It proved innovative as
well: both the thematic approach and the targeted invitation – three per
country at the CEO level – were widely appreciated by the participants.
In closing its deliberations, AEBF12 issued a chairman’s statement with
specific recommendations relating to the future of the financial markets
and general recommendations addressing issues connected to the qual-
ity of the business environment.
In addition to AEBF12, a number of business leaders were offered
the opportunity to discuss the forum’s final recommendations with
ASEM 8 leaders. This took place over a breakfast meeting at the Royal
Palace in the early morning of 5 October 2010. It was a first in the his-
tory of ASEM, inspired by a formula used before in the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation forum.15 The purpose was to stimulate an ex-
change of views on Asia-Europe economic and financial cooperation. A
discussion paper had been distributed in advance as food for thought.
The physical setup consisted of six different breakfast lounges with
up to 12 participants each, composed in such a way as to achieve a ba-
lanced composition of political and business leaders from Asia and Eur-
ope as well as from the new ASEM partners16, inspired by a ‘3/3/3/3
formula’. Discussions focused on the financial and economic crisis, ac-
cess to finance, (new) banking regulations, currency matters (including
the feasibility and desirability of a single Asian currency), free trade, cli-
mate change and small and medium-sized enterprises.
The formula worked well. It lent political support for closer interac-
tion between the business worlds of Asia and Europe. Participants felt
it would promote business-friendly policies and generate positive spin-
offs on trade and investment flows between the two regions, in particu-
lar in the financial sector.
ASEM 8 – the Brussels summit
Since the inception of the ASEM process in 1996, Asia and Europe
have stuck to their schedule of meeting every other year with remark-
able regularity. The summit provided the opportunity to give expression
to Asian and European views with regard to world developments.17 The
main themes were the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis
and the promotion of more sustainable forms of development. These to-
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pical choices took into account the context of the international agenda
in the fall of 2010. A month after ASEM 8, in November 2010, a G20
meeting was to be held in the Republic of Korea, a non-G8 country, to
shape the required policies in the face of the financial and economic
crisis. In December 2010, the 16th Conference of the Parties of the Cli-
mate Change Convention in Cancun, Mexico, was to build further on
the Copenhagen Summit of December 2009.
ASEM is first and foremost a forum for developing direct and perso-
nal contacts among Asian and European leaders. Hence, host country
Belgium facilitated the holding of bilateral meetings by providing an
appropriate setting for discussions, both within the Royal Palace and
outside it. Most of the meetings were held on the morning of Monday,
4 October 2010, prior to the opening of ASEM 8, in the classic rooms
of the Royal Palace. Van Rompuy, President of the European Council
and Chair of ASEM 8, was kept very busy that morning. For many par-
ticipants, meeting him was the highlight of their summit participation.
Meanwhile, outside the Palace, the new comprehensive EU-Vietnam
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was being signed. Dur-
ing the summit, leaders used the various coffee breaks for further per-
sonal contacts. Chance meetings happened, as between Japanese Prime
Minister Naoto Kan and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao which was widely
publicised. Premier Wen Jiabao also met with the euro zone troika con-
sisting of EU Commissioner Olli Rehn, European Central Bank Presi-
dent Jean-Claude Trichet and President of the eurogroup Jean-Claude
Juncker. They addressed exchange-rate issues. ASEM 8 thus allowed
Asian and European leaders to catch up with each other directly, in real
time, outside of the organised discussions. The Belgian art de vivre at
lunch and dinner seemed to have operated as a natural encouragement
as well.
King Albert II of Belgium, Van Rompuy, Leterme and the President
of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso welcomed leaders
in the Royal Palace in downtown Brussels, which was perceived as a
most fitting and prestigious venue for an ASEM gathering.18
The general level of representation was very high. On the Asian side,
the Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, the Korean president Lee Myung-Bak,
the Japanese prime minister Naoto Kan and virtually all ASEAN leaders
took part. On the European side, participating leaders included French
president Nicolas Sarkozy, German chancellor Angela Merkel, the Brit-
ish deputy prime minister Nick Clegg and the Spanish prime minister
José Luis Zapatero. The Secretary-General of the ASEAN Secretariat,
Surin Pitsuwan, and José Manuel Barroso were also present. Of all
Asian participants, 12 out of 17 were represented at the head of state or
government or at the vice-prime minister level. For the European side,
the corresponding figure is 24 out of 28 participants. The attendance at
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less than head-of-state level by two of the acceding new members was
seen by many ASEM partners as a disappointment.19
In order to run ASEM smoothly, speaking arrangements were worked
out, with the host country Belgium, in cooperation with all ASEM part-
ners, striving to strike a balance between organised interventions and
spontaneity.
This was for the most part achieved by conceptually dividing each
session into two parts: a first part where leaders would take the floor on
the basis of pre-registrations and a second part reserved for free flow
discussion managed by the chairperson. Each leader received one pre-
registered speaking opportunity and the possibility to intervene in the
free flow discussions. To ensure time would be left for the latter, allo-
cated speaking time was strictly limited to five minutes. The eventual
number and sequence of speakers did, of course, depend on the disci-
pline in the length of the interventions and on the management by the
chair. The latter used its privilege to determine the exact sequence in
order to stimulate a high degree of interaction between Asian and Eur-
opean leaders and to ensure the dynamism of the discussion. A similar
contribution to fruitful discussions was the remarkable discipline of
ASEM leaders to confine their comments to the topic being dealt with
at a particular session. The brevity of the interventions also helped con-
siderably in sustaining the dynamism of the discussion.
The ASEM 8 Brussels summit kicked off with a business-like open-
ing ceremony on Monday, 4 October 2010 at 4:15pm, in the spacious
Salle du Trône, the main venue for heads of state and government. Un-
der the overarching theme of ‘Greater well-being and more dignity for
all citizens’, in short, ‘quality of life’, Chairman Herman Van Rompuy
opened ASEM 8 by thanking host country Belgium and by welcoming
Russia, Australia and New Zealand who had joined ASEM as of that
day. In his speech, Wen Jiabao referred to the full-blown international
financial crisis at the time of ASEM7 in Beijing in October 2008. Leter-
mere remarked on the very peculiar situation of ASEM 8 not being
faced with some urgent or dramatic emergency. He deemed it, however,
well-placed to look at policies over the medium and longer term.
In the process of setting the agenda for ASEM 8 (see chapter 2), it
soon became clear that the discussion on financial and economic gov-
ernance and the issue of moving towards more effective global financial
and economic governance were of the greatest interest to all. Hence,
the governance issue topped the agenda and was attributed the largest
time span, having both the first session and the working dinner dedi-
cated to it. This proved an inspired move, for session 1 ran out of time
and lively discussions continued over dinner.
The challenge posed by the first topic was to address the prolonged
uncertainties of an unstable recovery and to define the structural re-
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sponses likely to prevent a repetition of the financial onslaught. ASEM
8 displayed its resolve to pursue reforms to financial regulation and
supervision. In addition, signals were sent on the modernisation of the
international financial institutions, taking account of the needs of
today’s world economy and of the shifts that have taken place as a result
of the strong growth in dynamic emerging markets and in developing
economies. On this topic, the Belgian prime minister stated in his
opening intervention that leadership in international financial institu-
tions implied open markets, a secure investment climate, the rule of
law and convertible currencies exchange rates determined by market
forces. The discussions among leaders on the role of the G20 in global
financial and economic governance became heated when one European
leader called the G20 a ‘serious threat to democracy’, pointing out that
of the 48 ASEM partners, only 12 are G20 members.
The second day of the summit started for the heads of delegation
with the breakfast meeting with business leaders, as mentioned earlier.
Session 2 then dealt with the progress made on the path of sustainable
development, following up on the Beijing declaration on sustainable
development. ASEM partners agreed on concrete actions that clearly ex-
pressed their resolve, such as tackling trade and investment barriers
that hamper the dissemination of innovative technologies. The demand
for transfers of environmentally friendly, resource-efficient and clean
technologies has increased dramatically in recent years. Since technolo-
gies spread through trade in goods and services and through invest-
ments, it made sense to focus on the obstacles to them. A discussion
was further held to ensure that regulatory policies are introduced in a
non-discriminatory, market-friendly way.
Referring to the importance of dialogue to reconcile trade liberalisa-
tion with the objectives of sustainable development, Leterme announced
that Belgium would host an informal meeting of senior officials re-
sponsible for trade and investment (SOMTI) in the spring of 2011. This
echoed the Asian side’s longstanding request for a resumption of the
meetings of the ASEM ministers for economy and trade. Apart from
that, the Lithuanian prime minister, host of the first ASEM ministerial
meeting on transportation, addressed a very concrete issue. He re-
minded those present of the desirability of filling in missing train links,
which could greatly reduce the time needed to transport goods between
Europe and Asia (from the actual 45 to 12 days).
During session 3, ASEM leaders worked on developing strong mes-
sages reflecting their common determination on a number of global is-
sues, including the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the
elimination of acts of piracy at sea, and the reversal of the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery systems. At this
session, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stressed that
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with the accession of his country, a land connection was finally estab-
lished between Europe and Asia. He underlined Russia’s wish to coop-
erate constructively in ASEM in areas such as non-proliferation, disaster
response, interfaith dialogue, non-proliferation, combating terrorism
and the fight against modern forms of piracy.
Over lunch, views were exchanged on the regional cooperation mech-
anisms and integration efforts that take place in the respective parts of
the Eurasian continent. Generally, the discussion served to reaffirm
each other’s objectives of fostering stability and raising prosperity
through regional cooperation. On political developments and security
issues such as Iran, Afghanistan, North Korea and Myanmar, as well as
the peace process in the Middle East, there was a frank and direct dialo-
gue designed to improve the understanding of the different positions
held by ASEM partners. On Myanmar, sharp interventions addressed
perceived shortcomings in the election preparations to which the Myan-
mar minister of foreign affairs responded. In an engaging intervention,
the Mongolian president referred to the evolution from communism to
democracy in his country and underlined that a similar evolution would
be desirable in Myanmar. Based on these various interventions, ASEM
partners adopted constructive conclusions, opening the way for new
developments on the ground and meeting the wider objectives of ensur-
ing lasting peace and stability.
The last session, under the heading ‘People-to-People, Visibility and
Future of ASEM’ presented an opportunity to further develop exchanges
among European and Asian civil society representatives and leaders.
Leterme introduced the theme, advocating a further deepening of coop-
eration within ASEM, in particular through education and training. He
emphasised the value of joint programmes such as DUO Exchange or
Erasmus Mundus that arrange for the exchange of hundreds, some-
times thousands, of students. To promote Asian languages and raise
the interest of studying in Asia, Leterme commended encouraging the
teaching of Asian languages in Europe at an earlier age, including travel
incentives and follow-up curricula in Asia. ASEM partners proposed to
focus on youth and therefore on educational exchanges. They also reit-
erated the importance they attach to the continuation of interreligious
and interfaith dialogue. In the course of their agenda, ASEM leaders ex-
amined the recommendations and suggestions issuing from the delib-
erations of the three parallel dialogues (Parliamentary Partnership, Peo-
ple’s Forum and Business Forum). This had never been done before. It
ultimately resulted in the tasking of senior officials to take the various
recommendations into consideration and, where relevant, to make sug-
gestions for appropriate action. It is interesting to note how the recom-
mendations of the parallel dialogues espoused the same themes as
those identified by the leaders as most relevant.
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In his final remarks at the closing ceremony, Van Rompuy presented
the agreed chair’s statement and the Brussels declaration entitled ‘To-
wards more effective global economic governance’. Both were adopted
by consensus and presented at the concluding coordinators’ press con-
ference by Leterme. The chair, the four ASEM coordinators and Laos as
the host of ASEM 9 delivered final remarks.
Centre for Fine Arts event
A further event scheduled for the summit was a special exhibition in
conjunction with ASEM 8 at the Centre for Fine Arts (BOZAR) in Brus-
sels called ‘A Passage to Asia, 25 Centuries of Exchange between Asia
and Europe’.20 The exhibition was set up in cooperation with the Asian
members of ASEM as an illustration of 25 centuries of interaction
between Asia and Europe, bringing some of the best of Asian culture to
the heart of Europe. Considering the spirit of joint undertaking that lay
at the basis of the initiative, it truly turned out to be the cultural equiva-
lent of the political Asia-Europe summit. Immediately after the ASEM 8
press conference, the heads of state and government and their partners
were offered the possibility of an exclusive visit to the exhibition hosted
by Prince Philippe and Princess Mathilde, Dukes of Brabant. Van Rom-
puy and Vanackere were also present.
Conclusion
The intense, inclusive and transparent preparations to the ASEM 8
summit, both in substance and form, helped to bring about a successful
event. With the Lisbon Treaty entering into force on 1 December 2009,
host country Belgium fully took into account the new European institu-
tions, which from the very onset expressed their full confidence in the
Belgian approach. On the Asian side, after some initial concerns, the
new reality was soon considered part of the evolving ASEM practice, by
no means affecting the quality and intensity of the multilateral dialogue
between Asian and European national leaders (see also chapter 12).
Some introductory interventions were felt to be rather formal, as is of-
ten the case with such meetings. Yet, in general, the debates were quite
spontaneous and interactive, leading participants to comment that
ASEM 8 turned out to be one of the best summits in the cooperation fra-
mework’s 14 years of history. Hence, the feeling is that the summit has
genuinely contributed to the preparation of the ensuing events on the in-
ternational agenda, in particular the G20 meeting in Seoul and the cli-
mate negotiations in Cancun, allowing for an improved understanding
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of each other’s perceptions and views. Last but not least, the intensity
and quality of the parallel dialogues helped to shape the summit’s out-
come and to bring the Asian and European people closer together.
* The opinions expressed in this article are the personal considerations of the author and
do not reflect official policy of the Belgian government nor can they be attributed to it.
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4 ASEM Working Methods Reform:
An Identity Issue
Tom Vandenkendelaere*
Since 1996, ASEM has constituted a unique framework for dialogue
and cooperation between Europe and Asia. Biennial summits of heads
of state and government, annual ministerial meetings and even more
frequent meetings at the level of senior officials provide a regular set-
ting for political dialogue.1 ASEM’s strength is its composition: 27 Eur-
opean Union (EU) member states, 16 Asian partners (of which 10 are
members of ASEAN), three members of the so-called third temporary
category (Australia, New Zealand and the Russian Federation), the Eur-
opean Commission (EC) and the ASEAN Secretariat.
Despite occasional ups and downs, the framework has remained re-
markably ‘open and evolutionary’ in accordance with the pledge made
during the first ASEM summit in Bangkok (Chair Statement of the
First Asia-Europe Summit Meeting, Bangkok, 1996: V, § 18). The ASEM
process is considered to be ‘an informal and non-binding dialogue and
multidimensional partnership based on equality and consensus’ (Idris
2010). These characteristics are part and parcel of the framework’s par-
ticular identity, which distinguishes it from other, more formal fora for
international dialogue. The informality appears to be a key aspect of the
dialogue between Asian and European countries, a dialogue that not
only addresses economic matters but also political and socio-cultural is-
sues (in contrast to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, for
example).
That being said, despite the deliberate informal character of ASEM, a
degree of formalisation and bureaucracy has crept into the ASEM pro-
cess over the last fifteen years (Keva/Gaens 2008: 115). The numerous
chairman’s statements, declarations and meeting conclusions that have
been adopted bear testimony to this.
ASEM’s working methods can be defined as the mechanisms used
by partners when pursuing their informal cooperation. They include
not only the functioning of the networks of ASEM coordinators, senior
officials and contact points, but also how they go about their work pro-
gramme, the many ASEM initiatives, the communication among mem-
bers and the negotiation processes. Throughout the years, and taking
into account the minimal degree of formalisation, questions have arisen
as to how these working methods could be improved. Attempts to an-
swer them have produced some particularly difficult exchanges, which
all seemed to have revolved around one issue: that of ASEM’s identity.
At least two views on ASEM’s identity exist among ASEM partners.
Some fear that changes in the working methods would engender a for-
malisation and institutionalisation of the existing mechanisms and
would have the effect of stifling cooperation. These ‘minimalist’ coun-
tries consider that dialogue and loose cooperation are added values in
themselves.
Another group of countries believes that, on the contrary, developing
the working methods would lead to increased efficiency of the coopera-
tion framework. In particular, considering the recently enlarged ASEM
membership, there is an urgent need for better procedures in order to
prevent ASEM from succumbing to its size, losing its coherence and
even losing track of the activities conducted in its name. For some
‘maximalist’ countries, concrete results should even be pursued in the
form of binding commitments. In addition, it is argued that increased
rigour would produce positive side results in terms of the global visibi-
lity of ASEM.
Indeed, and this is a view shared by most ASEM partners, ASEM’s
visibility has been below expectations so far, especially in comparison
with the magnitude of its potential (see also Bersick and Bauer in this
volume). Several authors have put forward suggestions to overcome
ASEM’s lack of international visibility, though mostly without success
(see e.g. Gaens 2006: 131; Yeo 2006: 150-1). There were pleas for a
more structured approach to the ASEM agenda and activities, which
would allow for a more user-friendly display of the outcomes and
achievements of the ASEM dialogue. But these pleas have so far been
unanswered.
The discussion between advocates and opponents of more stringent
procedures continues to this day. This article analyses the key elements
of the working methods, focusing on the following issues: 1) coordina-
tion and decision-making, 2) management of ASEM initiatives, includ-
ing the ‘Issue-Based Leadership’ mechanism, and 3) the secretariat issue.
The relevance of ASEM working methods
Ever since the beginning, ASEM’s working methods have been a point
of contention. Many spare no criticism for the lack of a structured ap-
proach and the consequent absence of deliverables coming out of the
meetings (Gaens 2006: 134-5; Yeo 2006: 150-1). Others, in the past no-
tably the EC, fought fiercely to maintain the informality of the ASEM
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process (Keva/Gaens 2008: 126-7). In essence, ASEM has been en-
dowed with a relatively simple institutional spine which ensures mini-
mal coordination of cooperation activities (Gaens 2006; Keva/Gaens
2008; Yeo 2006).
The core of ASEM working methods is made of the senior officials
and of ASEM contact points of the ASEM members.2 They operate in
coordinators’ meetings (bringing together two Asian and two European
coordinators, either in an ‘open format’ allowing all other ASEM mem-
bers to attend as observers or behind closed doors) and in plenary
senior officials’ meetings (gathering all ASEM senior officials). Plenary
senior officials’ meetings are traditionally preceded by regional prepara-
tory gatherings in different configurations. At first, the European group
and the Asian group meet separately, the latter being itself a combina-
tion of internal consultations within the ASEAN subgroup and the non-
ASEAN subgroup (the North-East South Asia group, or NESA). Plenary
senior officials’ meetings are prepared by the coordinators who agree
on the time and place, draft an initial agenda and also co-chair the
meeting. In practice, plenary senior officials’ meetings provide the
essence of the stimulus to the ASEM process, for they can decide by
consensus on the follow-up to be given to summit and ministerial meet-
ings and on the preparations to be agreed for a forthcoming summit or
ministerial meeting. In the Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework
(AECF) (AECF2000: V22-23), the function of the senior officials had
been left largely open. It has developed over time, and incremental
changes in their role have only rarely been called into question (see e.g.
Helsinki Declaration on the Future of ASEM & Annex on ASEM Work-
ing Methods and Institutional Mechanisms, 2006: Annex, II, 1-2).
ASEM senior officials’ meetings essentially ensure the development
of ASEM-specific initiatives. The AECF defines ASEM initiatives as
events or projects, in effect seminars, conferences, meetings or some-
times even more permanent forms of cooperation that shall ‘contribute
to advance the overall objectives and perspectives of the ASEM Process’
while ‘clearly stat[ing] [their] goals, prime actors, […]’ (AECF2000: V25-
27). Initiatives are thus intended as the practical backbone of the dialo-
gue to which ASEM aspires in three specified key areas: the political,
the economic and the socio-cultural. Initiatives have a twofold role.
They are meant to implement or follow up political resolutions taken at
the summit or ministerial level. At times, they feed back into the politi-
cal process and produce recommendations for higher-level political
decision-making.
The amount and variety of initiatives are generally taken to reflect the
dynamism of ASEM members and are therefore considered a positive
thing. The ASEM work programme agreed at the Beijing ASEM 7 sum-
mit, for example, produced an impressive array of initiatives: fostering
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interfaith dialogue, improving energy security, promoting tourism,
empowering local communities through the use of information and
communication technologies, introducing new demining technologies,
and increasing human security, to name but a few (Chair Statement of
the Seventh Asia-Europe Meeting, Beijing 2008: Annex II). However, as
Keva and Gaens point out, the ‘effectiveness, evaluation and follow-up
of all these initiatives have been the focus of debate throughout the pro-
cess’ (2008: 116). The key criticism is aimed at the fact that few records
are kept on how the initiatives came about, what substance they pro-
duced, what attendance they mustered, what conclusions – if any – they
marked up, and what follow-up was given in the end. Over time, it is
being said, the memory of the work that was delivered tends to fade
away. Hence, later initiatives with a comparable purview are sometimes
launched without taking precedents properly into account.
An attempt to tackle this problem was undertaken at the Helsinki
ASEM6 summit by introducing the ‘Issue-Based Leadership Concept’
(Helsinki Declaration on the Future of ASEM & Annex on ASEM Work-
ing Methods and Institutional Mechanisms, 2006: Annex, I, 2). The
concept was intended to bring more focus and coherence to ASEM in-
itiatives by defining in advance a number of clusters of areas of coop-
eration. The concept foresaw that interested ASEM partners would re-
group and take the lead on a specified theme: ‘from summit to sum-
mit’. They would take it to heart to implement a coherent programme
of seminars, events or other specified projects to carry the theme for-
ward. Those partners would then report back to the summit or to the
senior officials’ meeting on the results. Thus, ASEM initiatives would
be captured in a more systematic approach, allowing a more efficient
observation – and possibly evaluation – of the progress accomplished.
In the first year after the Helsinki summit, clusters of issues were
identified and later underwritten by a number of ASEM countries. They
included: the strengthening of multilateralism in addressing global
threats of common concern; integrating globalisation, competitiveness
and structural changes in the global economy, including labour issues,
education and human resource development; promoting health, science
and technology, including information and communication technolo-
gies; promoting sustainable development with a special focus on the
Millennium Development Goals, fighting climate change, protecting
the environment, clean energy; and finally engaging in intercultural and
interfaith dialogue (Keva/Gaens 2008: 119).
The effort was commendable, but doubts keep lingering about the
actual value of the ‘Issue-Based Leadership’ concept. The level of com-
mitment on the part of ASEM members has remained low. The clusters
of topics have appeared rather artificial, though most of the projects
were duly carried out. In this regard, lack of implementation was not
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the issue. Rather, the projects simply followed their individual logic,
visibly disconnected from the theme to which they allegedly belonged
and with little involvement of the other ASEM partners associated in
the cluster. Furthermore, the same weaknesses as with individual initia-
tives could be observed: little information was shared between ASEM
members, and hardly any follow-up was ensured.
Hence, the idea of setting up an ASEM secretariat continued to be
promoted. The arguments in favour of a secretariat are that it would
help keep records, create templates, streamline procedures, facilitate
communication, foster transparency, and thus would provide institu-
tional memory and ensure that every next step would take into account
what had been done or attempted before. Similar functions were
already performed by the ASEM Research Platform (ARP) initiated by
the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS). It operated from
2004 to 2006 and consisted of an archive of official ASEM documents,
a virtual library containing all articles and books written on ASEM, an
agenda of all ASEM events and a virtual discussion room for those
interested in ASEM affairs (Van der Velde/Stokhof 2002). The ARP
eventually served as the basis of the ASEM Infoboard launched in 2006
by ASEF.
Actually, the issue of an ASEM secretariat had been on the table al-
most since the very start of the ASEM process. In 1999, the Asia-Europe
Vision Group (AEVG) suggested that a small secretariat be created to
form a structural coordination mechanism. The AEVG’s proposal of
greater institutionalisation was later supported by the European Parlia-
ment’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy.
Such a secretariat would ensure that notably the EU member states
would not lose interest in ASEM. It would also allow the dialogue and
cooperation framework to achieve more concrete results (Keva/Gaens
2008: 126). At the time, the reticence of the European Commission and
a few Asian countries vis-à-vis such a secretariat constituted an obstacle.
There existed a fear of losing the flexibility that goes with informality
(Keva/Gaens 2008: 126). The positions of the different countries thus
reflected the aforementioned difference in views between ‘maximalists’
and ‘minimalists’ (Yeo 2006: 149).
Attempts to trigger the creation of a secretarial mechanism were
nevertheless undertaken. The Hanoi 2004 summit tasked the ‘Foreign
Ministers and Senior Officials to study and submit their recommenda-
tions on the continued improvement of ASEM institutional mechan-
isms, including the possibility of moving towards an ASEM Secretariat
at an appropriate time […]’ (Chair Statement of the ASEM 5, Hanoi
2004: § 6.3). This resulted in the launch of an ASEM Virtual Secretariat
(AVS) at the ensuing 2006 Helsinki summit. The AVS was intended to
‘function as ASEM’s coordination and information-sharing device, offer-
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ing technical assistance to the Coordinators’ (Helsinki Declaration on
the Future of ASEM & Annex on ASEM Working Methods and Institu-
tional Mechanisms, 2006: Annex, II, 3). It was to offer an intranet plat-
form for the posting of documents and invitations, including record-
keeping of agreed texts. Put simply, it was to function as a self-service
device for all ASEM members, dodging the need for recruiting or as-
signing personnel. As it turned out, however, the AVS was never put in
place. A feasibility study that was conducted never reached a conclu-
sion. Thus, the issue of whether a secretarial mechanism without a
guardian, like a ship without a captain, was a workable proposition at
all was left up in the air. In this context the staffing issue appears to be
a crucial one. It is related to the issue of ASEM funding, and it is a
known fact that ASEM members are unwilling, on a consensus basis,
to provide minimal funding for some kind of secretarial mechanism.
Against this background, the EC launched an initiative, which the
Hanoi 2009 foreign ministers’ meeting agreed to endorse. Its chair
statement welcomed ‘the proposal for an “ASEM 8 Coordinating Office”
as an ad-hoc one-year initiative to prepare, coordinate and support the
ASEM 8 Summit’ (Chair Statement of the Ninth ASEM Foreign Minis-
ters’ Meeting, Hanoi 2009: § 30). Up until ASEM 8 in Brussels, and
even some time beyond, the coordinating office had taken on a number
of secretariat functions, e.g. putting order into the ASEM archives, col-
lecting information about past and ongoing initiatives, developing tem-
plates, documenting practices of the last 14 years, setting up a model in-
tranet for use by ASEM members, etc. Two full-time staff members en-
sured the management and the functioning of the coordinating office.
The funding of the office was provided exclusively by the EC. Hence,
the survival of the coordinating office depended on the continuation of
EC funding. In addition, since it constituted a unilateral initiative, the
staff had no responsibility vis-à-vis the other ASEM members. It was
thus not answerable for the quality of its services to the whole of the
membership. The coordinating office was not ‘owned’ by the ASEM
community. Yet such ownership would appear to be a primary require-
ment for the credibility and the proper functioning of any secretarial
mechanism. Hence, discussions about ASEM’s working methods were
still going on when preparations for the Brussels summit of 2010 were
initiated. On the basis of consultations, the Belgian host of ASEM 8
sensed that there was a growing readiness on the part of ASEM mem-
bers to try to address some of ASEM’s recurrent weaknesses. The next
section explains how the ASEM working methods developed as a topic
for the agenda of ASEM 8. The analysis is based on the different nego-
tiation papers that were prepared in the run-up to the summit to which
the author had access.
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Reforming ASEM’s working methods
The working methods of ASEM were themselves the subject of discus-
sion. But a new factor intervened that would draw even more attention
to them. In May 2009, the ASEM foreign ministers’ meeting in Hanoi
decided to admit Russia and Australia as new members and tasked sen-
ior officials to define suitable modalities to make this happen by the
time of the Brussels summit. The modalities question arose because it
became clear that both countries could not be part of either of the two
geographical groups constituting ASEM: Europe and Asia. Not being
part of either geographical group, the two countries could also not take
part in the ASEM coordination mechanism. In this context, the argu-
ment was made that adaptations to ASEM’s working methods might be
desirable so as to address the issue of differential treatment that the
new members risked receiving.
On 6 October 2009, Belgium circulated a ‘non-paper’ designed to
consult the ASEM membership on the purpose and content of the up-
coming summit (see Annex 4). One of the proposals was to plan for a
discussion on the future of ASEM. Under this heading, the all-encom-
passing formula figured as follows: ‘issues relating to the functioning
of the dialogue may be discussed, including the general coordination of
the dialogue, the management of the ‘Issue Based Leadership’ and the
efficiency of the work achieved within ASEM, based on proposals to be
developed’ (ASEM 8 Non Paper, 2009).
After a first round of reactions and further consultations, the topic
was integrated into the follow-up paper – the ‘concept paper’ – issued
on 15 January 2010 (see Annex 5). At the time, the exact modalities for
the accession of Russia and Australia were still undecided. The ‘concept
paper’ argued that a discussion of the working methods would appear
logical, given that ‘with 45 members and still expanding, working meth-
ods matter more and more to preserve and further advance the ASEM
process and ensure its future’ (ASEM 8 Concept Paper, 2010). Adding
to this, ASEM members were reminded that every summit so far had
devoted a part of its discussions to the working methods and that, in
this regard, Brussels would not be different.
ASEM members confirmed that they agreed on the need to discuss
the working methods during the senior officials’ meeting in Madrid in
January 2010 and in their communication afterwards. The issue conse-
quently became part of the ‘annotated agenda’, which was circulated on
15 April 2010. The Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with
the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung,
then decided to devote the ASEM outlook seminar, a traditional pre-
summit event, specifically to ASEM’s working methods. Being one of
the first preparatory events, the workshop was seen as an excellent op-
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portunity to devise and test workable ideas. Belgium prepared a paper
with an array of suggestions. These included an improved and better-
defined coordination mechanism; a two-person ‘technical support
team’; a better-structured senior officials’ meeting; an expanded role for
the upcoming summit host; a renewed definition of the ‘Issue-Based
Leadership’ mechanism; a more dynamic, real-time ASEM website; the
development of a separate intranet for delegation use only; an enhance-
ment of interaction with ASEF; and finally, more recognition of the rela-
tionship with the parallel dialogues – the Asia-Europe Parliamentary
Partnership, the Asia-Europe Business Forum and the Asia-Europe Peo-
ple’s Forum (Improving the Working Methods of an Enlarged ASEM:
Suggestions, 2010).
The discussions during the outlook seminar dealt with all issues but
dedicated much time to the proposed ‘technical support team’. Aware
of the agonising discussions in the past, the idea had deliberately been
formulated in a very cautious manner: it was suggested that only two
persons would be needed to accomplish what in essence were only ad-
ministrative tasks. This and other suggestions were encouraged by
workshop participants, who at times called for a much more ambitious
version of an ASEM secretariat. Eventually, taking all sensitivities into
account, an amended paper on ASEM’s working methods was circu-
lated to ASEM members on 22 April 2010 (see Annex 7). The paper re-
fined the proposals that had been discussed during the seminar. It fore-
saw a better-defined and more precise role for the coordinators in an at-
tempt to ensure better continuity in between senior officials’ meetings.
The text also envisioned a greater role for the upcoming summit host
alongside the ASEM coordinators. The text furthermore suggested a
clarification of the tasks and responsibilities of the senior officials’
meetings. The idea of a ‘technical support team’ as an unpretending ad-
ministrative tool at the service of the entire ASEM membership figured
in the proposal. It would, among others, facilitate communication be-
tween ASEM members, maintain records of decisions and run an intra-
net system. Furthermore, ‘Issue-Based Leadership’ would need to be
better defined and given a few more guidelines so as to perform more
to the benefit of the entire ASEM membership. As first suggested, the
parallel ASEM dialogues were also to receive more attention from the
intergovernmental process.
The paper was then discussed at the senior officials’ meeting held in
Phnom Penh on 5-6 May 2010. Many of its suggestions readily found
support, but more time would be needed before decisions could be
taken. There were, as expected, questions about how to implement the
‘technical support team’ idea. Some ASEM members were more ambi-
tious and showed their willingness to talk about setting up a full-fledged
secretariat. Others argued against the so-called creeping institutionalisa-
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tion that a ‘technical support team’ could trigger. An issue was even
made of the suggestion to keep records of the decisions taken at senior
officials’ meetings, the objection being that this would lead to unneces-
sary drafting sessions. As a result, the final version of the ‘annotated
agenda’, which was released on 2 June 2010 in preparation for the
ASEM 8 summit (see Annex 6), used approximately the same language
as the earlier 15 April version, indicating that there had been no pro-
gress in regard to the ‘working methods’ between the two dates.
On 8 July 2010, a first integral body of draft texts intended for ap-
proval by the ASEM leaders at the Brussels summit was circulated. This
included a draft chair statement. With regard to ASEM working meth-
ods, the proposals from the 22 April paper had all been integrated with
a view to ensuring further consideration by the ASEM membership.
And indeed, the ASEM senior officials reviewed the proposals in detail
during their two-day meeting in Brussels on 14-15 July.
As it turned out, the discussions indicated overwhelming support
among the ASEM membership. Quick agreement was reached on the
more prominent role of the upcoming summit host. In the run-up to
the summit it is responsible for and the increased recognition of the
parallel dialogues. There was also consensus that the idea of an ASEM
virtual secretariat had to be shelved definitively. But with regard to the
‘technical support team’ and the other aspects of the working methods,
a few members felt that further examination was needed. Several details
remained to be clarified. One of the suggestions that garnered quite
some acceptance was that leaders would delegate to senior officials the
housekeeping matter of further defining and then deciding on the ad-
ministrative support that would be required to ensure the future effi-
ciency of the ASEM framework.
The recollection of the chair, an unofficial report of the meeting
drawn up to assist the ASEM members in their preparations for the
ASEM 8 summit, integrated this suggestion. It noted: ‘Senior Officials
should be tasked to […] set up a light, practical and cost-effective mech-
anism that would provide technical support to the Senior Officials’
Meeting and to the Coordinators and [to] seek to define more clearly
the concept of “Issue-Based Leadership” and [its] responsibilities’
(ASEM Senior Officials’ Meeting, Brussels, 13-15 July, 2010, Recollection
from the Chair, 2010: § 5).
The 16 August version of the draft chair statement integrated a for-
mula akin to the language from the recollection of the chair. However,
the formula had to be revised based on the feedback received. The en-
suing versions would gradually evolve towards a more limited tasking
to senior officials. They would be asked only to work out proposals and
make recommendations, and then submit them to the next ASEM for-
eign ministers’ meeting for decision, i.e. not take the decision them-
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selves as suggested before. According to some ASEM members, equip-
ping ASEM with administrative support, even if it would be in the form
of a modest two-person ‘technical support team’, represented a first in-
stitutional step that required a political, not an administrative, decision.
The solution that was emerging concerning the proposed administra-
tive support in turn also inspired the language for the other aspects of
working-method reforms, including the ‘Issue-Based Leadership’ issue.
An all-encompassing phrase was added, inviting senior officials to seek
overall improvements in the various existing mechanisms of coopera-
tion. That such a phrase could be added constituted a strong indication:
the ASEM membership agreed that the growing number of members
as well as the integration of a new kind of member, namely the third
temporary-category members, would require a number of improve-
ments to ASEM working methods. The need to undertake action on the
question of working methods was thus formally recognised.
The eventual result figures in § 84 of the chair statement of ASEM 8.
In fact, the consultations conducted since the Hanoi foreign ministers’
meeting as well as the outlook workshop and the different working texts
that were put forward had a double effect. They raised awareness about
the difficulties that ASEM was going to face in the near future, and they
provided first indications on how ASEM members thought they might
be addressed. The negotiations held at the senior-official level in the
run-up to the summit brought quite some focus, in particular during
the period between July and September. Hence, the tasking that the
Brussels summit gave to senior officials is not to be understood as a po-
lite way to defer the issue to a next vague opportunity. It was a precise
demand, which incidentally also carried a clear deadline. As the ASEM
8 chair’s statement stipulated, the tasking of the senior officials was
expected to result in concrete proposals in time for the 2011 foreign
ministers’ meeting in Hungary (Chair’s Statement of the Eighth Asia-
Europe Meeting, 2010: § 84). To this effect, a coordinators’ meeting and
no less than two senior officials’ meetings were scheduled to take place
before the 2011 foreign ministers’ meeting.
Also, the recognition of the special role of the upcoming summit host
should be considered as an important step forward. Being an integral
part of the coordination mechanism during the two years preceding the
ASEM summit for which it is responsible, the upcoming summit host
can henceforth take on a leadership role and, as an important stake-
holder, guide the ASEM community towards more and better political
achievements. This change harbours considerable potential for ASEM.
When the upcoming summit host takes up this responsibility in earn-
est, it could provide the sort of stimulus that the ASEM process actually
needs, in particular in between summits.
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Despite the clear advances in political terms, chances are that actual
changes to ASEM working methods will be prudent, incremental and
based on concrete added value. This is because any step hinting at
some form of institutionalisation of ASEM remains controversial. A few
steps are being suggested that would seem to respect this constraint.
They could be described as ‘first-aid’ measures that are intended to fit
within the existing framework and therefore should not arouse major
controversy.
The first one concerns ASEM’s existing website, the ASEM Info-
board, nowadays a rather passive tool that imperfectly serves the visibi-
lity of ASEM. The idea with regard to the Infoboard is the following:
make it the entry portal for an intranet that would be created for exclu-
sive use by ASEM delegations. It would raise the profile of the website
and give it a more official character. Increased use of the intranet by the
delegations would probably result in an increase in use of the public
website by the public, raising in the end the external visibility of ASEM
itself. Practically speaking, a login section could easily be created on the
ASEM Infoboard. After logging in, delegations would then be led to an
intranet system comprising a notice board, a private-message facility,
current information on ASEM events and activities, updated lists of offi-
cials, contacts and institutions, and an archive.
The other suggestion concerns the staffing issue. Considering the in-
conclusive experience of the ASEM virtual secretariat, it has become
clear that an intranet, and for that matter also a website, do not work
without staff dedicated to make them run. But then, where to find the
resources? One idea is to look for them in places where a strong incen-
tive exists to make these tools operate properly. Much in line with the
explanation provided for the increased role of the upcoming summit
host in the coordination mechanism, that incentive could exist with the
hosts of ASEM’s main events. They have a major stake in the smooth
functioning of internal ASEM communication and also could be the
ones most ready to make investments that contribute to the success of
ASEM’s political cooperation. This could be the upcoming summit host,
as already hinted, and also the host of the upcoming foreign ministers’
meeting. If each of them would contribute one dedicated staff ‘from
summit to summit’ or ‘from foreign ministers’ meeting to foreign min-
isters’ meeting’, the necessary personnel would be available. Modern
telecommunication technologies would allow them to cooperate from a
distance, which would present the advantage that no permanent expa-
triation would be needed. At most, a relatively modest travel budget
would have to be foreseen.
Summits and ministerial meetings take place every two years but in
alternating format (e.g. ministerial meeting in 2009, summit in 2010).
This would mean that the personnel contributed by the summit host
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and the foreign ministers’ meeting host would essentially change one
at a time every year. So this scheme can work. However, it would not
guarantee that at all times there would be one Asian and one European
on the task. For this, it might be necessary to identify an ASEM mem-
ber that could contribute a third person on a voluntary basis who would
join the team for the purpose of geographical balance.
A charter stipulating in detail the essentially administrative tasks and
responsibilities as well as the division of labour could easily be drawn
up. In addition, provisions could be included to allow for possible
voluntary financial contributions in order to pay for personnel or travel
costs that would alleviate the burden on the hosts of ASEM’s main
events. In fact, experience with making such a scheme work is already
available: we can refer to the establishment of the coordinating office
set up and funded by the European Commission in 2010 as an ad-hoc
one-year initiative to prepare, coordinate and support the ASEM 8 sum-
mit. It has collected an impressive amount of material and even put
into place an intranet. This seems to neatly prefigure what ASEM mem-
bers would want to set up more formally among themselves.
Conclusion
ASEM working methods have generally remained unchanged since
ASEM’s inception. This is despite an impressive diversification of its
agenda and a doubling of its membership. Already nine years ago, ob-
servers had established a connection with the still undecided issue of
the ultimate identity of ASEM. Is it to remain a loose framework for po-
litical dialogue, or should it develop into an efficient and more binding
compact for cooperation? Such indecisiveness clearly has a detrimental
effect on the day-to-day work.
Throughout the preparations for ASEM 8, the Belgian summit host
sensed that the mood among the ASEM membership was shifting to-
wards reform of ASEM’s working methods. Though the diversity of
views on ASEM finality persists, there is a sense that some measures
could and should be taken in order to ensure the continued vitality of
the ASEM process and also to ensure that the three new members that
belong to neither the European nor the Asian group can be fully inte-
grated. Hence, leaders at the ASEM 8 summit endorsed a clear tasking
of the ASEM senior officials to work in that direction. Naturally, some
modest incremental steps can be thought of such as better exploitation
of modern communication technologies or creativity in addressing staff
requirements. Such minimalistic changes might be efficient enough in
the short term and, at the same time, might have a positive impact on
the external visibility of ASEM. Yet in the medium to long term, more
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changes will be needed if the goal is to make ASEM a strong, convin-
cing and concrete cooperation framework with a visible impact on Eur-
ope-Asia relations. For this, additional political will is required if ASEM
mechanisms – including the much promoted ‘Issue-Based Leadership’
– are to continue to be effective.
* The opinions expressed in this article are the personal considerations of the author
and do not reflect official policy of the Belgian Government nor can they be attributed
to it.
Notes
1 This analysis discusses the intergovernmental level of the ASEM process. For civil so-
ciety-related events see Lambert’s chapter in this volume.
2 Contact points are persons identified within the competent administration of each
ASEM partner and entrusted with the responsibility to receive and send communica-
tions relating to ASEM issues on account of the ASEM partner to whom they belong.
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5 Perception and ASEM Visibility in
the European Media
Sebastian Bersick and Tanja Bauer
Asia-Europe relations are in need of better communication. Why is this
so? As the European Union (EU) struggles with the political and eco-
nomic dangers of the ongoing financial and economic crisis, the impor-
tance of the Asian region for EU policymaking is becoming ever more
evident. The crisis only highlights the undergoing power shift from ‘the
West’ to ‘the East’ and the continuing need for the EU to react to the
structural changes that have taken place in the international political
economy following the end of the Cold War. At the same time, the suc-
cessful economic development of emerging countries like China and
India reinforces the cooperation and integration processes among Asian
countries.1 As a consequence, the practical importance of multilateral
institutions that can contribute to governance and problem-solving capa-
cities, such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), is increasing. Yet the
ASEM 2010 summit in Brussels was not influenced by external devel-
opments alone. More than anything else, the accession of Russia poses
a challenge to the inter-regional identity of ASEM. In addition, the
accession of India (in 2008) and the implementation of the Lisbon
Treaty requirements by the Belgium host of ASEM 8, increased the in-
stitutional asymmetry that forms part of ASEM’s identity (Bersick 2003:
203ff). As a result, ASEM’s European members have achieved greater
unity, while ASEM’s Asian members have increased their diversity.
How Asians and Europeans manage these changes and the challenges
for governance they imply will largely determine the overall sustainabil-
ity of the ASEM process.
As a result, a deeper understanding of the regional cooperation and
integration processes in Europe and Asia will be needed in order to
smooth over the institutional differences in Asian-European affairs. In
this context, studying perception can contribute to improving the com-
munication between Asia and Europe, as perception is a decisive factor
in determining the expectations of others (Chan 2010: 134). The
research on perception is not concerned with the study of facts but with
the question of how facts are constructed and understood. ‘Perceptions
matter – because they are a basis for understanding and a foundation
upon which actors make choices and decisions. Understanding the per-
ceptions and perspectives of “the other” side can provide a basis for the
improved communication and give guidance on policy adjustments’
(Wetterqvist 2009: 16). The study of perception is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the advance of policymaking. Images and per-
ceptions of ASEM should be regarded as intangibles: immaterial but
essential assets that reflect on ASEM and thus help to build its substan-
tial foundation (Chaban/Lai 2009: 220). A disregard of these intangi-
bles may have negative consequences for the ASEM process, its
resources and target-group-specific initiatives and policies. The question
of how Asia is perceived by Europe is thus becoming increasingly rele-
vant for European as well as for Asian policymakers. Evidence-based
knowledge on the production of perceptions in the Asia-Europe context
can help to overcome stereotypes that may otherwise inadvertently in-
fluence policymaking within and between both regions.
This chapter deals with the perceptions of Asia in Europe and will
analyse the visibility of ASEM affairs, and especially the ASEM Brussels
summit of October 2010, in the European media. It shows the first re-
sults and draws on the quantitative data sets of a multidisciplinary and
cross-national research project, which conducted a media analysis that
studied Asia’s image in European news media production. The data
was collected in a three-month period by a team of researchers in eight
EU member states that form the European part of the Asia-Europe Per-
ception Project.
The Asia-Europe Perception Project
Though Europeans and Asians share a long history of interaction, it
was only in 1996 that the two regions of Europe and Asia started to
build a partnership through an informal process of dialogue and coop-
eration. From the outset, it has been the rationale of the ASEM process
to facilitate understanding between the two regions as well as the coun-
tries and peoples involved. In order to link the many segments of Asian
and European societies within the overall framework of the ASEM pro-
cess, to facilitate cooperation and to counter the perceived threat of a
clash of civilisations, the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) was estab-
lished in 1997. Among ASEF’s agenda is the support of the European
Studies in Asia (ESiA) network, an academic cooperation initiative that
aims to reinforce Asia-Europe relations by stimulating European studies
in the Asian region. The centrepiece of this endeavour is the ongoing
comparative study of EU and ASEM imagery in Asia (see Chaban/Hol-
land 2010). The research project – The EU through the Eyes of Asia –
studies the external perceptions of the EU with a view to ‘[p]aying atten-
tion to how the EU is viewed abroad [which] helps us to evaluate
whether gaps between expectations and realities have affected the
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“reach” of EU influence’ (Rhodes quoted in Chaban/Holland 2010:
129).
Building on this focus of differing conceptualisations between Europe
and Asia, the mirror project – Asia in the Eyes of Europe (ASiE) – com-
plements the already established research agenda by adding the ‘missing
leg’. The two research projects are the two sides of the overarching inter-
regional Asia-Europe Perception Project, a systematic empirical analysis
of each other’s perceptions. The ASiE research project consortium con-
sists of ASEF, the National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE), the
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), the Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung (KAS) and Tsinghua University in Beijing. The eight national re-
search partners are: the Austrian Institute of International Affairs, the
Brussels Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies, the Copenhagen
Business School – Asia Centre, the Institut Français des relations inter-
national – Centre Asie, the German Council on Foreign Relations, the
University of Siena, the Romanian Institute of European-Asian Relations
and the London School of Economics and Politics.
Asia in the Eyes of Europe
The ASiE research project intends to deliver an analysis of Europe’s
cognitive outlook towards Asia and ASEM. It deals with the under-re-
searched issue of public perceptions of Asia in the EU, aims to track
the existing landscape of perceptions of Asia within the EU, and seeks
to contribute to, deepen and enhance European-Asian understanding.
Since images can be counterproductive to an effective dialogue be-
tween the EU and Asia, it is necessary to study Europe’s image of and
attitude towards Asia. Yet no systematically empirical research on Eur-
ope’s perceptions of Asia – and in particular of Asian region-building
processes – has so far been conducted. Europeans’ perceptions of the
formation of Asia as a region that is not merely geographically defined
but increasingly also functionally integrated are largely unknown. No
empirical data exist on the perceptions that European have towards re-
gion-building processes in Asia. Yet perceptions provide the basis for
understanding as well as a foundation upon which actors make choices
and decisions. This lack of information can be thus detrimental to the
further development of inter-regional policy dialogue between Europe
and Asia and the ASEM process in particular. Given the formation of a
regional architecture in Asia and the EU’s role within it (Bersick 2009),
paying attention to how Asia is viewed in Europe helps to evaluate
whether expectation gaps or deficits (see Tsuruoka 2004) affect Eur-
opean and Asian policymaking. The European perception of the many
unfolding cooperation and integration processes in the Asian region
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will be key to improving European understanding of Asia’s future eco-
nomic, political and cultural dynamics and their impact on the develop-
ment of Europe and EU-Asia relations. A lack of knowledge may result
in the EU becoming more prone to unilateral and bilateral rather than
multilateral policies.
ASiE aims to assess Europe’s attitudes towards a region that has long
considered the EU as a reference point for its own regional integration
agenda. Asian regional dynamics are essentially fostered by emerging
powers like China and India. At the same time, the emergence of regio-
nal organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), ASEAN+3 (APT) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) as well as
inter-regional institutions such as the ASEAN-EU Dialogue and the
ASEM process demonstrate the need for institutions of regional govern-
ance. Against the background of contemporary processes of cooperation
and integration in Asia, ASiE seeks to answer the question whether Eur-
opeans have any sort of perception regarding Asian integration and re-
gion-building. A study of Asia’s image in Europe can help Europeans
and Asians to understand how their mutual interaction impacts the
shaping of institutions of regional and inter-regional governance that
can complement structures of global governance. The research does not
only assess European perceptions of individual Asian countries but also
the perceptions of organisations such as ASEAN, ASEM or the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). The analysis of the regio-
nal dimension adds not only comparability but also policy relevance to
the overarching Asia-Europe Perception Project.
The research on the image of the EU in Asia revealed that individual
EU member states were considered to be politically relevant actors
rather than the EU as a regional organisation (Holland/Chaban 2007).
The ASiE project is following up on these findings and aims to eluci-
date views within the EU concerning the question “Do Europeans per-
ceive Asia as an international actor or merely as a geographic region
that is home to individual countries?” The study identifies, measures
and compares public perceptions of Asia within the EU and is intended
to create knowledge with regard to the perceived role of countries and
region-building processes in Asia. Questions that guide the research in-
terest are: Which Asian countries do Europeans deem important for
their own future? Which issues do Europeans regard as pivotal areas of
cooperation? What do Europeans know about region-building processes
in Asia? Do Europeans perceive regional organisations or institutions in
Asia as international actors? Do Europeans consider them as politically
relevant actors? Do Europeans think that Asian regional organisations
and institutions possess problem-solving capacity?
Questionnaires have been developed in order to conduct a public opi-
nion survey, and stakeholder/elite interviews address these questions by
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using an issue-based approach. Relevant policy fields for assessing the
problem-solving capacity of national governments and regional organisa-
tions or institutions are environmental protection, cultural cooperation,
development aid and assistance, trade, energy and natural resources, hu-
man rights and democracy, security and anti-terrorism, and social wel-
fare. This can help to shed light on the question of to what extent Eur-
opeans are aware of Asian contributions and potential to contribute to
multilateral initiatives, for example on preventing climate change, peace-
keeping and reconstruction and development.
A key topic and issue that will likely effect the implementation of the
research project is the future development of the current economic and
financial crisis. Does the crisis change the image of Asia or individual
Asian countries in Europe? If so, how? Whereas an overly simplified
view of the EU held by Asians is potentially detrimental to the EU’s im-
age and influence in Asia, the same holds true for a simplified view of
Asia held by Europeans. The research project aims to provide policy-
relevant analysis, advice and recommendations on the basis of the em-
pirical findings. In terms of accessibility, the research data will be
shared freely online to promote key research on the role of perceptions
in Asia-Europe relations.
Research methodology
The overall research methodology of the Asia-Europe Perception Project
differentiates between the national and regional level both on the Eur-
opean and Asian side, as well as four image levels and three perception
levels (see Bersick 2010b; Holland/Chaban 2007). The study measures
the image and attitude of Europeans towards Asia on three perception
levels over a time period of 12 months. The research project is to sys-
tematically survey the image of Asia, of individual Asian countries, re-
gional organisations and of ASEM as created and disseminated by pub-
lic discourses within the EU.2 In each location, the study follows an
identical methodology involving three research instruments: (1) a public
opinion survey; (2) a media analysis, and (3) key stakeholder/elite inter-
views. Due to the large size of Europe-ASEM, practical and methodolo-
gical considerations made it necessary to develop a representative sub-
set of sample countries. This sample includes eight EU member states,
namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Romania
and the United Kingdom.
Results of the media analysis are being published here below for the
first time. The media analysis consists of a three-month analysis of
Asian representation in the eight member states’ national mainstream
press and prime television news broadcasts on a daily basis (from 1
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September 2010 to 30 November 2010). The methodology of the media
analysis consists of a combination of quantitative measures and qualita-
tive measures. A quantitative measure is content analysis, which is an
effective research measure that allows for comparing media items with
the help of key words, including Asia, Asian, ASEM, ASEAN and
APEC. The data analysis makes use of qualitative discourse analysis by
aiming to answer the following questions:
– How visible is Asia in the European media?
– Is Asia being reported on as an actor in the context of a third party?
– Are Asian regional organisations being reported on as an actor in
the context of a third party?
– What is the volume of the media coverage of Asia in Europe?
– Which Asian actors are seen as major, secondary and minor actors?
– Which sources of Asian news stories are used by the European me-
dia?
– How is Asia portrayed by the European media? How is it evaluated?
The data presented on ASEM visibility is embedded in the broader re-
search interest of the project. The visibility of ASEM in the European
news media was measured by counting the frequency of the use of the
key word ASEM or Asia-Europe Meeting. The qualitative measure of
frames is used to further facilitate the analysis of how the various
media in the different EU member states interpret ASEM. The metho-
dological framework for the research looks at three media outlets in
each location: 1) one popular reputable national daily newspaper with
the highest readership, 2) one popular national daily, and 3) the most
popular TV news broadcast. An additional aspect of the media analysis
is the inclusion of a EU-level media analysis (see Table 5.1).
ASEM visibility in the European news media
The visibility in terms of news volume is an important indicator of
media attention. It is indicative of the degree of importance that is gi-
ven by the news media to an institution, its policies and – as in the case
of ASEM – its summits.
Table 5.2 shows a first quantitative analysis of the data focusing on
the absolute number of news items referring to Asia and ASEM in each
location as well as the total and the percentage of ASEM-related news
items relative to Asia-related news items.
The small number (113) of ASEM-related news items, which made up
only 4.06 percent of the total media coverage of Asia-related news,
points to a particular media attention deficit. Over the three-month time
span of the media analysis, only the French and Belgium media pub-
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lished a double-digit number of articles that dealt with ASEM (see Table
5.2 and Figure 5.1). On the one hand, it is remarkable that, in Belgium
alone, 67 articles were published while another country with a compar-
able population size like Austria only produced four. On the other hand,
the case of Belgium is a special one: the EU’s headquarters is located in
the Belgian capital, and Belgium’s national media would have a vested
interest in covering domestic events that happen in their own country,
be it at the national, international or supranational level. Moreover,
ASEM 8 took place in Brussels, which will have increased the interest
of the Belgian media (not even taking account of the fact that they will
have certain advantages when it comes to technical and human re-
sources on-site). And finally, the fact that there are twice as many media
outlets to serve both official languages in Belgium is another driving
factor.
Table 5.1 European media outlets monitored
Daily Newspaper Tabloid / 2nd Daily
Newspaper
TV Primetime News
Austria Der Standard Kronenzeitung ORF2 20 min/ 7:30pm
Belgium (F) Le Soir La Libre RTBF 30 min/ 7:30pm
Belgium (D) De Standaard De Morgen VTM 30 min/ 7:30pm
Denmark Jyllands Posten Ekstra Bladet TV2 30 min/ 7:00pm
France Le Monde Le Figaro France2 30 min/ 8:00pm
Germany Su
¨
ddeutsche Zeitung BILD Tagesschau/
ARD
15 min/ 8:00pm
Italy Corriere della Sera Il Giornale TG1 30 min/ 8:00pm
Romania Adevarul Libertatea Observator/
Antena-1
1 hour / 7:00pm
UK The Daily Telegraph The Daily Mail BBC 30 min/ 6:00pm
European
Union
European Voice* Euro News 30 min/ 7:00pm
* European Voice is a weekly newspaper.
Table 5.2 Number of Asia- and ASEM-related news items
Location Asia/Asian ASEM ASEM (%)
Austria 287 4 1.39%
Belgium (Dutch) 258 16 6.20%
Belgium (French) 363 51 14.05%
Denmark 296 3 1.01%
France 659 16 2.43%
Germany 241 5 2.07%
Italy 255 3 1.18%
Romania 133 7 5.26%
United Kingdom 268 0 0.00%
European Union 26 8 30.77%
TOTAL 2785 113 4.06%
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It is a remarkable result of this analysis that the media in three of the
four most populous and arguably Asia-relevant sample countries –
namely Germany, Italy and the UK – produced a rather meager output
of ASEM-related articles. And other countries’ ASEM coverage, such as
Austria’s, was limited to brief reports about the ASEM summit.It seems
that Germany in particular is more preoccupied with its own bilateral
relations with single Asian countries, especially China. Very surpris-
ingly, there has been no news coverage at all in the British media on
ASEM-related topics. There was no mention in The Daily Mail, The Daily
Telegraph or on BBC news on TV, even though the Asia-related news ar-
ticles in the period of ASEM 8 were dominated by economic topics in-
volving the British economy. Recurring topics were the British national
debt and Britain’s business with emerging Asian nations such as China
and India. Further country-specific analysis of the data collected will be
published in the course of the research project and should contribute to
explaining in detail the visibility pattern of ASEM in the European med-
ia.
As ASEM is considered by its participants to be a major platform of
EU-Asia relations, the results of the media analysis reveal an alarming
media attention deficit. Its gravity becomes particularly apparent when
comparing the absolute number of Asia-related news items with the ab-
solute number of ASEM-related news items (see Figure 5.1). The ratios
of 659:16 in France, 241:5 in Germany and 268:0 in the UK clearly sug-
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gest that, for the time being, Asia-related topics are largely delinked
from ASEM affairs in the European media. It is telling that the EU
media forms the only exception. The ratio of 26:8 is indicative of a per-
ception of ASEM as an inter-regional institution as opposed to that of a
summit event, which mainly provides the opportunity for enhancing bi-
lateral state-to-state relations. The institutional asymmetry within the in-
ter-regional relationship and the question whether relations between the
European and the Asian side of ASEM derive their actual and potential
importance from the bilateral state-to-state level or the inter-regional le-
vel form part of an explanation of the visibility pattern (see also chapter
2). Further research within the ASiE project will contribute to develop-
ing policy recommendations on how best to reduce ASEM’s visibility
deficit in the European media.
The data analysis revealed an increase in attention in the news media
towards ASEM seen in almost all the newspapers that were monitored.
The peak took place around the time of ASEM 8 in Brussels, which
clearly shows the interest the media had in the summit. Compared with
other Asian summits that took place during the three-month time
period of the media analysis, such as the ASEAN or the APEC summit,
ASEM 8 was by far the most visible one in the European media. From
a total of 2784 Asia-related media outputs, 113 dealt with ASEM affairs,
slightly more than 4 percent (see Table 5.2). Of this 4 percent, 12.39
percent were TV features broadcast either on the days of the summit or
on the two following days at the latest.
At the same time, ASEM coverage ranks first in the media analysis
(4.06 percent) among all Asian regional institutions, followed by
ASEAN (1.54 percent) and APEC (1.18 percent), even though these two
regional organisations also held summits during the survey period (see
Figure 5.2). Other organisations such as the Asian Development Bank
(ADB), the EAS, or free trade regimes like the East Asian Free Trade
Area (EAFTA), the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia
(CEPEA), the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or the Free Trade Area of
the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) were only mentioned once – all in the French
press. A further difference in the visibility of ASEM was the timing:
while ASEM-related articles were remarkably clustered around the time
of ASEM 8, ASEAN and APEC were mentioned throughout the time
span of the analysis, gaining only somewhat more attention at the time
of their summits.
Measuring ASEM’s visibility through the volume of media coverage
alone can only provide partial information about ASEM’s image in Eur-
ope. According to Chan (2010), it is necessary to go beyond policy state-
ments and probe further into actions and issues in order to assess the
visibility and perception of an actor or an institution in international
politics. One indicator (among a bundle that was developed for the pur-
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pose of this project) is the notion of a frame to categorise how ASEM
was being presented and thus perceived by the media.3 The methodol-
ogy used a five-fold typology that allows for coding whether ASEM was
presented as a political, economic, social, environmental and/or devel-
opmental actor. The following table shows the framing of ASEM in the
European media.













Austria 4 3 1 0 0 0
Belgium
(Dutch)
16 16 0 0 0 0
Belgium
(French)
51 42 1 8 0 0
Denmark 3 2 1 0 0 0
France 16 12 4 0 0 0
Germany 5 5 0 0 0 0
Italy 3 0 3 0 0 0
Romania 7 7 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom 0 0 0 0 0 0
European Union 8 6 2 0 0 0
Figure 5.2 Media output on ASEM and Asian regional institutions relative to over-
all Asia-related news coverage
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The results of the media analysis reveal an overwhelmingly consistent
picture, with 93 news items framing ASEM as a political actor, followed
by 12 news items that frame ASEM as an economic actor (see Table 5.3
and Figure 5.3). The only other field in which ASEM seemed to be no-
ticed was social affairs, which includes topics belonging to research and
education (8 news items). There is no media output that sees ASEM as
a developmental or environmental actor. Broken down to the European
level, the EU media outlets focused on political (6 items or 75 percent)
and economic affairs (2 items or 25 percent) (see Figure 5.4). Among
the EU member states, the French-speaking media of Belgium, which
delivered the highest volume of ASEM-related news (51 items), frame
ASEM mainly as a political actor (42 items or 82.35 percent), with far
less coverage framing ASEM in economic terms (1 item or 1.96 per-
cent). However, 15.69 percent dealt with social affairs (8 items). Here,
the highest share of news items coincides with the only case that does
frame ASEM in social terms. Both the Dutch-speaking media of Bel-
gium and the Romanian media outlets see ASEM as a purely political
actor without any exception. The French media frame ASEM in political
(12 items or 75 percent) and economic (4 items or 25 percent) terms, as
is also the case in the Danish press, which has the lowest output vo-
lume together with Italy apart from the UK, which had no ASEM cover-
age at all. The Danish media frame ASEM in political (2 items or 66.6
percent) as well as economic terms (1 item or 33.3 percent). German
media outlets frame ASEM in purely political terms (5 items). By con-
trast, the Italian press perceives ASEM in purely economic terms (3
items).
Figure 5.3 Framing of ASEM in absolute numbers per location
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Conclusion
A first analysis based on the empirical data of the ASiE research project
reveals key quantitative and qualitative findings.
The differences in the perception of ASEM affairs throughout the
eight EU member states that form the sample set of the media analysis
are remarkable. However, some general tendencies remain: in all cases,
about 90 percent of the share of ASEM-related articles was published
around the time of ASEM 8, which took place in Brussels on 4 and 5
October 2010. Consequently, the week before and after the summit was
the time span with the best coverage on ASEM-related articles, with very
few random articles appearing before or after those two weeks. In com-
parison, articles referring to other Asian regional institutions were not
released in such a clustered time span but instead were spread out over
the whole period of media observation. This was despite the fact that the
APEC and ASEAN summits took place during our survey period – the
APEC summit on 13 and 14 November 2010 in Yokohama, and the 17th
ASEAN summit from 28 to 31 October 2010 in Hanoi.
The analysis of the data on ASEM’s framing shows that ASEM is per-
ceived mainly as a political actor. Furthermore, there seems to be a lack
of interest in ASEM affairs apart from the actual ASEM summits: there
was very little coverage of ASEM that was not related to ASEM 8. Even
though the summit was visible in the European news coverage, general
ASEM affairs lacked visibility.
Figure 5.4 Framing of ASEM in percentage per location
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The results of the media analysis demonstrate a media attention defi-
cit and the need for ASEM to raise its visibility in Europe. It is highly
probable that if the ASEM summit had not taken place, the volume of
ASEM-related media output would have been far less and the visibility
of ASEM correspondingly low. ASEM coverage in countries such as
Italy or Denmark was only related to the ASEM summit in Brussels. In
the case of the UK, there was no ASEM-related coverage at all. These
results are indicative of a communication deficit that reaches deeper
than the need for reform and adjustment of ASEM’s working methods
(see Vanderkendelaere in this volume). For ASEM to increase its visibi-
lity and to establish an adequate image, more understanding for the
need to improve communication in Asia-Europe affairs will have to be
generated among the European – and ultimately Asian – public. Such a
strategy would include the dissemination of knowledge, as was sug-
gested by the Connecting Civil Society Conference 4 (CCS4) which took
place immediately following the ASEM summit in Brussels. It stressed
the need to advance inter-regionalism and regional integration and to
create an Asia-Europe Knowledge Community that enhances mutual
understanding by facilitating the establishment of an ASEM network of
think tanks.
Notes
1 In this chapter, the regions of Europe and Asia are defined according to the participa-
tion pattern of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process. ASEM has evolved into the
central platform for communication between Asia and Europe. Currently, ASEM con-
sists of a total of 48 partners: 28 partners on the European side and 17 partners on the
Asian side plus three members – Australia, New Zealand and Russia – that belong to
a temporary third category, which leaves the regional assignment for the time being
open. ASEM brings together Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Laos, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Ma-
laysia, Malta, Mongolia, Myanmar, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thai-
land, United Kingdom, Vietnam, the ASEAN Secretariat and the European Commis-
sion. (http://www.aseminfoboard.org)
2 An image is a reference to some aspect of the world that contains within its own struc-
ture and in terms of its own structure a reference to the act of cognition that generated
it. It must say not that the world is like this, but that it was recognised to have been like
this by the image maker, who leaves behind this record: not of the world, but of the act.
See Harold Cohen: What is an Image? http://crca.ucsd.edu/%7Ehcohen/cohenpdf/
whatisanimage.pdf.
3 The Asia Europe Perception Project follows the definition of framing suggested by
Robert Entman. He claimed framing to be the ‘selection of some aspects of perceived
reality to make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to pro-
mote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or
treatment of recommendations’ (Chaban/Holland 2007: 34).





6 IMF: The Road from Rescue to Reform
J. Thomas Lindblad
The times are changing for the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In
earlier days, when an IMF programme met with failure, the IMF simply
blamed the ineptitude of the host government and got away with it
(Sachs 2005: 74). That is no longer possible. Today, the IMF also has to
account for its own actions and possible shortcomings. During the last
decade or so, circumstances have compelled the world renowned insti-
tution to venture on the path of reform. Corresponding initiatives are
fully endorsed by ASEM, as expressed notably at the ASEM 8 summit
in Brussels on 4 and 5 October 2010 (ASEM 2010: 3). This chapter ana-
lyses the present quest for reform at the IMF and ASEM’s role within
it. It pays particular attention to the lessons drawn from the Asian fi-
nancial crisis in the late 1990s.
The IMF was conceived in July 1944 and inaugurated in March 1946
as the twin of the World Bank within the institutional framework under-
pinning the Bretton Woods system of international monetary regula-
tion. The general aim was to promote worldwide economic stability as
laid down in six fundamental articles of agreement pertaining to inter-
national monetary cooperation, a balanced growth of international trade,
stability in foreign exchange markets, the multilateral system of pay-
ments, the funding of corrections to maladjusted balances of payments
and, finally, the alleviation of disequilibria in world money markets
(IMF 2006: 25). The fifth article has attracted the most attention and
criticism, since it enables the IMF to extend large rescue packages to in-
dividual members. Since 1946, the number of signatories accepting the
articles of agreement has increased from 38 countries to almost 200.
The Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1971, but its institutions sur-
vived. In the mid-1970s, developed countries such as the United King-
dom and Italy did receive financial aid from the IMF, but thereafter
recipients were for a period of several decades almost exclusively found
among developing countries. The IMF played a key role in resolving
debt crises in Latin America in the 1980s, only getting involved in
Asian economies on rare occasions such as with Turkey and the Philip-
pines. Then came the Asian crisis of 1997/98 with large-scale rescue
packages extended to the three most severely hit countries: Thailand,
Indonesia and South Korea. Brazil followed in 1998/99 but after that it
became quieter around the IMF. Between 2000 and 2007, there were
scarcely any interventions by the organisation. Annual IMF lending fell
sharply, from $ 80 billion in 2000 to $ 16 billion in 2007 (Washington
Post, 24 May 2008). Most countries affected by the worldwide subprime
crisis in 2008/09 did not need to turn to the IMF for help. Therefore,
during the initial years of the present recession, IMF intervention was
confined to smaller countries such as Armenia, Georgia, Hungary, Lat-
via, Ukraine and Pakistan. A return to large-scale operations only came
with the recent packages, offered jointly with the European Union (EU),
to help Greece and Ireland get out of their current financial predica-
ments (Katsimi/Moutos 2010).
In order to understand reform zeal at the IMF, we need to look back
on the discourse in the wake of the large-scale interventions of the late
1990s. The heated discussions occasioned a great deal of soul-searching
at IMF headquarters, which has since resulted in a wide range of re-
form measures. These three topics – discourse, soul-searching and re-
form – are discussed below.
From Tequila to Asia
The sudden devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994 caused
large-scale capital flight and a subsequent huge deficit in Mexico’s bal-
ance of payments. The IMF stepped in and, together with the US gov-
ernment, offered a rescue package of $ 50 billion, of which the IMF
supplied $ 17.8 billion. The current account of the external balance re-
covered, but national income fell by 6 percent in 1995, and rapid infla-
tion continued into 1996 (Boughton 2000; Krugman 2008: 30-31, 42).
The Mexican crisis, remembered among economists as the Tequila cri-
sis, is important because it gave rise to the first fundamental discussion
of IMF’s methodology in crisis management.
Generally, the IMF offers assistance on condition that the recipient
country pursues an economic policy in line with the Washington con-
sensus, a term usually applied to the common ideological outlook of
three institutions whose offices happen to be located within a stone’s
throw from one another in downtown Washington: the IMF, the World
Bank and the US Treasury. Ten so-called principles were formulated in
1987/88 and convey the essence of the Washington consensus. They are
as follows: prudent fiscal discipline, removal of government subsidies
for purposes other than social and basic physical infrastructure, an equi-
table system of taxation, market-based interest rates, market-determined
exchange rates, trade liberalisation, liberalisation of capital flows (espe-
cially foreign direct investment), privatisation of state-owned enter-
prises, overall deregulation in favour of the operation of market forces
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and, finally, legal protection of private property rights (Sheng 2009:
110). Apart from adherence to these principles of economic policymak-
ing, IMF rescue packages are likely to come accompanied by specific
conditionalities or strong recommendations with regard to structural re-
form. Interestingly, however, no such conditionalities were imposed in
the Mexican case. As a result, the badly needed restructuring of the
banking sector in Mexico only took place in 1999, several years after the
Tequila crisis. The IMF was charged with promoting moral hazard, or
risky behaviour, under the assumption that there would be a bailout
anyhow. Some American Congressmen later even insinuated that the
IMF paved the way for the Asian crisis by being so lenient in Mexico
(Dreher 2006; Dreher/Walter 2010).
The 1997 crisis hit Asia like a bolt from a clear sky. Within six
months after the floating of the Thai Bath on 2 July 1997, a whole host
of countries in Southeast and East Asia moved from being fast-growing
‘miracle’ economies to nations in acute financial distress. Agreements
with the IMF were signed in Bangkok on 20 August, in Jakarta on 31
October and in Seoul on 23 November 1997. The aggregate rescue
package to Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea was unprecedented,
amounting to a staggering $ 110 billion, of which the IMF alone sup-
plied $ 34.1 billion or one-third of the total (Sheng 2009: 114). By the
end of the year, it was apparent that the IMF could not possibly go on
extending such huge packages. In all cases, there were strings attached,
with the IMF urging immediate and far-reaching reform of the financial
sector. In Indonesia, actual payment of the rescue funds was slowed
down because of a lack of confidence in the willingness of the Suharto
administration to undertake reform. Agreements with the IMF were
renegotiated several times, and the full amount was only paid out in
mid-1998 after Suharto had stepped down and was succeeded by B.J.
Habibie as president of Indonesia. All three recipients have since repaid
their loans to the IMF.
Hardly any event in economic history has so quickly become the sub-
ject of heated discussion as the Asian financial crisis. An early consen-
sus emerged among leading economists that moral hazard, or implicit
government support of banks and private investors, had combined with
underregulated financial institutions in causing ‘bubble’ economies
with too much indebtedness relative to assets (Krugman 1998; Berg
1999). The idea here was that the governments in the affected countries
should have supervised their financial sectors better. Others, by con-
trast, argued that governments had done too much. Some, notably for-
mer World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz, put the blame on the
excessively rapid liberalisation of the financial sector in Southeast and
East Asia during the decade preceding the crisis. By this logic, the IMF
could be held partly responsible for the onset of the crisis. Stability and
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confidence could only be reestablished by finding the ‘right’ regulatory
regime for the financial sector (Stiglitz 2003: 90). In a more extreme
version, the blame for advocating dramatic financial deregulation was
coupled with a fully fledged conspiracy theory implicating not only the
IMF and the World Bank but also the American and British treasuries
and even bankers in the City of London (Wade 1998: 1545-1547).
The conditionalities imposed by the IMF on the governments of Thai-
land, Indonesia and South Korea immediately became the subject of
controversy and criticism. Apparently, the IMF deliberately did not offer
rescue packages of sufficient volume to resolve the problems of the cri-
sis-affected economies. The money was supposedly enough to prevent
large-scale capital flight and create a situation conducive for structural
reform. The loans accompanied measures of economic policy such as
harsh austerity in fiscal policy, less government spending, higher inter-
est rates and allowing insolvent banks to fail. Some of the measures
backfired. Tight budgets were obviously incompatible with rising expen-
ditures on welfare and poor relief at a time of declining tax revenues.
Access to credit for new investment was curtailed by higher interest
rates and also by higher minimum capital requirements forced upon
banks. In Indonesia, closing the ‘worst’ banks did not result in the
intended restoration of confidence but instead had the opposite effect:
an immediate large-scale capital flight. An early critical voice was that
of Eisuke Sakakibara, Japan’s deputy minister of international finance,
who urged Asian governments not to let domestic banks fail, arguing
that this was not customary in developed countries (Wade 1998: 1538).
IMF intervention became highly unpopular, especially in Indonesia
and South Korea. Sentiments of economic nationalism surfaced among
the general public, and leading economists in the region became
increasingly outspoken in their criticism. A Japanese initiative to estab-
lish an Asian Monetary Fund endowed with $ 100 billion was instantly
torpedoed by combined opposition from the IMF, the US government
and the EU (Sheng 2009: 318). The Fund’s tendency to prescribe the
same medicine to all ‘patients’, regardless of individual circumstances,
together with its insistence on a monopoly position in global crisis re-
lief, fostered widespread resentment of the IMF in Asia. Sooner or later,
the mounting external pressures had to evoke an internal discussion
within the IMF itself.
A great deal of soul-searching
The first major challenge for the IMF after the Asian financial crisis
was the necessity to intervene in Brazil, where rapid inflation, rising
wages and an ever larger debt service brought about an unmanageable
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deficit in the government’s budget. Brazil was struck by an acute pay-
ments crisis in September 1998, and a rescue plan was quickly drawn
up by the G7 ministers. Yet this time, the IMF was put under greater
pressure than before when implementing its rescue package. The US
government insisted that the Brazilian currency, the Real, should not be
devalued until after the presidential elections that took place in two
rounds in the course of October 1998. Then the lobby of Brazilian man-
ufacturers entered the scene trying to keep the peg with the dollar in or-
der not to lose revenue when selling in the American market. In the
event, the Real was only devalued in January 1999 (Sheng 2009: 422-
423). If anything, the Brazilian episode demonstrated a steady loss of
credibility on the part of the IMF.
One of the most severe points of criticism was that the IMF had exa-
cerbated the Asian crisis; its policies had made things worse than they
need have been (Stiglitz 2003: 90). The insistence on prudent fiscal
policy was particularly misguided, as this policy failed to address the
real problems. Instead, effective demand declined, which made it more
difficult for the crisis-hit economy to stage a recovery on its own accord
(Krugman 2008: 115-116). In the case of Indonesia, the policy of retain-
ing a balanced budget indeed proved untenable in the face of rapidly in-
creasing poverty. The IMF had unmistakably served as the lender of last
resort in the world economy, but its policies had above all benefitted for-
eign creditors. This was reason enough to look critically at what the
IMF was doing (Lee/Sin 2008).
The IMF was quick in going on the defense. In June 1998, a few
months prior to the Brazilian crisis, a special issue of the IMF-sponsored
journal Finance & Development appeared, largely devoted to countering
the mounting criticism. Stanley Fischer, then Deputy Managing Direc-
tor, wrote: ‘The IMF is typically called in only in a crisis (…) [usually
the] result of governments having been unwilling to take action’
(Fischer 1998: 4). In other words, under circumstances of crisis and
financial distress, it was only logical that one tried to shift the blame to
the rescuer. Liberalisation and contagion were rigorously rejected as
prime causes of the crisis itself, which was perceived as the outcome of
overheating, pegged exchange rates, inadequate supervision, problems
of governance and lack of transparency (IMF staff 1998). By implica-
tion, restrictive policies and structural reform were the appropriate mea-
sures to be taken. An additional argument was brought forward by John
Lipsky, who from 2006 was serving as First Deputy Managing Director
of the IMF. According to Lipsky, there had been an underestimation of
regional linkages and capital flight, whereas too much importance was
attached to the dollar peg. The damage and disorder of the crisis could
thus have been avoided (Lipsky 1998).
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In 2001, the IMF set up an Independent Evaluation Office. Two years
later, in July 2003, a strikingly frank report was published analysing cri-
sis management in Indonesia, South Korea and Brazil. The report ad-
mitted that a good bank restructuring strategy had been missing in
Indonesia and also that the IMF had given insufficient attention to cor-
ruption and cronyism. The inherent risks of a rapid liberalisation of the
capital account had been inadequately appreciated in South Korea. In
all three countries covered by the report, surveillance by the IMF had
had very little impact on domestic economic policies. An excess of con-
ditionalities had even on occasion led to a non-implementation of the
rescue package – e.g. in the case of the lack of cooperation by the
Suharto cabinet in Indonesia in late 1997 and early 1998. The report
also admitted that the IMF had failed to foresee the crisis because the
weaknesses observed in the financial sector had not been taken ser-
iously. Finally, the IMF had not convincingly communicated its inten-
tions and policies to the market (Independent Evaluation Office 2003:
executive summary). Reactions to the report spoke of an urgent need
for reform at the IMF.
Three lessons from the Asian crisis were neatly summarised by then
Managing Director Rodrigo de Rato. First, the IMF had to guard against
disruptions in international capital markets. For this purpose, new
instruments were developed in the vein of estimating capital flow risks.
Second, the IMF realised that the forces of contagion in today’s world
economy are quick and damaging. Since then, regular surveillance of
members’ economies by the IMF staff also includes a balance sheet
analysis. Third, the IMF understood that it was crucial to listen more
carefully to members when implementing rescue packages, in particu-
lar with regard to matters of social stability as an auxiliary priority next
to economic growth (De Rato 2007).
However, despite such concrete measures of reform, the fundamental
question about the role and responsibility of the IMF in the world econ-
omy today remains a matter of dispute. The IMF does not have the
authority to function as central bank of the members’ central banks. It
also lacks the resources and credibility to serve as a lender of last resort.
The critical examiner thus wonders, what is then the Fund’s role? A
few examples may suffice to illustrate the current discourse. Mervyn
King, Governor of the Bank of England, thinks that the IMF should
‘keep an eye on global externalities’ or, in other words, offer expert ad-
vice on the external risks of monetary policies (King 2006). Jean-Claude
Trichet, President of the European Central Bank until October 2011, is
less optimistic, arguing that the existing setup of the IMF cannot cope
properly with today’s rapid change (Trichet 2007).
The subprime crisis began in the real estate sector of the US econo-
my in 2007 and spread to the world economy in the course of 2008.
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Despite claims to the contrary, the IMF does not seem to have antici-
pated the crisis, as indeed holds true for the vast majority of observers.
As the crisis unfolded, the IMF did come up with estimates of the huge
damage done. In April 2008, the IMF’s Global Financial Stability report
cited worldwide losses of credit of a colossal magnitude: $ 945 billion
(Sheng 2009: 425). Throughout the years 2007-2009, the IMF re-
mained somewhat on the sidelines observing the enormous rescue
packages initiated by the US and EU governments; the IMF was, as
mentioned above, only directly involved in packages given to a number
of smaller economies. Still, vigorous critics of the IMF did not keep
quiet. Joseph Stiglitz accused the IMF of having contributed actively to
causing the subprime crisis by its hard and consistent push for the lib-
eralisation of capital markets since the 1980s (Stiglitz 2010: 214-215).
When the IMF again entered the stage as a large-scale supplier of res-
cue funds in 2010, the situation was very different from the one that
had prevailed during the Asian crisis. The crises in Greece and Ireland
bore a greater resemblance to the debt crises in Latin America during
the 1980s when government and not private business was the foremost
culprit. Lavish deficit spending had to be curtailed, which clearly neces-
sitated restraint in fiscal policy and improvement of governance. In
addition, conditions imposed on the governments to be rescued were
subject to reconciliation with the EU and the priorities of EU economic
policy. This was an entirely new situation for the IMF. The time hori-
zon is still too short to be able to pass judgment on the IMF’s perfor-
mance in Europe during the present recession. Time will also tell what
the outcome was of several years of soul-searching concerning the
tasks, responsibilities and methods of the IMF.
Zeal for reform
One of the most sacred traditions in the institutions inherited from the
Bretton Woods system of international payments concerns the preroga-
tives in appointing top executives: always an American as President of
the World Bank, always a European as managing director of the IMF.
Since its inception, the IMF has had ten managing directors, distribu-
ted as follows by country of origin: France 4, Sweden 2, and 1 each for
Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Spain. The longest record of
service is held by the Frenchman Michel Camdessus, managing direc-
tor from January 1987 to February 2000, whose reign came to a conclu-
sion in the midst of the soul-searching in the aftermath of the Asian
financial crisis. Camdessus’s immediate successor, Horst Köhler, who
later became president of Germany, was the one most ardently pres-
sured to instigate reform at the institution. His successor, the Spaniard
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Rodrigo de Rato (in office from June 2004 to October 2007), assumed
responsibility during what was arguably one of the quietest and inward-
looking phases in IMF history, whereas the current top executive, the
Frenchman Dominique Strauss-Kahn, has had to steer the IMF through
the commotion surrounding the subprime crisis and subsequent reces-
sion.
Although getting the most publicity, the Independent Evaluation Of-
fice was not the only institutional innovation at the IMF in 2001. In that
year, the Fund also created a new department, the Capital Markets
Department, with the specific task of monitoring development in global
finance. This department was later merged with the Monetary Affairs &
Exchange Department and the subsequent Monetary & Capital Markets
Department is at present responsible for producing half-yearly financial
stability reports. These reports apply standards of economic vulnerabil-
ity that are successively improved by the Financial Stability Forum,
whose mandate from the G7 ministers of finance and central bank gov-
ernors dates from February 1999.
Already in 1999, when Camdessus was still managing director, coun-
try surveillance by the IMF was formalised in a format developed jointly
with the World Bank, labeled the Financial Sector Assessment Program
(FSAP). These programmes provide a comprehensive review of the
strengths and weaknesses of a member’s financial system with the aim
of improving resilience to external shocks. Between 2000 and late
2007, the IMF, together with the World Bank, conducted no less than
114 FSAPs. Yet it is worth noting that the largest member of the IMF,
the United States, has not yet been subject to such a review of potential
risks, whereas China and India were only added to the list at a very late
stage. In total, the IMF counts 40 members in the Asia-Pacific region,
but only about one in four has been covered by the FSAP initiative
(Sheng 2009: 123, 352-354). There seems to be a strange incongruence
between the origins of financial crises and the targets of IMF country
surveillance.
More is at stake at the IMF than departmental innovation and reshuf-
fling or the improvement of procedures. There is growing consensus
that the quota distribution of voting power at the IMF is hopelessly out-
dated and reflects the situation in the world economy at the conclusion
of the Second World War. Just to give one example, Belgium has a quo-
ta of 2.13 percent, almost as much as Brazil and Mexico taken together
(2.61 percent) or even China (2.94 percent). The G20 summit in Seoul
on 11-12 November 2010 accepted a proposal for quota reform at the
IMF in order to ‘adequately reflect the relative weight and responsibil-
ities of the IMF members in the world economy’. This proposal was en-
dorsed at the 2010 ASEM summit (ASEM 2010: 3). However, the im-
mediate target is modest: a shift of 5 percent from overrepresented
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countries like Belgium to members that are obviously underrepresented
such as China and Brazil.
As mentioned at the outset of this article, ASEM 8 at Brussels in
October 2010 strongly endorsed IMF reform, especially with respect to
issues of governance. This includes the procedure for the appointment
of top executives, staff diversity at senior and mid-level positions, and
the size and composition of the Fund’s executive board. According to
the Brussels declaration of ASEM 8, top executives at the IMF should
be selected in an ‘open, transparent and merit-based process’ (ASEM
2010: 3). The time has come to move beyond a situation such as in
2000 when the US government vetoed the first candidate of the
German government, Caio Koch-Weser, in favour of the second one on
the list, Horst Köhler. It is also no longer inconceivable that the next
managing director of the IMF comes from another part of the world
than the EU.
The endorsement of IMF reform by the ASEM members stems from
a genuine concern about the vulnerability of both Asian and European
economies to the vicissitudes of international capital markets. The
ASEM partnership therefore involves financial cooperation through the
sharing of information and dialogue. The aim of this cooperation was
laid down at ASEM 5 in Hanoi 2004, with the damage and distress of
the Asian financial crisis still fresh in peoples’ memory. The overall aim
is ‘a sound, sustainable and resilient financial architecture in order to
cope with potential financial shocks’ (ASEM 2004: 2). At ASEM 8, it
was officially acknowledged that the integration of financial markets in
Asia and Europe still left much to be desired. There is considerable
scope for an enlargement of trading, investment and financial services
between the two regions (ASEM Chair 2010: 3). In other words, the ul-
terior ambitions of ASEM and the IMF coincide, which explains why
the former is so interested in the reform of the latter.
Conclusion
On 15 January 1998, President Suharto signed the second agreement
between the IMF and Indonesia following the IMF’s outspoken irrita-
tion at the slowness of the Indonesian government in implementing
the Fund’s policy recommendations. The picture of the ceremony
showed the Indonesian president seated with bent head while Michel
Camdessus was standing haughtily with folded arms looking on (Van
Dijk 2001: 105). This image, which was widely televised at the time, un-
intentionally captured both the IMF’s excessive confidence in carrying
out its task in accordance with the Washington consensus and the
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increasing resentment of recipient countries of policies imposed by the
IMF as a condition to get needed rescue money.
The analysis of the historical background to the current reform zeal
at the IMF conceives the Asian financial crisis as a turning point. Did
the IMF, by consistently promoting the liberalisation of international ca-
pital flows, contribute to causing financial crises, in Asia in 1997/98,
Brazil in 1998/99, even worldwide in 2008/09? Did IMF’s application
of a standard recipe for domestic reform of the financial sector make
matters worse? Whatever the answers to such questions, heatedly de-
bated among economists since the late 1990s, one outcome was certain.
The IMF had to undergo reform. A great deal of internal soul-searching
took place during a period when the IMF played a less conspicuous role
in the world economy than before. Reform has not been particularly
quick, but things are clearly changing at the IMF. From the perspective
of Asia-Europe cooperation, the IMF seems to be moving in the right
direction. ASEM 8 and the ASEM process can make a sustainable con-
tribution to IMF reform by continuing to endorse and support reform
measures at the IMF that would enhance the institution’s transparency
and responsiveness to changing conditions in the world economy.
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7 In Search of a New Global
Financial Architecture:
China, the G20 and ASEM
Jörn-Carsten Gottwald
The economic crisis that hit the world of globalised finance in 2008 is
profoundly changing the architecture of global governance. The United
States and the European Union (EU) are facing enormous challenges in
stabilising their financial markets. Asian economies faced the loss of
their most important export markets. Global economic cooperation and
regulation are at the top of the agenda of international relations. At
ASEM 8 in Brussels in October 2010, ASEM leaders addressed the is-
sue of global economic governance, publishing the Brussels Declaration
on More Effective Global Governance. Europe, Asia and particularly the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) managed to agree to revise the global
financial architecture on an ongoing basis.
While the mere fact that all members of ASEM put aside their differ-
ences and formulated a joint statement is remarkable in itself, the new
role of the PRC in global regulatory reform is even more eye-catching.
China has overcome the initially harsh fallout from the turbulence in
global financial markets. Continuing to fulfill its role as the major
growth engine of the world economy, its leadership is suddenly being
thrust on to the centre stage of global governance. From the Chinese
perspective, the financial crisis was a Western crisis that impacted an
economy well-prepared to meet the challenge (Sun Mingchun 2009). It
nevertheless brought out the imbalances and structural weaknesses of
the PRC’s integration into the world economy (Schueller/Schueller-
Zhou 2009). Abroad, observers wonder if ‘China [will] change the rules
of global order’ (Chin/Thakur 2010: 119) during this ‘Bretton Woods
moment’ (Helleiner 2010: 619) of ‘rising influence, rising challenges’
(Overholt 2010: 21). The Chinese leadership is caught between, on the
one hand, pride about its increased global influence and profile and, on
the other hand, insecurity as well as anxiety regarding the implications
of its new role as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in global governance.
The financial crisis of 2008 exposed severe shortcomings in the global
financial architecture ‘known variously as neoliberalism, the Washington
Consensus or the globalization consensus, centred on the notion that all
governments should liberalize, privatize, deregulate’ (Wade 2008: 5).
The global response to the crisis has been overshadowed by the broader
issue of underlying norms and values. The so-called Beijing Consensus
(Cooper Ramo 2004; Halper 2010), with its unique combination of
high-speed export-led economic growth and authoritarian politics, is
being discussed in the PRC as the Chinese model (zhongguo moshi, Yu
Keping 2006) or Chinese way (Zhou Song 2010). This model adds a
new dimension to the ongoing debate on how to understand China’s
new role in international relations: is China a threat to the pre-existing
world order or a new contributor to transnational rulemaking? (Hellei-
ner/Pagliano 2010). This debate has also raised the issue of Chinese lea-
ders’ perceptions of global governance and the transnational/inter-regio-
nal response to the crisis, and the compatibility of these perceptions with
established Western thinking (Zhang Baohui 2010; Rosenau/Wang
2009; Beeson 2009; Chan/Pak/Chan 2008). The scepticism towards
global governance is only gradually being replaced by a more proactive
attitude (Buzan 2009; Zhu Liqun 2010; Gottwald/Duggan 2011), with
potentially far-reaching consequences for the EU’s relations with China
and ASEM in particular (Bersick 2008). In this context this chapter ar-
gues that the ASEM summits in Beijing 2008 and Brussels 2010 high-
light China’s policy of gradually taking on a more active role in reform-
ing the global financial architecture in close cooperation with its Eur-
opean and Asian partners.
The 2008 crisis and Sino-EU cooperation
From the perspective of comparative government, the PRC has been
aptly described as a learning, adaptive authoritarian system, with the
state dominated by a Leninist party apparatus (Shambaugh 2008;
Naughton 2008; Niquet 2009). Learning from its own history, from
Western market economies and from the results of extensive experi-
ments, the Chinese Communist Party has managed to strengthen its
grip on the Chinese polity while at the same time introducing funda-
mental economic and social reforms (Brodsgaard/Zheng 2006; Heil-
mann 2008; Pearson 2007; Zheng Yongnian 2010). The global crisis
that erupted in 2008 threatened the cornerstone of China’s economic
development,which is heavily dependent on exports and foreign direct
investment. This has put the adaptive capabilities of the Chinese polity
to the test, as there is no ‘best international practice’ in dealing with this
unprecedented event. From late 2008, when governments in America,
Europe and Asia were searching for an answer to the financial melt-
down, China has also been drawn into the debate. The leadership in
Beijing was caught unprepared and needed several weeks to develop a
political reaction. In the end, it had to acknowledge that the ‘globaliza-
tion of the crisis requires a globalized response’ (Bergsten 2008), even if
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it included a revision of China's traditional role in international rela-
tions.
In the aftermath of the 1997/98 financial crisis in East Asia, China
intensified its domestic reforms and developed a more supportive atti-
tude towards regional cooperation in the context of the Chiang Mai
Initiative.1 However, the potential for Chinese leadership even at the
regional level was perceived as limited (Hyeoung 2009: 453-455).
Improvements in regional cooperation were the result of decreasing US
opposition, a more proactive Japan and an evolving adaptation of
China’s political stance. The EU attempted to support these reforms.
The integration of the PRC into the global order had long been a funda-
mental objective of the EU’s China policy. At the same time, the EU
sought to understand China’s emerging financial markets better
through several forms of cooperation, including a roundtable on finan-
cial services underpinned by a bilateral project from 2002 to 2005 (EU
2005). While there is little evidence of substantial outcomes emerging
from this project beyond a deeper mutual understanding, these efforts
facilitated the emergence of a network of regulatory experts that became
heavily involved in coordinating the crisis management.
The EU-China dialogue on macroeconomic and financial regulatory
issues, one of several sectoral dialogues, was initially dominated by Eur-
opeans’ perception that they were helping to introduce European norms
and standards to an emerging China. It was launched in 2004, with the
first meetings held in Brussels in 2005 followed by more meetings in
Beijing the following year. The project aimed to facilitate an exchange
of views between the two sides meant to support the improvement of
the regulatory framework for financial services in China. Europe, which
was itself grappling with the challenges of creating a single market for
financial services from 1998 onwards, was not on the agenda (EU
2010). The roundtable led to several follow-up projects in various areas
of EU-China relations. These meetings facilitated the emergence of net-
works of regulators, market participants and politicians. That proved in-
strumental in the first efforts to coordinate crisis response at the ASEM
summit in Beijing 2008. The bilateral dialogues and exchanges, along
with training programmes for bankers and regulators, also paved the
way for international careers for leading experts from the PRC. While
Europeans had long established claims to top positions in the Bretton
Woods organisations, their Chinese counterparts were only beginning
their ascendance in the world of global finance. Thus, the asymmetry in
the objectives of the sectoral dialogue on financial services could be
used by the Chinese side for the long-term goal of improving their un-
derstanding of global governance and preparing Chinese candidates for
top international posts.
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When the financial crisis erupted in the US over the summer of
2008, the complex multi-level polity of the EU lacked a clear central
authority to formulate a political response. Most member states initially
perceived the crisis as a failure of Anglo-American capitalism with only
limited effects on continental Europe. Early calls by France for a Eur-
opean fund to stabilise the banks were rejected by the German govern-
ment in blunt language (Proissl 2009). With the Commission treading
cautiously, key member states such as France, Germany or the United
Kingdom (UK) tried to agree on a joint agenda. Often enough, though,
they failed to build a consensus, as was the case with taxes on banks
and the remuneration of managers. But the EU was able to support re-
forms to financial regulation, including the so-called ‘Basel III’ rules for
banks and the supervision of cross-border activities. Germany and
France closely coordinated their positions, which was expressed in a
joint letter by the French president and the German chancellor (Le
Monde 18 March 2009).2 Despite efforts to coordinate a European
stance, conflicts such as the sovereign debt crisis inevitably highlighted
the deep divisions within the EU (Wills 2010). In those areas where the
EU managed to identify common ground, it called for more stringent
and comprehensive international regulation supported by measures of
peer review and peer pressure. This followed the European approach of
allowing members to veto issues of crucial significance but raising the
bar for the use of these veto powers through public and peer pressure
on any member openly opposed to the proposed policies backed by a
majority. China was deemed to be an integral part of any future global
architecture and therefore needed to be integrated more firmly into the
organisations and procedures of global governance.
This constituted a tremendous turnabout from the rather hostile atti-
tude taken earlier towards Chinese outward investment (Gottwald
2010). Suddenly, European leaders were welcoming China’s policy of
reasonable investments in Europe, announced in 2009 by Prime Minis-
ter Wen Jiabao in Berlin. Similarly, announcements of China’s intention
to buy the sovereign debt of struggling EU member states were greeted
with much fanfare (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 28 January 2010).
Premier Wen reiterated China’s practical support in tackling the sover-
eign debt crisis and ‘expected Germany to play a key role in and exert
great influence on it’ (Bi Mingxin 2011). Even the heated dispute over
China’s foreign exchange policy was kept in check within the partner-
ship. This remained an unresolved issue between the two sides but was
prevented from escalating into a major dispute. Europe found itself
caught between the sharp criticism by the US of China’s state-con-
trolled exchange rate and calls from the PRC to develop an alternative
to the US dollar as a global currency (Boschat/Horobin 2011). Striving
to strike a balance between US and Chinese demands, French President
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Nicolas Sarkozy conceded China’s sovereignty in setting its foreign ex-
change policy, thereby confirming a key stance of the Chinese leader-
ship in the global efforts to reform the international monetary system.
With France taking over the presidency of the G20 in 2011, the Eur-
opean position on China became even more important. This explains
Europe’s decision to leave open confrontations with the PRC on its ar-
guably undervalued currency to bilateral meetings between the US and
Chinese representatives, while sticking to a carefully drafted line of ar-
guments reminding nations of the need to let exchange rates express
the differences in economic performance (Süddeutsche Zeitung 28 Janu-
ary 2011).
Under the current presidency of France in 2011, the G20 continues
to seek a solution to the contentious issue of exchange rates. China
failed to secure the cooperation of its BRIC partners (Brazil, Russia and
India), as Brazil was one of the most outspoken critics of what the Latin
American government considered to be the deliberate undervaluation of
the Renminbi. China was less concerned with the push for coordinated
structural reform in G20 member countries in spite of the PRC’s gen-
eral emphasis on national economic sovereignty. From the perspective
of Chinese leaders, the PRC deserved a strengthened position as a re-
sult of its support for the global crisis response and rejected calls for
taking on more responsibility by allowing its currency to appreciate, for
example.
Even in one of the most controversial discussions, the PRC and Eur-
ope seemed to slowly develop common ground. While the PRC declared
its exchange-rate regime to be a domestic issue not fit for consideration
at the G20, it did take steps to accommodate calls for a change in its ex-
change-rate regime, allowing for an appreciation of the Chinese cur-
rency. Thus, the exchange rate nominally constituted an occasion where
Chinese and EU leaders differed on the interpretation of intervening in
domestic affairs by calling for a change in policies. At the same time,
the carefully drafted statements of the two partners and the sequence of
steps taken by the Chinese leadership highlight a careful assessment of
interests and an incremental revision of its norms. In the end, an open
conflict was prevented, and the issue was pushed back to bilateral US-
China and US-EU talks.
The new G20
With European support, the G20 was reinvented as the main forum for
organising a global response to the financial and economic crisis. The
first summit of the new G20 took place in Washington in 2008, con-
vened by the outgoing Bush administration. Traditionally, China had
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been sceptical about global governance, adopting international norms
and standards only sporadically according to internal preferences (Wal-
ter 2010: 161-162). Thus, it came as no surprise when the Chinese lead-
ership initially voiced its support for the global coordination of national
responses but did not call for a new global governance. Instead, it an-
nounced just days before the summit got underway a RMB 4 trillion
package to boost domestic demand (Xinhua 2008a) in order to sustain
China’s economic growth. This move was intended to signal China’s
efforts to support global economic growth and thus contain growing
international pressure for a more active involvement in global govern-
ance (Niquet 2009: 5-8). At the same time, the Chinese central govern-
ment loosened constraints on local government investments (Wu Guo-
guang 2010: 28) and ordered the state-controlled banks to facilitate
cheap credit.
At the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, China used all its
channels of bilateral and multilateral cooperation to define its policies.
Issues of financial regulation steadily gained importance in Sino-Eur-
opean relations. The EU and China used the ASEM7 summit in Beijing
to prepare a joint position for the G20 summit in Washington in No-
vember 2008. At ASEM7 summit, Wen announced his support for the
EU position on regulating global financial markets, sending out a
strong signal of European-Chinese cooperation and improved French-
Chinese ties. According to the German government, coordination be-
tween the two sides proved to be surprisingly unproblematic. Ahead of
the G20 summit in London in April 2009, both sides developed posi-
tions that were much closer to each other than the widening gap be-
tween the US on the one hand and Europe and China on the other.
In his speech at the Washington G20 summit in November 2008, Pre-
sident Hu Jintao stressed the need for close cooperation and a funda-
mental review of global rules. He called for fast and decisive action by
national governments but within and according to their individual cir-
cumstances. Hu Jintao emphasised the special responsibility of the more
advanced economies and warned against premature moves (State Coun-
cil 2008). The US, the EU and emerging markets such as Brazil and
India all expressed their clear expectations that the Chinese leadership
would become heavily involved and support the response to the crisis
through ‘responsible investment’ abroad. The Chinese media, however,
focused on the country’s potential new dominance, particularly in the
economic sphere, in the emerging new world order (Caijing, 28 Novem-
ber 2008).
China’s leaders hope to use the opportunity created by the financial
crisis to further strengthen the country’s reform policies and its integra-
tion into the world economy, including global governance (Sina.com
2009). The preservation of Chinese economic growth is considered to
102 JÖRN-CARSTEN GOTTWALD
be the most important contribution to global efforts to respond to the
crisis (State Council 2009a). Global crisis management was pro-
nounced to be the number one priority of China’s Ministry of Foreign
Relations for 2009 (Yang Jiechi 2009). The growing role of the G20,
however, has stirred concerns about its impact on China’s economic
sovereignty. The establishment of a global banking regulator with
authority over Chinese banks is deemed unacceptable (FT Online
2009). Instead, global governance reform was intrinsically linked with
ongoing reforms at home. A deeper integration and a more pro-active
attitude to the reform of financial regulation on a global scale should
enhance the sophistication of China’s domestic regulatory framework
as well as open up attractive opportunities for outward investment (Qi
Bao 2008). Based on the principle that every country should contribute
according to its specific circumstances, China has called for an orderly
and systematic reform of the financial system that should strengthen
the involvement of emerging markets and developing countries.
Improving China’s representation in the IMF
The coordination of macro-economic policies became one pillar of the
global crisis management that came out of the G20. The second pillar
was the issue of how to improve the existing institutions of global fi-
nancial governance in order to better hedge against future crises. China
had long sought to be better represented at the IMF and the World
Bank and was eager to follow up on earlier reform attempts. Further-
more, the transformation of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) into
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) saw the PRC joining a key organisa-
tion right at the start of its work. Both cases highlight the ambition of
China’s leadership to influence future rulemaking while being careful
not to overcommit itself.
Reforming the IMF became one of the key issues for the new G20 in
its attempt to reform global economic governance. China had joined
the World Bank and the IMF late, drawing upon the institutions’ exper-
tise in the formulation of its reform policies in the 1980s as other de-
veloping countries did (Jakobson/Oksenberg 1990). After years of isola-
tion, China was able to link up with a well established set of norms,
ideas and policies through its membership in these Bretton Woods in-
stitutions. The IMF, however, suffered an ‘identity crisis’ (Truman
2005) as emerging countries grew increasingly frustrated with US and
Europe’s refusal to significantly raise their voting rights and board re-
presentation. Even after a careful reform proposal was launched in
2006, Chinese officials still deplored the insufficient voice given to
poor and transition countries and the ability of the advanced countries
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to overrule their concerns in important matters regarding IMF govern-
ance (Xinhua 2007). The IMF was pushed back into the centre of global
governance by the 2008 financial crisis. The two main issues of inter-
nal reforms concerned the representation of countries on the IMF ex-
ecutive board and voting rights. Both were dominated by the Western
powers of the post-World War II period and did not reflect the growing
importance of Asian or Latin American emerging countries in the
world economy. Negotiations on reforming voting rights dragged on for
most of the first decade of this century. While the US supported from
an early stage an increase in China’s share, the large European states
feared losing their permanent representation on the board and were re-
luctant to agree to any major revision. As late as 2006, China had fewer
voting rights than the Netherlands and Belgium combined (see Lind-
blad in this volume). This underpinned Chinese claims that the IMF
was ‘dominated by the US, Europe and Japan’ (Xinhua 2006). High-
ranking officials repeatedly stressed the crucial importance of IMF re-
form for China’s leadership in the context of the global crisis manage-
ment (Wu Chong 2010).
Reforming the regulatory architecture of global finance became one
of the main objectives of the global response to the crisis. The first G20
summit in Washington called for a revision of the institutions and orga-
nisations involved in the regulation of financial services, including the
IMF (G20 2008, 2009). One of the key deficits – the lack of accurate
representation of emerging markets – could be resolved relatively sim-
ply. China’s decision to provide an additional $ 40 billion to the IMF in
April 2009 was hailed as an important step in increasing its representa-
tion in the organisation and in bringing its voting rights closer to its
importance to the global economy (Xinhua 2009c).
In pursuing reform of the IMF, the PRC lined up with other emer-
ging nations like Brazil and India in demanding a recalibration that
reflected the changes in their share of global economic activity. The
agreement among G20 finance ministers in 2009 to redistribute six
percent of voting rights from developed markets to emerging markets
thus received a cautious welcome. The Chinese vice minister of foreign
affairs in charge of the G20, Cui Tiankui, called it an ‘obvious progress’
towards real reform of the IMF (Xinhua 2010a). He further stressed the
need for China not to attempt to maximise its interests in the context of
the reforms, which might include the way in which voting rights are
calculated and how the organisation is governed.
In its October communiqué in 2009, the IMF officially called for a
revision of the quota of the member states by the end of 2011. The
changes would propel four emerging economies into the top 10 and
make China the third ranking country in the IMF (IMF 2010). In its
proposal to strengthen the representation of poorer and emerging
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states, the IMF went beyond the original G20 call for an increase of 5
percent, which was supported by the G20 finance minister meeting in
South Korea in October 2010 (EIU 2010). By the end of 2010, the num-
ber of countries and their share of voting rights that were needed to
accept the changes had increased considerably. The Chinese govern-
ment pushed for the speedy implementation of the agreement, calling
for an ‘aggressive’ coordination of the countries by the IMF to secure
its swift realisation (Xinhua 2010b). To avoid future haggling about
changes in quotas, the Chinese minister of finance called for a mechan-
ism for automatic adjustment to reflect shifts in the relative weight of
member states.
An important part of China’s policy is the grooming of experts for
key positions in international organisations. Acknowledging the need to
foster expertise on global governance, Chinese candidates are carefully
prepared. Candidates for top positions at the IMF are first transferred
to the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), while candidates for the World
Bank are first sent to the Ministry of Finance. Zhu Min, who assumed
the position of Special Advisor to the Managing Director of the IMF in
February 2010, was first promoted deputy governor of the PBOC. His
appointment was interpreted by Chinese observers as a ‘significant step
toward breaking up the US and Europe's dominant position in the in-
ternational financial stage’ and as a symbol of China’s growing weight
in international institutions (Wang Bo/Mao Lijun 2009). Earlier, Justin
Yifu Lin had already been appointed chief economist of the IMF.3
Setting up the Financial Stability Board
One of the potentially most important outcomes of the London G20
summit in April 2009 was the decision to upgrade the Financial Stabi-
lity Forum (FSF) to a global Financial Stability Board (FSB). The FSF
had had very little success in promoting global rules and codes of con-
duct in financial services prior to the crisis, but as the FSB it took a cen-
tral role in identifying and addressing key factors that had led to the
global financial crisis of 2008 (Carrasco 2010: 205). The FSF had been
rightfully criticised for excluding representatives from emerging mar-
kets: homogeneity was deemed more efficient than the inclusion of ma-
jor nations (Liberi 2003: 549). Thus, joining the FSB resolved an issue
of substantial prestige for the PRC. Nevertheless, the PRC thus signed
up for a mechanism with potentially far-reaching effects on its sover-
eignty to deal with issues of financial services regulation.
China joined the FSB aware that this would increase the pressure for
it to adopt international standards. Accordingly, domestic voices called
for the setting up of a Chinese financial stability board to support the
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State Council in the supervision of the financial system and to improve
coordination among the existing supervisory authorities (Yan Pei 2010).
Not surprisingly, this call did not find the support of the Chinese cen-
tral bank, which is entrusted with macro-prudential supervision (Zhou
Xiaochuan 2010). The FSB’s establishment and mandate ‘present sig-
nificant threats to national sovereignty, as it gives the international com-
munity the authority to review and regulate the financial and opera-
tional structures of private enterprises, potentially bypassing the juris-
diction of national regulatory systems’ (Kelly 2009).
The EU and China supported the establishment of the FSB, includ-
ing peer reviews of regulation and regulatory reforms. The FSB expli-
citly calls for a race-to-the-top of its members and thus includes an ele-
ment of transferring sovereignty over the regulation of financial ser-
vices from national governments to an international body (G20 2010:
18-20). China ‘pledged to support robust and transparent independent
international assessment and peer review of their financial systems
through the IMF-World Bank Financial Stability Assistance Programme
(FSAP) and the FSB peer review process’ (G20 2010: 19). In this re-
gard, the FSB follows similar procedures within the G20. The mutual
assessment process puts national economic policy under the scrutiny of
peers and introduces an element of pressure to comply with globally
agreed objectives (Kelly 2010). However, all measures decided by the
G20 need unanimity and thereby leave room for a veto. Calls for the in-
troduction of new banking levies and a global transaction tax were ve-
toed, to the disappointment of EU leaders. In the case of the FSB, Chi-
nese support might have been facilitated by the comparatively weak in-
stitutional set-up of the board which has raised concerns about its
ability to fulfil its ambitious tasks (Kawai/Pomerleano 2009).
Conclusion
The traditional objective of the strategic partnership between China and
the EU – to facilitate mutual cooperation and contribute to better global
governance – has moved one step closer to realisation. Relations
between Asia and Europe have matured enough to address the crucial
issue of revising the global financial architecture. In ASEM as well as at
the global level, the emergence of China as a key actor has changed the
framework for policymaking. At the same time, China’s involvement in
ASEM and the various levels, tracks and venues for exchange within
and between Asia and Europe support this turnabout in Chinese poli-
cies. A leadership that needed to define its actornes at the ASEM sum-
mit in Beijing in 2008 returned to the ASEM summit in Brussels in
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2010 with a sophisticated long-term strategy based on learning and co-
operation.
By learning from new experiences and by adapting its policies, the
Chinese government has committed itself to the potentially far-reaching
efforts of the new G20 and the new FSB, knowing that the current
round of rulemaking will have a major impact on the future of financial
systems worldwide. China was left out of the defining of the rules for
the liberalisation of capital until the late 1990s. However, during the
Asian financial crisis and even more so in the aftermath of the current
economic and financial crisis, it has stepped up its involvement. China
has realised its objective of gaining the recognition it deserved of its
growing contribution to the world economy by securing an increase in
its voting rights at the World Bank. At the same time, a long-term strat-
egy is emerging of bringing Chinese cadre into mid-level and top posi-
tions at the reformed Bretton Woods institutions. Taken together, these
measures reveal a fundamental change in Chinese attitude towards the
global governance of financial services while at the same time demon-
strating continuity in the PRC’s policymaking process in terms of mov-
ing step by step, learning by doing, and taking a long-term view. In this
the ASEM process has proven to be most intrumental. While there are
still ‘hardly any comprehensive proposals on the table’ regarding how
the future global financial architecture will look like, the PRC – now in-
creasingly embedded in inter-regional and global governance – is set-
ting important milestones.
Notes
1 On 6 June 2000, the members of ASEAN+3 agreed in the Thai resort of Chiang Mai
to conclude a set of bilateral swap agreements to mutually support each other in case
of a financial crisis. In 2003 and 2007, the Chiang Mai Initiative was multilateralised
and expanded. It has thus become an important pillar of the regional multilateral ar-
chitecture.
2 The full text of the joint letter is available at http://www.deutschland-frankreich.diplo.
de/Europaische-Union-muss-geschlossen,4196.html [19.03.2009].
3 Contrary to general policies, Justin Yifu Lin had not been specifically prepared by a
stint at the Ministry of Finance or the People’s Bank of China for his new position at
the IMF and took a leave of absence from his chair at Peking University.
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8 Banking Regulations at a Crossroads
Bram de Roos*
In the declaration following the eighth Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM),
the heads of state and government of Asia and Europe announced their
resolve to strengthen the resilience and the transparency of the financial
system and reform the financial sector. Indeed, the seriousness of the fi-
nancial crisis calls for no less. The factors that contributed to a situation
where the global financial system was dependent on ever-increasing
housing prices in the US are now subject to new legislative initiatives in
countries around the world. The careless credit issuance and complex
securitised products that have caught so many investors’ attention are
now the target of scrutiny and restrictions, setting the stage for sweep-
ing regulatory reform.
However, instead of looking at what went wrong, we can also draw
lessons from what went well. While European countries needed unpre-
cedented bailouts to keep the financial system going and are still having
difficulty coping with the fallout, many Asian countries were only
affected by the crisis because of a decline in international trade. Some
Asian economies have already returned to pre-crisis growth rates. The
different stages in economic development cannot be disregarded, but
there could very well be elements of financial regulation in Asian mar-
kets that can inspire guidelines for the future in other countries. The
Asian crisis of 1997 also spurred a wave of regulatory reform that
aimed to protect the affected countries against future external shocks,
and these new regulations have contributed to a less severe impact from
the most recent crisis. At the same time, protracted periods of high eco-
nomic growth require ever deeper, more liquid and more efficient capi-
tal markets. As the economies of Asian and Eastern European countries
grow, past mistakes and best practices of countries with a more devel-
oped financial system can guide the design of a more efficient and
stable financial sector.
Using datasets on government intervention, economic growth, finan-
cial regulations and the stability of banks, this article aims to explore
new directions in the search for an improved regulatory framework.
While a detailed scrutiny of legislative differences and correlations be-
tween regulations and financial instability goes beyond the scope of this
analysis, the data might offer leads for further research. ASEM is well
positioned to facilitate an exchange of knowledge to help develop guide-
lines based on the experience of its member countries that can contri-
bute to a more stable financial system. The data focuses on ASEM
member countries where possible.
The first section of this chapter focuses on the most important causes
and impacts of the 2008 financial crisis. Because this event inspires the
current call for regulatory reform, it is important to look at what went
wrong and how countries were affected. Since Asian countries were
generally only affected through the contraction of economic activity in
the US and European countries, Asian regulatory systems, especially in
those countries that suffered least from the crisis, can point out new
directions for regulatory reform in Europe.
In the following section, aspects of banking regulation and their dif-
ferences in Europe and Asia are discussed.1 In general, Asian ASEM
members doled out less government support to keep their financial sec-
tors afloat in the wake of the crisis. At the same time, these countries
have a more stringent regulatory framework. I will then analyse the
main characteristics of the Basel framework for banking supervision,
since this is the most successful initiative for internationally uniform
guidelines. These guidelines use metrics such as the capital ratio and
leverage to monitor the vulnerability of financial institutions to external
shocks and aim to establish a global level playing field while reducing
the probability and severity of a subsequent crisis.
The fourth section points out some challenges related to the imple-
mentation of banking regulations (internationally coordinated). While a
solid regulatory framework can contribute to a more stable financial
sector, characteristics such as a bank’s ownership structure and the will-
ingness and ability of local authorities to implement regulations can
lead to unintended consequences. The last section discusses how ASEM
can contribute to a more robust regulatory framework through the ex-
change of information and best practices. The unique experiences of
member countries can allow other members to develop more tailored
and effective regulations to create a more stable financial sector.
The causes and impact of the financial crisis
As described by Claessens, Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven in the IMF
Working Paper “Lessons and Policy Implications from the Global Fi-
nancial Crisis”, the crisis of 2008 was caused by some characteristics
seen in previous crises but was able to spread due to recent develop-
ments in the financial markets. The more familiar characteristics are
(Claessens et al. 2010: 4):
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a a bubble in asset prices, in this case mainly house prices in the US
which rose by 30 percent over the five years preceding the crisis;
b a credit boom, also especially in the US, fuelled in partly by guaran-
tees by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mack and NINJA (no income, no
job) mortgages;
c marginal loans and systemic risk resulting from the large amount of
sub-prime mortgages that were extended based on the expectation of
ever-increasing house prices (in 2005, sub-prime mortgages ac-
counted for 15 percent of US home-purchase loan originations, com-
pared with less than 5 percent in 2000); and
d regulation and supervision, which failed to recognise and target the
weaknesses of the system, and the interconnectedness that even-
tually led to the spread of the crisis.
What Claessens et al. call the new dimensions of the crisis include:
a increased opaqueness caused by the creation of complex securitised
financial products and off-balance special purpose vehicles (while
less than 35 percent of loans that didn’t conform to the underwriting
standards of government-sponsored agencies were securitised in
2000, this had increased to more than 70 percent in 2007);
b financial integration and interconnectedness, resulting from the in-
creased openness of domestic markets and larger international capi-
tal flows, especially among OECD countries;
c the role of leverage among both financial institutions and borrowers,
as European banks held smaller capital reserves and US institutions
used more and more off-balance-sheet constructions. This high
leverage left both borrowers and lenders more vulnerable to even
small shocks; and
d the central role of households in the crisis via the boom in sub-
prime mortgage lending.
This combination of familiar and new characteristics led to a significant
impact and wide contagion of the crisis once housing prices in the US
declined. While initially only financial institutions with a direct expo-
sure to this market were affected, other institutions soon felt the impact
as interbank lending contracted sharply and stock prices declined. Even
with additional liquidity provided by central banks, many institutions
were strapped for cash, as they had to write off assets and had very lim-
ited access to liabilities. This process was exacerbated by the collapse of
Lehman Brothers, which significantly reduced mutual trust in the fi-
nancial sector, further reducing the availability of inter-bank loans. As
credit dried up and economic activity contracted, markets and sectors
with no direct exposure to the US housing market suffered from a
sharp reduction in credit lines to finance working capital, trade finance
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and other needs for capital. In a similar fashion, exports declined due
to lower demand. See Figure 8.1 for a simplified representation of this
chain of impacts.
When comparing the impact of the crisis on Europe and on Asia, the
presence of each of the above-mentioned characteristics determined the
stage in the contagion when the countries were affected. Those Eur-
opean countries that showed signs of all characteristics, from a bubble
in asset prices to the central role of households, were hit by the finan-
cial crisis earlier and more severely. Asian countries, which were less
exposed to the US housing market and had a lower propensity for mar-
ginal lending, leverage and off-balance-sheet structures, were mainly af-
fected by the global contraction of the credit market and reduced eco-
nomic activity. Vincelette et al. point out that ‘limited exposure to toxic
assets in the developed world and a fairly closed capital account
shielded China from the initial financial turmoil of 2008’ and that ‘the
impact has been mainly through the trade channel’ (Vincelette et al.
2010: 13). This means that the financial institutions of most Asian
countries remained relatively stable, and it was mainly the real economy
that suffered from the reduced demand abroad.
Figure 8.2 compares the support for financial and other sectors pro-
vided by governments in response to the crisis. This financial support
consisted of: (a) capital injections to recapitalise banks, especially the
systemically important ones; (b) asset purchases and direct lending by
the Treasury to support banks and offload toxic assets from their balance
sheets; (c) central bank support with or without direct Treasury funding,
provided through credit lines, the purchase of assets, or asset swaps;
and (d) guarantees for financial sector liabilities, provided for bank de-
Figure 8.1 Impact of financial crisis
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posits, interbank loans and in some cases bonds (Cottarelli 2009: 6).
Claessens et al. note that ‘advanced economies have been most affected,
while most emerging market countries have had less need for capital or
other forms of financial sector support’ (Claessens et al. 2010: 14). In-
deed, the European countries of the G20 provided on average 35.92 per-
cent of their 2008 GDP in support, while for Asian G20 countries, this
figure was 18.58 percent. Even without the outlier Ireland (which pro-
vided 198.1 percent in guarantees to its financial sector and was even-
tually forced to accept a bailout by the IMF in November 2010), the EU
average is 26.04 percent.
Compared with their European counterparts, Asian ASEM members
not only experienced less strain on their financial sectors during the cri-
sis but also enjoyed a more speedy recovery (see Figure 8.3). While on
average, the GDP of European ASEM members is not expected to re-
turn to 2008 levels in 2011 (solid black line), Asian ASEM members
will have an average GDP rate that is 10 percent higher than the 2008
level (solid grey line). This highlights the resilience of the Asian coun-
tries and the protracted impact the crisis has had on European ASEM
members.
Taking into account the difference in government intervention and
the development of GDP growth in the wake of the crisis, Asian regula-
tory systems might reveal directions for regulatory reform that could
help to prevent a similar contagion or at least a similar impact as seen
during the most recent financial crisis.
Figure 8.2 Government support in response to the crisis (as of June 2009, in per-






Source: IMF, FAD-MCM database as cited in Claessens at el. (2010): 31
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Indeed, when comparing the stability of banks in Asia and in Europe,
we can see a trend towards greater stability in Asia between the crisis of
1997 and the crisis of 2007, while in Europe there has been a general
downward trend since 1995. To measure banking stability, we can use
the z-score from the World Bank’s Financial Structure dataset. This is
the ratio of return on assets plus the capital-asset ratio to the standard
deviation of return on assets.2 The higher the z-score, the more stable
(or the more risk-averse) the bank.
Even though the average z-score for Asian and European ASEM
member countries has converged since the onset of the crisis, the dif-
ference in the years immediately preceding 2008 is in line with the
more limited impact of the crisis on Asia, resulting in less governmen-
tal support for financial institutions in Asia in the wake of the crisis.
The average z-score over the period 2000-2009 for the Asian ASEM
members is 11.47, while for European members this is 10.40 (see Fig-
ure 8.4). This further supports the notion that banking regulations in
Asia led to a more stable financial sector than those in Europe.
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A comparison of banking regulations in Asia and Europe
European – and especially Anglo-Saxon – banking regulations have
been characterised by increasing liberalisation and more and more
open markets. Throughout the past decade, this led to a wider range of
products offered, higher volumes of transactions and larger interna-
tional flows of capital (Beck et al. 2009: 10-12). In many Asian coun-
tries, however, regulations have remained more restricted, even after a
wave of liberalisation in the 1990s and in the beginning of the 2000s.
Barth et al. compiled a database of indicators for banking regulations
(see Figure 8.5). Of these indicators, ‘capital requirement’ is the mini-
mum capital requirement as stipulated by the authorities of a given
country. ‘Capital stringency’ is an index of regulatory stringency regard-
ing bank capital. This takes into account if the capital ratio is risk
weighted, if it depends on market risk, if assets are marked to market,
etc. In short, it indicates to what extent regulations restrict the ‘quality’
of capital used for the capital requirement. ‘Restrictions on activities’
measures regulatory impediments to banks to engage in securities mar-
ket activities, insurance activities, real estate activities and the owner-
ship of non-financial firms. The dataset provides an overview of the reg-
ulations in place during the build-up of the financial crisis in major
Asian and European economies.
While most countries use a capital requirement of 8 percent, on aver-
age the Asian ASEM member countries included in the dataset have a
slightly higher requirement than their European counterparts, but this
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is not the case for the individual countries shown on the graph. Major
Asian countries such as India, Japan and South Korea have a higher
capital stringency than for example France and Germany, but on aver-
age there is no large difference in stringency between Asian and Eur-
opean countries. Where we can see the most divergence between Asia
and Europe is in the restriction on activities of banks. While the average
for the European ASEM members included in the dataset is 7.2, for
Asian countries this is 10.0. Indeed, this could be a key issue in finan-
cial regulation, as the financial crisis was largely rooted in the creation
and trade of securitised products, and this securitization led to ever-
expanding amounts of liquidity that was channeled to homeowners
(sometimes financially weak).
In the case of China, Vincelette et al. argue that its pre-crisis policies
protected the country against external shocks, namely: ‘Prudent fiscal
policies, which left China with generally low budget deficits and reported
public debt below 20 percent of GDP as it entered the crisis; Fairly pru-
dent monetary policy, with tightened controls on bank lending during
periods of perceived overheating (a preemptive ‘deleveraging’, which
left banks with relatively low loan-to-deposit ratios). A cautious approach
to financial sector liberalization and opening up of the capital account’
(italics in source) (Vincelette et al. 2010: 12).
Nevertheless, while some Asian countries have impressive perfor-
mances to show for these prudent policies, according to certain metrics
the current financial structure in emerging markets might not be able
to support the recent levels of economic growth much longer.3 In order
to deepen capital markets and enhance liquidity and efficiency, liberali-
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sation and privatisation are likely to be embraced. This, however, would
also call for better regulation to strike the right balance between effi-
ciency and stability. By looking at the experience of European econo-
mies, emerging markets can learn from past mistakes and adopt as-
pects of policies most applicable to their particular situation.
A new regulatory framework: Basel III
In order to get an understanding of what new banking regulations we
can expect and what metrics are likely to be included in new regula-
tions, the Basel III framework offers a good overview of some of the
key issues and measures monitored by regulating authorities. The ef-
forts by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to establish inter-
national regulatory standards for bank capital adequacy and liquidity
have so far been the most ambitious and successful initiative to estab-
lish international guidelines for banking regulations.
Established in 1974, the Basel Committee introduced a capital mea-
surement system commonly known as the Basel Capital Accord in
1988. The main guideline of the system was a minimum capital ratio of
8 percent. This standard has been progressively introduced in virtually
all countries with internationally active banks. However, because this
blanket approach for capital measurement did not take into account the
risk related to certain assets, a revised Capital Adequacy Framework
was proposed in 1999 and issued in 2004. This framework consisted
of three pillars: (a) minimum capital requirements based on risk-
weighted assets; (b) supervisory review of an institution’s internal
assessment process and capital adequacy; and (c) disclosure and trans-
parency to strengthen market discipline. According to a survey con-
ducted by the Financial Stability Institute in 2006, 95 countries were
intending to adopt the framework, called Basel II, in some form or an-
other (SSI Occasional Paper 2006: 1).
However, before countries had a chance to get well underway with
the implementation of the Basel II framework, the financial crisis
shifted priorities and put the implementation on hold. Indeed, the
implications of the crisis were such that the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision designed a new framework, known as Basel III. This
new framework aims to address the factors that contributed to the
spread and the impact of the crisis. Its goal of strengthening the global
capital framework is pursued by: (1) raising the quality, consistency and
transparency of the capital base; (2) enhancing risk coverage (e.g. for
securitised assets and off-balance-sheet items); (3) supplementing the
risk-based capital requirement with a leverage ratio to make financial
institutions less vulnerable to shocks; (4) reducing pro-cyclicality and
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promoting countercyclical buffers; and (5) addressing systemic risk and
interconnectedness. Basel III also introduces a global liquidity standard
to mitigate the impact of write-downs and bank runs. This liquidity
standard includes a short-term liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and a
longer-term net stable funding ratio (NSFR).
According to the Committee, the LCR ‘aims to ensure that a bank
maintains an adequate level of unencumbered, high-quality liquid as-
sets that can be converted into cash to meet its liquidity needs for a 30
calendar day time horizon under a significantly severe liquidity stress
scenario specified by supervisors’ (Basel III: International framework
2010: 3).4
The NSFR ‘establishes a minimum acceptable amount of stable fund-
ing based on the liquidity characteristics of an institution’s assets and
activities over a one year horizon’ (Basel III: International framework
2010: 25).5 Furthermore, the Committee proposes that ‘the required
amount of stable funding is calculated as the sum of the value of the as-
sets held and funded by the institution, multiplied by a specific re-
quired stable funding (RSF) factor assigned to each particular asset
type, added to the amount of off-balance sheet activity multiplied by its
associated RSF factor’ (Basel III: International framework 2010: 28).
The exact level of the RSF factor is to be determined by the relevant
authorities, taking into account the characteristics of the liquidity risk
profile of an institution’s assets, off-balance-sheet exposures and other
activities. While Basel III typically uses a blanket approach, here it al-
lows for national authorities to adapt the framework to local circum-
stances. This could lead to either more or less effective regulations, as
discussed in the next section.
To assess the potential impact of the Basel III framework, the Com-
mittee conducted a survey among 263 banks, divided into Group 1
banks with a total Tier 1 capital of over E 3 billion that were well-diver-
sified and internationally active, and Group 2 banks (all other banks).
Table 8.1 shows the changes in capital ratios if all the Committee’s final
rules – both for the definition of capital and for the calculation of risk-
weighted assets – were fully implemented as of 31 December 2009. For
the common equity Tier 1 amounts, the gross percentage indicates the
ratio in relation to the bank’s current risk-weighted assets, while the net
percentage takes into account the new risk-weighted assets, deduction
and filters. The new regulations would have the largest impact on the
larger, more diversified and internationally active banks, but on average,
the banks would still comply with the capital ratio levels stipulated by
the Basel III framework. However, the exclusion of banks that were not
able to provide all necessary data to participate in the survey can be ex-
pected to lead to an upward bias in the results, as these banks typically
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have less stringent internal capital requirements, or no effective way of
monitoring them.
Table 8.1 Average capital ratios by banking group (percent)
Number of Banks CE Tier 1 Total Tier 1 Tier 1
Gross Net Current New Current New
Group 1 74 11.1 5.7 10.5 6.3 14.0 8.4
Group 2 133 10.7 7.8 9.8 8.1 12.8 10.3
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010
The average LCR was 83 percent for Group 1 and 98 percent for Group
2 banks, so most of the banks that took part in the survey would need
to improve their liquidity. The average NSFR for Group 1 banks is 93
percent, while for Group 2 banks this is 103 percent. Banks have until
2015 to comply with the 100 percent LCR requirement and until 2018
to meet the requirements for the NSFR.
The new requirements will be phased in over time until 2019, when
banks have to comply with all new regulations. However, Basel III will
be implemented by national authorities, and the Committee can only
monitor implementation to the extent that banks provide the necessary
data. Therefore, it is likely that there will be differences in the timing
and extent of adoption of the Basel III framework by national (and local)
authorities. This implies that, even when adopting the Basel III frame-
work, national authorities will have considerable discretion in shaping
their own regulations. By sharing best practices and conducting case
studies of countries with similar characteristics, authorities will be bet-
ter equipped to adopt regulations suitable to their situation. Here,
ASEM could play an important role as a facilitator of knowledge sharing
and joint research efforts.
The effectiveness of banking regulations
While banking regulations set an important framework for the activities
of banks and might improve the stability of financial institutions, they
don’t always have the desired effect. Indeed, Laeven and Levine (2009:
265) found that, despite governmental regulations, the ownership struc-
ture of a bank can have a decisive impact on the bank’s stability. In order
to operationalise the ownership structure, Laeven and Levine use the
variable cash flow (CF), which reflects the cash-flow rights of the largest
owner of the bank. This variable is zero if the bank is widely held. For
stability (or risk aversion), they use the z-score referred to above, and also
the volatility of the equity returns and of the pre-tax and pre-loan-loss
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provision earnings of the bank. Variables reflecting the regulatory envir-
onment are the level of capital requirement, the stringency of the capital
requirement and the restrictions of activities banks can engage in.
Their conclusion is that ‘greater cash-flow rights by a large owner is
associated with greater risk. […] These results are consistent with the
view that owners tend to advocate for more bank risk taking than man-
agers and debt holders (Galai/Masulis 1976; Demsetz/Lehn 1985) and
that large owners with substantial cash-flow rights have greater incen-
tive and power to increase bank risk taking than small shareholders’
(Jensen/Mechling 1976; John/Litov/Yehng 2008).
This relationship not only mitigates the effect of governmental regula-
tion but can also lead to an inverse effect. According to Laeven and
Levine’s research, ownership can reverse the impact of capital strin-
gency such that, for banks with a large owner who has more than 50%
cash-flow rights, more stringent capital requirements can lead to higher
risk. But for banks with less concentrated ownership, more stringent
capital requirements do lead to lower risk, as would be intended by the
regulator (Laeven/Levine 2009: 269). A similar effect occurs for activity
restrictions. If CF is low, there is no statistically significant relation be-
tween more restrictions and the banks’ stability. However, when a bank
has a large owner, activity restrictions boost risk. This can be explained
by the fact that the owner seeks to compensate for the lost revenues due
to the restrictions by engaging in other permitted, but riskier, activities.
Even though the ownership of most systemically important banks is
generally widely dispersed, an effect similar to concentrated ownership
might occur in the case of high rewards for short-term gains, as is the
case with many bonus structures. While managers might have less
power and less incentive to change the policy and practices of a (depart-
ment of a) bank, they might be less risk-averse in the prospect of a sig-
nificant reward if they bet on the right horse (or the right securitised
asset).
The fact that a certain regulatory environment can produce very dif-
ferent results is illustrated by the banking landscape in the Netherlands,
where banks have (or had) rather diverging ownership structures. Over
the past few years, this landscape has changed significantly due to cer-
tain risks taken by the owner(s) or executives of the banks, neglect by
regulatory authorities, the impact of the crisis and the ire of deposit
holders. Even though they all operated under the same regulations, the
fate of DSB Bank, ABN Amro and Rabobank took very different turns.
While DSB Bank was sponsoring, among others, a Dutch speed skat-
ing team, the US Olympic speed skating team and one of the Nether-
lands’ top soccer teams (AZ), the bank was luring consumers to take
out loans and mortgages with teaser rates, cross-selling them with man-
datory insurance products. These and other misleading and illegal prac-
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tices (the bank was fined for its way of selling loans by the Dutch
Financial Markets Authority) led to a public appeal to the bank’s custo-
mers by one of its clients to take out all deposits. This resulted in a
bank run during which E 70 million of savings out of a total of E 4.3
billion were taken out. This eventually pushed the bank into bankruptcy
in October 2009. Dirk Scheringa, the founder of the bank, was the only
shareholder and had pocketed millions with the bank’s aggressive lend-
ing and selling strategy. In the aftermath of the collapse, a parliamen-
tary commission concluded that the Dutch central bank had failed to
flag misconduct and that the issuance of the banking license should al-
ready have been subject to more stringent requirements regarding the
governmental structure of the bank (Scheltema 2010: 18-19).
ABN Amro was a listed company with a large number of share-
holders which, according to Laeven and Levine, should have resulted in
less risk-taking. Nevertheless, the Children’s Investment Fund, an active
shareholder, pointed out the disappointing results of the company dur-
ing a shareholders’ meeting in 2006 and proposed selling off parts of
the bank. Eventually, this led to the largest acquisition in the banking
history in October 2007, when RBS, Santander and Fortis acquired
ABN Amro for E 71 billion, at a price of E 38.40 per share, 14 percent
higher than the market price. Rijkman Groenink, the bank’s CEO,
received about E 20 million from the sale of options and shares, and
E 4.3 million in the form of a golden parachute. Other top managers
allegedly received about E 7.5 million each on average (Smit 2009: 420-
421).
The acquisition not only led to the demise of the oldest financial in-
stitution of the Netherlands, but also proved too risky for two of its
three acquirers. When the financial crisis unfolded, RBS ran into liquid-
ity problems and was bailed out by the UK government. The Dutch-
Belgian bank/insurance firm Fortis also suffered from the crisis, and
the Dutch banking activities of Fortis were taken over and changed back
into ABN Amro by the Dutch government. The rest of Fortis was ac-
quired by BNP Paribas.
Rabobank, on the other hand, is a cooperative owned by 1.8 million
members with a highly decentralised management structure. It consists
of 143 independent local banks, coordinated from the headquarters in
Utrecht in the Netherlands. It weathered the crisis surprisingly well
(among others because of its low exposure to the sub-prime mortgage
market and its high capital ratio of 13.8 percent by year-end 2009), and
is one of the few banks in the world with a AAA rating from Standard
& Poor’s and an AAA rating from Moody’s (Rabobank Annual Report
2009: 53-56).
These diverse experiences of banks domiciled in the Netherlands
show how the same set of regulations still allows for very different own-
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ership structures and strategies, or the failure of regulatory authorities
to properly implement the rules, which can severely impact the stability
of the institution.
Conclusion
The impact of the 2008 financial crisis shows that the current composi-
tion of banking regulations has not been able to prevent a near melt-
down of the international financial system. In response, political leaders
have been looking for new legislation that should increase the stability
of the banking sector. While countries such as the US and the UK have
already drafted new rules, the international character of the financial
sector would allow banks to avoid stricter rules by moving to another
jurisdiction, and banks subject to more stringent regulations will face
tough competition from financial institutions in more lenient jurisdic-
tions. To mitigate this problem, the Basel Committee for Banking
Supervision proposed the Basel III framework, which should become
the international standard for financial regulation.
However, the timing and extent of the implementation of this frame-
work can differ significantly between countries, as we have seen in the
case of Basel II. This can be caused by the determination (or lack there-
of) of the relevant political leaders to implement regulatory reform, but
also by the structure of the legislative process, which might make it
more or less easy for opponents to prevent the adoption of a bill. Even
if stricter rules were adopted, regulatory bodies would still need to effec-
tively implement and monitor the new requirements. The capacity and
willingness of these institutions to do so can diverge from country to
country, and even in the Netherlands the central bank can allow a bank
with only one shareholder (who was also the CEO) to engage in irre-
sponsible lending practices.
In addition, an international standard can only touch upon certain as-
pects of banking regulations. The NSFR already leaves an important
part of the regulation to the discretion of the local authorities through
the RSF factor, but factors such as governance, ownership, restriction of
activities, interconnectedness or even bailout policies are hard to cover
with a blanket approach as pursued by Basel III. Indeed, the very core
of banking consists of taking a view on risks that are inherently hard to
assess and practically impossible to regulate. Besides, there will always
be banks that will find a way around regulation to conduct business the
way they see fit, and it will be very hard for political leaders to respond
in time and efficiently. The Basel framework is a case in point. The fi-
nancial crisis erupted before Basel II had a chance to become the norm,
while it had been in the making since 1999. Now, the Basel Committee
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for Banking Supervision has made good use of the momentum to draft
a new framework, but by 2019, when Basel III must be completely
phased in, chances are that the next crisis will have emerged and sub-
sided, calling for yet another revision of the framework.
Despite such challenges, it is important for governments and regula-
tory institutions to keep looking for ways to strengthen the structure of
the financial sector. Indeed, the many different factors that play a role
in stabilising the financial sector call for a careful and tailored approach.
This can be based on an international guideline such as Basel III, but
each country will have different characteristics calling for different mea-
sures. When drafting new legislation, these differences need to be taken
into account.
One way to do this is by looking at what worked for other countries.
The limited impact of the crisis on Asian countries and their speedy re-
covery might reveal some lessons for better guidelines, while countries
that are now experiencing high economic growth can draw lessons from
asset bubbles that have occurred elsewhere in the past. The ASEM pro-
cess can play a key role in facilitating the exchange of knowledge and
best practices, for example by coordinating joint research efforts on the
subject through the Asia-Europe Foundation, or by organising meetings
between representatives of the members’ central banks. The informal
setting typical of ASEM will allow for a candid dialogue and an easier
exchange of information than at highly politicised arenas such as the
UN or the OECD. This open dialogue is necessary to bring back mutual
trust in the financial industry (its political aspects), so as to maintain
the international character of the financial sector while improving the
regulatory framework to create more stable financial institutions.
* The opinions expressed in this article are the personal considerations of the author
and do not reflect official policy of the ING Bank nor can they be attributed to it.
Notes
1 This article mainly focuses on Asian countries that are members of ASEAN, high-
lighting countries that have shown high economic growth over the past few years
such as China and India.
2 According to Beck et al. (2009: 12), ‘if profits are assumed to follow a normal distribu-
tion, it can be shown that the z-score is the inverse of the probability of insolvency.
Specifically, z indicates the number of standard deviations that a bank’s return on as-
sets has to drop below its expected value before equity is depleted and the bank is in-
solvent.’
3 In India, for example, the ratio of non-performing loans to deposits in 2008 was
about 1 percent and GDP growth averaged 8.5 percent in the 2005-2008 period (see
Prasad/Rajan 2008: 24). Yet in China the savings rate of 54 percent of GDP in 2007,
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compared with 37 percent in 2000, has been successfully channeled into productive
investments (see Vincelette et al. 2010: 4).
4 This LCR is defined as the stock of high-quality liquid assets divided by the total net
cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days and should be equal to or higher than 1.
5 The NSFR is defined as the available amount of stable funding divided by the re-
quired amount of stable funding, and should be equal to or higher than 1.
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Security Governance

9 Asia and Europe: Meeting Future Energy
Security Challenges
Christopher M. Dent
Energy security is a major global challenge of the 21st century, as it is
also inextricably linked to other key challenges facing humanity: global
poverty and climate change. Asia and Europe are being brought closer
together in interdependent energy relationships and moreover share a
broadening range of energy security challenges and predicaments. This
chapter examines how these relationships have developed on the inter-
regional scale, paying particular attention to the Asia-Europe Meeting
(ASEM) process.
As the birthplace of both the Industrial Revolution and many impor-
tant developments in energy infrastructure and technologies, Europe
has played a key role in shaping the world’s energy systems and prac-
tices. The European Union (EU) comprises many of the world’s largest
advanced industrial economies, and as a region it accounts for around a
quarter of the world’s energy demand as well as carbon emissions.
While the EU’s absolute levels of energy units demanded is set to rise,
as with all regions, its share of the world total is expected to fall to
around a fifth by 2030 (IEEJ 2009).
Asia is having an increasingly profound impact on global energy
security.1 Spurred by rapid economic development, the region’s energy
consumption levels rose fivefold over the period from 1970 to 2009
while the average world energy consumption rate only doubled. In
1970, Asia accounted for just a seventh of world energy consumption,
but by 2009 this share had grown to a third of the world total. Current
estimates predict the region’s share will rise to well over 40 percent by
2030 (IEEJ 2009). East Asian nations in particular – most significantly
China, Japan and South Korea – must manage acute energy security
vulnerabilities, especially their critical dependencies on imported energy
fuels. We may consequently expect intensified competition among
energy-hungry East Asian states trying to secure access to these fuels.
Yet at the same time there is a deepening acknowledgment that stron-
ger international cooperation is required (e.g. on energy supply chains
and green energy technologies) given the interdependent nature of
many energy security predicaments and challenges confronting them
(Cheng 2008; Itoh 2008; Jain 2007; Saha 2003; Sovacool 2010; Wesley
2007; Zhao 2008).
Energy security is inextricably linked to climate change and global en-
vironmental security: what may be referred to as the energy-environ-
ment-security nexus. Emissions from the combustion of carbon fuels
(oil, coal, gas) are the primary known cause of climate change, and the
International Energy Agency’s ‘reference scenario’ predicts there will be
a 55 percent increase in global primary energy demand from 2005 to
2030 – mostly in carbon fuels – that will in turn lead to a 57 percent
rise in carbon emissions. China and India alone are expected to account
for almost half of these increases, and Asia combined about two-thirds
of the total growth in global energy demand and emission levels in this
forecast. This lends greater imperative to ASEM partners to collabora-
tively foster ways to mitigate their structural dependences on carbon
fuel-based energy systems.
Defining energy security
Many authors who write on energy security do not define the concept,
implicitly assuming that their readers understand what is meant by the
term. Another problem concerns how the study of energy security may
be viewed as a ‘total field’ of scholarly inquiry, in that: ‘nothing exists
that is not energy, or not affected by energy’ (Ciuta 2010: 124), and thus
the field of inquiry concerning all things energy security related is
boundless. The effective functioning of economies and societies criti-
cally depends on energy services, whether in providing the means for
production, exchange, transportation and communications, or the facili-
tation of education, health or other welfare services. Given the pervasive
nature of energy, defining the empirical domain of energy security is
also symptomatic of the wider problem of theoretical spillovers in the
study of inter-related security sectors (e.g. environment, economic, hu-
man, military), which has led some to question the actual analytical use-
fulness and meaningfulness of the concept of energy security (Clawson
1998; Mallaby 2006). For example, the ever more apparent environ-
mental risks associated with the pursuit of energy security (i.e. energy
consumption being the primary cause of climate change) has meant
that energy security and environmental security domains have become
ever more conflated. What is and what is not related to energy security
can therefore be highly contested. That in turn has implications for
aggregating (and disaggregating) the empirical domain of energy diplo-
macy itself, as is discussed later.
In acknowledgement of the above, Loschel et al. (2010) noted that
definitions of energy security can vary significantly, can often be some-
what vague, or place a particularly strong emphasis on supply security
aspects. As a general observation, most academic definitions are rather
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narrow and overtly economistic in a traditional market-oriented sense.
For example, Bielecki argues that ‘energy security is commonly defined
as reliable and adequate supply of energy at reasonable prices … the
meaning of reliable and adequate supply is rather straightforward: it
simply means uninterrupted supply that fully meets the needs of the
global economy’ (2002: 237). For Bohi and Toman, it ‘refers to the loss
of economic welfare that may occur as a result of a change in the price
or availability of energy’ (1996: 1). Organisations working on energy is-
sues tend to take a similar approach. According to the International
Energy Agency (IEA), energy insecurity ‘stems from the welfare impact
of either the physical unavailability of energy, or prices that are not
competitive or overly volatile’ (IEA 2007: 12). The Clingendael Interna-
tional Energy Programme (CIEP) in the Netherlands defines energy
security as ‘the availability of energy at all times in various forms, in
sufficient quantities, and at reasonable and/or affordable prices’ (2004:
37).
Over time, analysts have come to acknowledge the increasingly
important environmental dimension to energy security, and therefore
have been compelled to extend beyond hitherto narrow and overtly
economistic definitions of the concept. Thus, a useful and more holistic
conceptual approach to energy security is based on addressing three
types of risk, namely the securing of energy supplies (minimising sup-
ply or quantity risk) at stable and affordable prices (minimising price
risk), and taking into account the environmentally damaging effects of
energy consumption (minimising environmental risk), especially from
the combustion of carbon fuels (Research and Information System for
Developing Countries 2005). A further helpful definitional approach
that adds an important temporal sustainable perspective on energy
security is offered by Froggatt and Lahn, who contend that ‘meeting the
dual challenges of maintaining stable energy services in the short-term,
without jeopardising them in the long-term, means reformulating
‘energy security’ as ‘securing the transition’ to a low or no carbon econ-
omy’, and which ‘prepares for a long-term vision of efficient, clean, safe
delivery of energy services to meet societal needs’ (2010: 6-7). The expli-
cit emphasis on managing ‘long-term’ energy security provides a wel-
come balance to most definitions that implicitly emphasise short-term
energy market supply and price stability.
Asia and Europe’s main energy security predicaments
ASEM 8 saw the accession of Russia, Australia and New Zealand as
new member states. Owing to disagreement over their geographic asso-
ciation, these countries were assigned their own specific category that
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was neither European nor Asian. ASEM Asia (East Asia and South Asia,
as defined earlier) represents the original and still substantive core of
the ‘non-European’ element of the Asia-Europe Meeting and for the
purposes of this chapter’s analysis is the focus of the Asia-Europe
energy relationship.
ASEM Asia’s main energy security predicaments have become more
acute as a consequence of the region’s burgeoning industry-based eco-
nomic development, which has unleashed soaring demand for energy
resources and a rapid depletion of indigenous fuel reserves. Like Eur-
ope, ASEM Asia is now a major net energy-importing region. Figure
9.1 illustrates where East Asia’s main oil and gas reserves are located,
these being concentrated in Southeast Asia and China, which also pos-
sess the bulk of the region’s coal reserves. India is the world’s third lar-
gest coal producer and ranks among the world’s top 20 oil and gas
producers. Pakistan also possesses notable levels of carbon fuel re-
serves. By contrast, Northeast Asia’s developed economies – Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan – have virtually no such energy resources and
have thus long maintained high energy-import dependencies, this being
historically very pronounced on Middle East oil. Despite still possessing
considerable energy fuel reserves, China has become East Asia’s largest
energy importer, for example importing more oil than any other nation
in the world except for the United States. Southeast Asia’s main energy
producers (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam) are also
quickly turning into net energy importers. The region’s imported oil
dependency ratio is set to jump significantly from 10 percent in 2002
to 70 percent by 2025 (CEC 2009). ASEM Asia’s maintenance of a
dynamic economic growth pattern will require increasingly high levels
of energy inputs from foreign sources.
Moreover, flows of transported foreign energy supplies entering into
the East Asia region in particular are funnelled through narrow sea-lane
‘chokepoints’ that are highly susceptible to blockade and piracy (see also
Kamerling and Van der Putten in this volume). The most important is
the Malacca Straits which at its narrowest point is only around one kilo-
metre wide but through which a quarter of world trade passes (approxi-
mately 100,000 ships per year, including around half the world’s oil
tankers). Energy and other resource imports are also shipped through
other chokepoints such as the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra,
the Lombok Strait between Bali and Lombok, and the Makassar Straits
between Borneo and Sulawesi (Figure 9.2). Furthermore, there are var-
ious territorial disputes among a number of Asian countries concerning
zones in the South China Sea (Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands) and
the East China Sea (between China and Japan) due to claims over po-
tentially significant oil and gas reserves thought to be located there, and
through which most of ASEM Asia’s energy trade passes.
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Another key predicament for ASEM Asia’s energy security is how to un-
lock the region’s enormous potential for the development of its renew-
able energy sector and more generally its green energy sector including
energy efficiency and saving technologies. Like other regions, Asia can-
not remain primarily focused on ‘carbon-oriented’ energy security. Sup-
ply, price and environmental risk imperatives require the region’s states
and societies to develop low or zero-carbon energy paradigms if they are
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to achieve sustainable development into the 22nd century and beyond.
Japan is a world leader in many renewable, carbon-abatement and
energy-efficient technologies – it is among the world’s most energy-
efficient nations. According to a recent report, Asia will account for
around a third of total global wind power capacity by 2020, just behind
Europe’s 35 percent share but ahead of North America’s 29 percent.
China has become a leading global player in this sector, increasing its
wind power capacity from just 1.2 GW in 2005 to 25.8 GW by 2009.
This makes it currently the world’s third largest wind power producer
by nation, and it is set to become the largest within a few years (GWEC
2010). China now has around 50 wind turbine producers, the three lar-
gest of which – Gold Wind, Sinovel and Dongfang Electric – are in the
world’s top 10 in terms of size. Four of the world’s top 10 solar power
companies are also Chinese: Suntech, JA Solar, Trina Solar and Yingli.
India too has made significant progress in developing its wind and solar
energy sectors. It more than doubled its wind energy production capa-
city from 2005 (4.3 GW) to 2009 (10.9 GW) and is now ranked fifth in
the world, and is making large-scale investments to increase its solar
power capacity. The Philippines already produces around 20 percent of
its electricity from geothermal sources. China has set itself a target of
meeting at least 15 percent of its primary energy demand from
renewables by 2020, and has hinted this could even exceed 20 percent.2
Japan has also discussed a 20 percent target by 2020, and the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has set an indicative, non-leg-
ally binding target of 10 percent of total energy demand from
renewables by 2020.
ASEM Asia possesses the technological, financial and kinetic
resources to make a significant global impact on green energy develop-
ment, but the challenges are enormous. Its governments need to create
robust incentive structures to attract investment funds as well as green
energy technology transfers and development. These invariably require
some degree of foreign assistance. Part of the problem here to date has
been the relatively limited international energy cooperation among
ASEM Asian countries, although this situation is changing. Regional or-
ganisations such as ASEAN, ASEAN Plus Three (APT), South Asian As-
sociation for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Asia-Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation (APEC) forum are affording greater priority to ad-
dressing energy security issues.
Like ASEM Asia, the EU also has a growing dependence on extra-
regional energy sources. The EU’s current energy import ratio is
around 55 percent, but this is projected to rise to 67 percent by 2030
(CEC 2009). Diversifying energy diplomacy linkages have become a
strategic priority for the EU (Pomfret 2009; Umbach 2010; Youngs
2009). In 2007, the European Commission launched the ‘Energy Policy
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for Europe’ strategy against a background of growing concerns about
climate change and the EU’s growing dependence on energy imported
from a relatively small number of foreign suppliers. The aim was to
achieve EU consensus on three complementary objectives: competitive-
ness, sustainable development and supply security.
The EU has a much stronger energy infrastructure and technology
base than ASEM Asia as a whole, and is therefore generally better able
to respond to sudden energy security shocks. Nevertheless, it faces sig-
nificant supply security risks associated with dependencies on foreign
energy suppliers, most notably Russia and its pipeline supply of gas.
The EU has sought to mitigate this particular risk by developing gas
pipeline projects with Caspian and Central Asian energy partners. For
example, the Nabucco project involves a 3,300km pipeline to transport
natural gas from Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iraq and Turkmenistan to Europe
(Austria, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria specifically) through Turkey.
As a group, the EU is the world’s leading producer of renewable-
based energy and is far more energy efficient than the United States. In
the wind energy sector, Europe’s production capacity has almost
doubled over the period 2005 to 2009 (40.7 GW to 75.5 GW3), over
twice the US’s current capacity and three times that of China (GWEC
2010). It has also set itself the legally binding target of raising renew-
able energy’s share in the overall final energy demand from 7 percent
in 2007 to 20 percent by 2020. The EU’s own energy security position
is also being increasingly affected by ASEM Asia, especially in terms of
supply security risk, as Asia’s burgeoning growth in energy demand
raises pressures on common suppliers (e.g. from the Middle East, and
in the future increasingly from Central Asia and Russia) to simulta-
neously satisfy the resource needs of both regions (Hadfield 2008; Mar-
quina 2008). These shared supply linkages, however, only strengthen
the interdependencies in Europe-Asia energy relations, along with the
mutual ‘environmental risks’ of continued carbon fuel dependence and
its global warming effects.
Asia-Europe energy cooperation
Dialogue on energy issues between the EU and ASEAN predates
ASEM’s endeavours in this area. However, this was relatively ad hoc
and often placed under other categories of technical cooperation. It was
not until the 2000s that EU-ASEAN energy relations were placed on a
firm footing. In early 2002, both the Technology Transfer for Energy
Cogeneration from Biomass in ASEAN Countries scheme and the EC-
ASEAN Energy Facility (EAEF, with E 31.5 million in funds) programme
were established. This remains to date the most substantive scheme of
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energy cooperation between the EU and an Asian grouping yet created.
Its principal aim is to facilitate the development of sustainable energy
policies in Southeast Asia, building on ASEAN’s own regional action
plans for energy. The EAEF’s main objectives for Southeast Asia’s en-
ergy sector are to:
– modernise the region’s electricity generation and distribution infra-
structure;
– promote the use of clean coal, biomass cogeneration, and combined
heat and power technologies;
– promote energy efficiency and energy conservation practices;
– ensure the security of energy supply to rural areas;
– develop regional energy resources;
– create stronger institutional and regulatory foundations in Southeast
Asia for promoting sustainable energy policies; and
– strengthen links between EU and ASEAN business and policy-
makers in the energy sector.
To date, the EAEF has funded around 80 projects involving policy-
makers, private sector organisations and local public authorities from
Europe and Southeast Asia. Probably the most important outcome of
the programme has been to strengthen micro-level energy partnerships
between the above-noted forms of agency.
In other developments, an EU-ASEAN senior officials’ dialogue on
energy cooperation has been in place since 2007, and in June 2009 the
EU and ASEAN agreed on the implementation of their 2010 Energy
Work Plan, although at the time of writing few details were available
concerning its content. A key energy security concern for the EU in
Southeast Asia is nuclear safety, primarily relating to non-proliferation,
nuclear waste, operational safety issues and decommissioning. An EU-
ASEAN workshop on nuclear safety and security was held in June 2008
at Bangkok. More generally, ASEAN states are eligible partners of the
EU’s Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation created in 2007. In
the same year, ASEAN established its own nuclear energy safety sub-
sector network, and some ASEAN states are also members of the Asian
Nuclear Safety Network (ANSN) comprising eight countries from the
region (China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) with the support of France, Ger-
many, Australia, the US and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). 12 ASEM countries are members of the Global Nuclear Energy
Partnership that involves around 30 countries worldwide working on
nuclear safety issues. Thus, the nuclear energy sector appears to be the
most prominent sector where EU and ASEAN member states are in-
volved in various forms of multilateral cooperation.
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Another important initiative in this context is the Energy Charter
Treaty (ECT), which was established in 1994. The treaty is an EU-
centred arrangement to address key challenges such as the free move-
ment of energy goods across borders, the facilitation of energy transit
via cross-border pipelines, and dispute settlement provisions through
binding legal arbitration (Energy Charter Secretariat 2004). It is not an
EU institution as such but a regionalised arrangement based on EU
member states. Its main aim has hitherto been to manage supply secur-
ity risks of energy flows from Russia and increasingly from Central Asia
through establishing firmer rules and norms on energy trade and for-
eign investment protection. ASEM Asia’s growing links with the same
energy suppliers would suggest that the ECT could provide a potentially
very important platform on which to better manage Asia-Europe energy
security interdependencies. Both regions now have a strong vested
interest in ensuring predictable flows of energy in transit over the Eura-
sian land mass. Japan and Mongolia are currently signatories, while the
PRC (which now has oil and natural gas pipelines with Central Asian
states), Indonesia, South Korea and Australia have observer status. Both
the PRC and Indonesia have seconded government officials to work at
the ECT’s main office in Brussels. The ECT, as a centrepiece of Eur-
opean energy diplomacy, would offer a number of advantages to ASEM
Asia as a potential multilateral framework for cooperation between all
countries in the region (Gavin/Lee 2007; Marquina 2008).
From certain perspectives, Europe and ASEM Asia would not seem
to be natural energy partners. Their inter-regional energy trade is extre-
mely limited: while each region sources imported energy fuels from
similar partners (e.g. Middle East states), they do not source from each
other in any substantive way. Furthermore, discernible differences of
thinking on energy security are apparent between European policy-
makers and their Asian counterparts. This has also to some extent been
evident in each region’s scholarly communities (Sovacool/Brown 2010).
These differences can be attributed to two main factors. First, a more
market-oriented approach generally prevails in European liberal democ-
racies, which contrasts with Asia’s more state-centric mercantilist ap-
proach due largely to the region’s developmental statist and socialist
market traditions – the preponderance of national oil companies in Asia
is indicative of this (Paik et al. 2007). Second, energy security is more
closely linked to alleviating poverty or low welfare levels in Asia,
whereas in prosperous Europe there is greater capacity and socio-politi-
cal pressure to focus on green energy issues. Extending electricity gen-
eration infrastructure to the poorest regions in Asia is, for example,
viewed as vital to raising social welfare levels in these areas by provid-
ing energy for hospitals, schools, utility services and so on. Like any
partnership, the basis of an Asia-Europe energy partnership has to be
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grounded in definable common or working interests that are largely de-
termined by their shared energy security challenges and other issues,
namely:
– high-level dependencies on relatively few foreign energy suppliers;
– an especially strong reliance on international energy market stability
and order as the world’s largest net energy-importing regions;
– reconciling both regions’ predicted growth in energy consumption
rates with climate change policy objectives;
– treating energy security as regional public goods;
– coping with the same potentially ‘game-changing’ developments in
the energy sector, e.g. the shale gas industry’s rapid development
and the as-yet-unknown fallout from the recent BP Deepwater Hori-
zon disaster;
– exploiting each region’s significant potential for developing green
energy sectors, i.e. renewables and energy-efficient/energy-saving
technologies;
– creating the necessary socio-technical and institutional environments
for the economy and society’s transition towards low-carbon energy
paradigms; and
– managing nuclear safety and proliferation issues in each region’s
lesser-developed zones.
The above, combined with deepening integration in the global energy
system generally (e.g. rapidly internationalising energy markets) and
the mutual need to establish sustainable low-carbon energy paradigms,
presents imperatives for ASEM partners to communicate and work
more closely on energy security affairs, and share ideas on how best to
address similar energy security challenges. This provides a foundation
on which Asia-Europe energy cooperation can be developed. For exam-
ple, it is strongly in the EU’s interest to assist ASEM Asian countries in
implementing carbon emission abatement technologies and practices,
as Europe is directly affected by Asia’s rising levels of CO2 emissions.
Similarly, the EU should promote the inclusion of ASEM countries as
new members to important multilateral energy organisations such as
the International Energy Agency (IEA) in order to help strengthen glo-
bal energy governance and market order. ASEM Asia’s attempts to de-
velop stronger forms of regional energy cooperation would also benefit
from drawing from aspects of the EU experience (Gavin/Lee 2007).
Municipal authorities from both regions could learn from each other on
how to implement sustainable energy practices in urban areas.
In addition, Russia’s very recent accession to ASEM creates an inter-
esting new dynamic in Asia-Europe energy relations. For some time
now, significant concerns have been raised in the EU regarding Rus-
sia’s predictability as a major energy partner. This is one of the reasons
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the EU has sought to diversify its foreign energy partnerships. Russia
now supplies China with pipelined oil through the East Siberia Pacific
Ocean project, which will also supply Japan by 2015, and it is the first
time that ASEM’s membership includes a major energy exporter that
supplies both Europe and Asia. This may present competitive tensions
among ASEM partners as they seek to secure the same Russian energy
resources, but it could also be an important basis on which more sub-
stantial ASEM energy cooperation could develop.
There are bilateral, inter-regional and multilateral dimensions to
Asia-Europe energy relations. Individual EU member states, especially
large ones (e.g. Germany, UK, France) or ones with strong green energy
sectors (e.g. Denmark, Sweden), have developed particularly significant
bilateral energy relationships with ASEM Asian nations. For the sake of
scope and space, this chapter concentrates on the inter-regional and
multilateral aspects of Asia-Europe energy relations. Energy was noted
as a strategically important field in the European Commission’s July
1996 communications document, the ‘Europe-Asia Cooperation Strat-
egy for Energy’. Around a year later, the European Parliament passed a
resolution on this strategy, and the EU’s Energy Council adopted the
conclusions of the resolution later that same month. The conclusions
outlined a series of priority issues to be addressed, many of which are
largely aligned to the shared energy security predicaments mentioned
above. Cooperation on energy, the environment and climate change also
formed one of the pillars of the European Commission’s 2007-2013
Asia regional programming strategy (CEC 2007). While this document
stresses the importance of a cross-border approach, it did not outline in
detail how cooperation on energy is to be achieved. To date, there has
been far more dialogue than substantive cooperation accomplished at
the inter-regional level concerning Asia-Europe energy relations, and
this has been channelled primarily through ASEM and EU-ASEAN
links.
The inter-regional framework of ASEM is the most obvious mechan-
ism for strengthening the Asia-Europe energy partnership. There are
still, however, no regular ministerial or senior official level meeting pro-
cesses or any other ASEM-related apparatus in place to manage energy
security issues between both regions. We should therefore start by ex-
amining how the discourse on energy relations developed through
ASEM summits, with particular attention on chair’s statements and
leaders’ declarations (see Table 9.1).
Certain patterns may be discerned from the energy-related discourse
within ASEM. First, it took some time for energy security issues to be
established in ASEM summitry as an important field of inter-regional
dialogue and cooperation in its own exclusive right. It was originally
treated as just one listed item from a large basket of items where ASEM
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Table 9.1 Energy relations discourse in ASEM summits
– First ASEM summit (1996, Bangkok): The chair’s statement mentions ‘energy and
transport’ cooperation only under the broader context of promoting scientific and
technology flows between Asia and Europe.
– Second ASEM summit (1998, London): The chair’s statement only referred to
energy issues as bound up with other related issues rather than on an exclusive
singular basis, stating that ASEM partners ‘emphasised the importance of
continued work to develop policies and measures for cooperation in the other
relevant fields such as infrastructure development, energy and the environmental
sector with the objective of promoting sustainable economic growth’.
– Third ASEM summit (2000, Seoul): There was a clear emphasis on energy supply
and price security, the chair’s statement ‘expressing concern over volatility in oil
prices. Leaders shared the view that ensuring a stable supply of energy, including
oil and other fuels, was vital to the maintenance of long-term economic growth for
all ASEM partners and the world at large’. There was also the first explicit link
made in an ASEM summit statement to the energy-environment-security nexus, as
well as associated matters of global environmental governance: ‘Leaders
acknowledged that the degradation of the natural resource base and, in particular,
the problem of energy and environment, is a challenge for all ASEM partners and
reiterated their commitment to addressing global environmental issues, to
ensuring a successful Sixth Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change in November 2000, and to working towards the
early entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol.’
– Fourth ASEM summit (2002, Copenhagen): The energy-environment-security nexus
received even greater emphasis at this summit. Indeed, energy security was
inextricably linked to climate change in the chair’s statement: ‘Leaders underlined
the importance of the ASEM dialogue on environmental matters leading up to the
next ASEM Environment Ministers’ Meeting in 2003. They reaffirmed their political
will to implement the commitments made at the World Summit on Sustainable
Development and welcomed the new international targets on sanitation, energy,
sustainable consumption and production, chemicals and biodiversity.’
– Fifth ASEM summit (2004, Hanoi): There was a return to emphasis on traditional
energy security concerns over carbon fuel supply and price risks, with the Hanoi
declaration on a closer ASEM economic partnership calling for actions in response
to high and volatile oil prices, noting in particular that these ‘could slow down
regions’ economic growth’. Energy was again listed in a multitude of other areas of
cooperation to be promoted among ASEM partners.
– Sixth ASEM summit (2006, Helsinki): This marked a watershed in Asia-Europe
dialogue on energy-related matters. The Helsinki declaration on climate change
committed ASEM partners to ‘act with resolve and urgency to meet interrelated
multiple goals of addressing climate change, reducing air pollution and improving
the global environment while contributing to sustainable development and
synergies with energy policy goals’ and to ‘work together to improve access to
sustainable energy services in order to facilitate the achievement of the Millennium
Development Goals’. It noted that the ASEM group would invest an estimated $6.3
trillion in the energy sector by 2030, although this referred only to existing plans
and not to any ASEM-related initiative. Under its core principles of sustainable
development, the Helsinki declaration called upon ASEM to promote the transfer
and deployment of low carbon technology, enhance energy efficiency, and scale up
renewable energy infrastructures. The summit’s chair statement, which had an
entire section on sustainable development including environment and energy
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aspired to substantially strengthen Asia-Europe cooperation. Second, in
the early summits hosted by Asian nations (especially South Korea and
Vietnam), there was more concern with short-term carbon fuel energy
security matters. Notwithstanding the fact that host nations tend to have
some influence over the meeting discussions and outcomes, we should
be careful to conclude this was at the time a typically Asian response to,
or conception of, energy security challenges. Oil prices did indeed rise
somewhat leading up to both the Seoul and Hanoi summits, and these
were only two Asian nations from many in ASEM’s membership.
Third, a strengthening energy-environment nexus was discernible at
EU-hosted summits, first at Copenhagen and then more substantially at
Helsinki. Fourth, there has been a much stronger recognition of the
deepening energy security interdependence between Asia and Europe,
in terms of markets and supply especially, in the last two summits and
most notably at the 2010 Brussels summit. This reflected the general
trend towards the greater internationalisation of energy security rela-
tions generally.
ASEM foreign and environmental ministers’ meetings from the mid-
2000s onwards had called for the establishment of substantive energy
cooperation between both regions, and a number of new ASEM events
on energy security have been organised since. In June 2006, in the
run-up to the summit that year, Helsinki hosted an international work-
security, furthermore noted the importance of ‘mitigating threats to the Sea Lanes
of Communication between Asia and Europe’ and ensuring the safety of
international energy transporting routes generally.
– Seventh ASEM Summit (2008, Beijing): This followed on strongly from the previous
summit on energy issues. The Beijing declaration on sustainable development
acknowledged that energy security was inextricably linked to the stability and
growth of the world economy, and to sustainable development futures.
– Eighth ASEM Summit (2010, Brussels): Many of the points raised in the Brussels
declaration on more effective global governance derived from efforts to restore
stability in the global economy after the 2008 financial crisis. There was only a
passing reference in this document to sustainable development, no explicit
mention of energy, and the only mention of environment was the ‘financial
environment’. In some contrast, the chair’s statement did refer to energy security
and climate change issues. A specific note was made on ‘ensuring sufficient,
reliable and environmentally responsible supplies of energy at prices reflecting
economic fundamentals’, which was perhaps more aimed at ASEM Asian countries
that continued to subsidise the supply price of energy fuels (e.g. Indonesia).
Perhaps most importantly, the statement noted that ‘the global nature of [energy]
challenges and the growing interdependence between producing, consuming and
transit countries would require strengthened dialogue and partnership involving
ASEM partners and other stakeholders’. This acknowledged the growing direct
energy security linkages between both regions, thus reflecting key trends such as
sourcing from an increasing range of similar energy partners such as Russia,
Central Asia and Africa.
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shop entitled ‘Climate Change and Energy Security: The Role of ASEM
in Facilitating Cooperation between Europe and Asia’. This was fol-
lowed two years later by the first ASEM forum on energy security policy
convened in Hanoi in April 2008, and an ASEM seminar on energy
security and climate change held in Singapore in 2010. The most
important new event of all was the first ASEM ministerial conference
on energy security held in Brussels in June 2009, where foreign and
energy ministers from both regions assembled for the first time to dis-
cuss how to improve Europe-Asia energy cooperation. This was more of
an information-sharing and exchange-of-views exercise and did not lead
to the formulation of a substantive cooperation programme. Indeed,
such a programme has yet to be established by ASEM on energy secur-
ity, and at the time of writing there were no publically known plans for
when a second ASEM ministerial conference on energy security or
when a second ASEM forum on energy security policy might take
place.
Conclusion
We may say with some notable certainty that energy security will be-
come a more critical international and global challenge as the 21st cen-
tury progresses. Conventional carbon fuels are fast depleting; finding
and then extracting new carbon fuel reserves will involve increasingly
higher costs that will push up energy prices well beyond inflation rates;
and the pollutant effects of rising carbon emission levels will only
strengthen imperatives to reduce our unsustainable dependency on oil,
coal and gas. The global community thus faces risks on all fronts – sup-
ply, price and environmental – and energy security predicaments will
become more acute unless substantial efforts are made now to make
the transition towards a zero-carbon energy paradigm based on renew-
able and other green energy systems. This at least is the long-term goal
for human civilisation, and ASEM partners, as a large and important
global constituency, have a key role to play in this process.
Asia and Europe may not appear to be natural energy security part-
ners. Energy trade between them is negligible, and at a general level
each region often views energy security from contrasting perspectives
owing to development and socio-economic related factors. Nevertheless,
Asian and European energy security interests are increasingly overlap-
ping, bound by an ever wider range of shared energy security predica-
ments and issues, as well as closer interdependencies now evident in
international energy relationships and structures (e.g. markets, infra-
structure, finance, environmental externalities) in the global system
generally. While Asia and Europe are not engaged in a significant en-
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ergy fuel trade relationship, they are potentially very important partners
with regard to energy technology, infrastructure development, finance,
governance, policy practice and other areas. These provide a firm foun-
dation on which a stronger Asia-Europe energy security partnership
may be developed.
So far, ASEM has only talked about the energy security challenges
facing both regions and the common and global challenges confronting
ASEM partners. Substantial energy cooperation through ASEM has yet
to be achieved, and there is also currently no ASEM initiative in place
for this to be realised either. This needs to be urgently addressed. Meet-
ing most energy security challenges invariably requires long-term plan-
ning, and ASEM is a late starter compared with other transregional or-
ganisations such as APEC. There are opportunities for ASEM to build
on work already well established through EU-ASEAN energy projects,
as well as work programmes overseen by the Energy Charter Treaty that
are expanding the scope of Europe-Asia energy diplomacy.
The recent accession of Russia into ASEM introduces a new dynamic
in Asia-Europe energy relations. Russia is an energy superpower, and
one that supplies both the EU and ASEM Asia with significant levels of
energy fuel. As was noted, this may create competitive tensions between
both regions as ASEM partners seek to outbid others to secure Russian
carbon fuels, yet it also creates exciting new opportunities for develop-
ing energy cooperation. There is, finally, the important issue of
strengthening ASEM’s multilateral utility in helping improve various
forms of global multilateral energy governance. Through ASEM, the EU
could, for example, make a case for ASEM Asian countries acceding to
the International Energy Agency, or developing an Asia-Europe consen-
sus or proposals prior to G20 meetings on energy security issues. It is
time for ASEM to raise its game on energy security matters.
Notes
1 Here we refer to East Asia (Northeast Asia: China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea,
Mongolia, Taiwan; and Southeast Asia: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) and South Asia (India, Pa-
kistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh). With the exception of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Tai-
wan, all actors are part of ASEM Asia.
2 China Daily, 6 July 2009, ‘China considers higher renewable energy targets’, http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-07/06/content_8380826.htm.
3 Figures for OECD Europe.
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10 Enhancing Maritime Security Governance:
European and Asian Naval Missions
against Somali Piracy
Susanne Kamerling and Frans-Paul van der Putten
At the eighth Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the chair’s statement iden-
tified piracy at sea as one of the global focus issues of the ASEM part-
ners. The statement mentions in particular piracy off the coast of Soma-
lia as a current threat to the freedom and security of the seas. The Gulf
of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean – the waters where Somali
piracy occurs – are major thoroughfares of maritime trade between Eur-
ope and Asia. Since 2008, a large number of countries have contributed
to naval missions against Somali piracy. The great majority of these
countries are either European or Asian.1 The fact that so many nations
are involved in addressing Somali piracy – not just through naval mis-
sions but also in other ways – constitutes an important opportunity to
strengthen security governance on maritime piracy. However, even
when faced with a common threat, it is not easy for such a large num-
ber of countries to work together closely when there is little experience
in doing so. This is particularly true when it involves the military assets
of competing great powers in a maritime region that is of major strate-
gic importance. This chapter will address the question of how Asian
and European countries that are active in naval operations against
Somali piracy can contribute to more effective and thus enhanced mari-
time security governance. It will argue that the European Union (EU),
especially when supported by Asian countries, is in a favourable posi-
tion to help overcome geopolitical impediments to greater international
cooperation against piracy. In this regard, ASEM, as the main forum for
collective dialogue between Asia and Europe, can play a central role.
Maritime security governance and naval counter-piracy missions
While at first sight it may seem obvious that countering piracy is a mat-
ter of maritime security governance, in fact this is only part of the
story.2 The root causes for maritime piracy are typically related to politi-
cal, economic and social conditions that exist on land. In order for any
actor or group of actors to eliminate the threat of Somali piracy to com-
mercial shipping, conditions in Somalia itself need to be addressed. In-
itiatives in the sphere of maritime security can at best be complemen-
tary to whatever takes place on land. It is unlikely that Somali piracy
can be eliminated merely through naval operations and protective mea-
sures by merchant ships. A large number of states have dispatched war-
ships to protect shipping in the Gulf of Aden, but the number of pirate
attacks remains unprecedentedly high. Hostage-taking at sea has risen
for the fourth year in a row to record levels in 2010, of which hijackings
off the coast of Somalia last year accounted for 92 percent of the total.3
The primary effect of the naval operations seems to be that the pirates
have substantially expanded their area of activity. Attacks have increas-
ingly taken place at considerable distance to the east and south of the
Gulf of Aden (as far as the Arabian Sea and Mozambique Channel),
and therefore take place in a geographic area that is too large for
counter-piracy forces to cover effectively.
But even though piracy needs to be addressed primarily on land, this
does not mean that maritime initiatives are not important. Changing
the political situation on land, certainly in a country without effective
central government such as Somalia, takes time. But international com-
mercial shipping needs protection right away, on a continuous basis.
Moreover, it seems clear that foreign governments are quite willing to
contribute to initiatives aimed at containing or limiting Somali piracy
and its effects, but are more reluctant when it comes to addressing the
much more complicated issue of Somalia’s political and societal pro-
blems. The outlook is that Somali piracy will not disappear soon, and
for that reason there will remain a need to provide security at sea.
To maximise the effect of counter-piracy initiatives at sea, these need
to be part of a system of maritime security governance. Only through a
systematic approach can foreign governments sustain their maritime
operations over a longer period of time. To make the most of limited
resources, and to make initiatives relating to Somalia relevant also for
counter-piracy in other parts of the world, it is necessary to approach
them from the perspective of maritime security governance. A working
definition of security governance relevant to maritime security (among
others) has been proposed by Torsten Geise: ‘a multi-faceted process in
which nominally autonomous public and private actors, seen as bound
by a commonly shared security goal or interest, coordinate their various
means through binding policy decisions that allow for collectively mana-
ging the complexities of contemporary security risks’ (Geise 2010: 18).
At a minimum, a system of maritime security governance to limit
the threat of piracy at the global level should include the following ele-
ments: (1) a legal framework that defines the options and responsibil-
ities for actors engaged in counter-piracy;4 (2) a global coordinating
mechanism that operates on behalf of all relevant national governments
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and that offers a central platform for communication and coordinates
the execution of relevant initiatives; (3) a set of enforcement tools aimed
at protecting potential victims, deterring and capturing pirates, and
bringing piracy suspects to trial; and (4) a close aligning of the previous
elements with on-land approaches to piracy and with business sector
actors relevant to maritime piracy.
Naval operations to protect merchant vessels or to hunt for suspected
pirates are part of the third category, i.e. enforcement tools. The tighter
the elements on the list are interconnected, and the further they are ela-
borated, the more highly developed the system of maritime security
governance will become. The criteria show that, at present, maritime se-
curity governance in the sphere of counter-piracy is still weakly devel-
oped. All four elements are present, but there is still significant scope
for improvement (van Ginkel/van der Putten 2010).
While the basic situation has remained the same for centuries, some
things have been changing in the past two decades. Prior to the emer-
gence of Somali piracy as a major international issue, it was piracy in
the Strait of Malacca that drew considerable international attention. The
need to deal with Southeast Asian piracy brought together a great vari-
ety of actors. Important new initiatives were launched at the interna-
tional level, such as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combat-
ing Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP),5 the
Information Sharing Centre of the Federation of Asian Shipowners’
Association, and the Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur of the
International Maritime Bureau (part of the International Chamber of
Commerce).6 As the three coastal states of the Strait of Malacca (Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, Singapore) are opposed to direct interventions from
other governments, international cooperation with regard to the counter
piracy operations themselves have remained mostly limited to these
three countries.
Somali piracy, however, offers more opportunities for international
actors to be involved. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of
Somalia has allowed the international community to enter their territor-
ial waters and even on land in ‘hot pursuit’ under UN resolution 1851,
and welcomes the international initiatives that are being undertaken.
This offers an opportunity to work towards improved security govern-
ance by building on the maritime counter-piracy operations that cur-
rently take place. Naval missions to protect merchant vessels and to
search for suspected pirate ships are at the core of these operations.
Since 2008 the international involvement in protecting shipping
from Somali piracy has provided important new building blocks for the
further development of this systematic approach. The sequence of coun-
ter-piracy initiatives relating to Somalia started in November 2007 when
France, Denmark, Canada and the Netherlands dispatched navy vessels
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to escort ships of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) to
and from Somalia. In July 2005, a ship of the WFP carrying emergency
relief for Somalia had been hijacked for the first time. Further incidents
occurred, with 2008 witnessing a surge in piracy attacks on commercial
shipping. The UN put out a request to the international community to
step up to this increased threat.7 The EU was one of the first actors to
respond.
European counter-piracy operations at sea8
The Europeans launched EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta in Decem-
ber 2008 as a follow-up to the earlier missions of individual countries
to protect WFP ships. It was its first naval operation under the frame-
work of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Forces
participating in Operation Atalanta have been tasked with providing
protection for vessels of the WFP and the African Union’s (AU) military
mission to Somalia (AMISOM), as well as fishing and merchant vessels
in the region. They are authorised to ‘employ the necessary means, in-
cluding the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to
bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery which may be com-
mitted in the areas where they are present’ (EU Council Secretariat
2009).
Atalanta is currently in its third year of deployment, as it was ex-
tended in December 2010 until December 2012.9 The two-year exten-
sion of the mandate saw a broadening of the possibilities for Atalanta to
take more aggressive actions against pirates. Atalanta’s command is
now allowed to launch air strikes or strikes from the sea to target pirate
camps identified by the mission on land (Europe Diplomacy & Defence
2010). However, the emphasis remains on the responsibility of states in
the region and on regional cooperation. The approach of the EU there-
fore enhances maritime capacity building in an overall comprehensive
approach. In this context, the EU also provides training of maritime per-
sonnel from the information and training centres in Djibouti and Sa-
na’a (Yemen) in the context of the Djibouti code of conduct, a regional
framework of agreements between countries and organisations involved
in the piracy problem. Moreover, the EU has tried to broaden its exist-
ing counter-piracy initiatives by also inviting non-EU countries to be ac-
tive under the EU flag. This applies to Norway, Croatia and Montene-
gro, but also South Africa, Australia and New Zealand (Homan/Kamer-
ling 2010: 75).10 The EU has been very active at the operational level in
cooperating with other actors such as China and India.
Also in late 2008, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
deployed one of its standing naval units (Standing NATO Maritime
Group 1, SNMG1) to conduct anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Afri-
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ca region. At the time, NATO was providing escorts to WFP vessels
transiting through the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa under
Operation Allied Provider. NATO ended Operation Allied Provider in
December 2008 and transferred WFP protection responsibilities to the
EU’s Operation Atalanta (Homan/Kamerling 2010: 73-78). NATO then
launched a new anti-piracy mission, Operation Allied Protector, under
the command of SNMG1 in March 2009. The forces participating in
Operation Allied Protector acted to ‘deter, defend against and disrupt pi-
rate activities’. In the summer of 2009, NATO followed this up with a
further counter-piracy operation, Operation Ocean Shield, to continue
its presence in the Gulf of Aden until at least the end of 2012.11 Both
NATO standing maritime groups (SNMG1 and 2) were to alternate their
involvement in Ocean Shield. Along with the US and Canada, various
European (EU and non-EU) countries participated in these successive
NATO missions.12 The NATO operations were initially not set up as
counter-piracy missions but as out-of-area missions to the Indian
Ocean. They were turned into counter-piracy operations for the duration
of the ships’ stay in the Gulf of Aden. NATO, like the EU, strives for a
comprehensive approach to counter-piracy including capacity building
and regional cooperation (Homan/Kamerling 2010: 76-78).
The third mechanism in which European countries participate are the
US-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). CMF has several multina-
tional naval task forces, each with a specific purpose, and consists of 25
countries based in Bahrain. From 2008 the Combined Task Force 150
(CTF150), which constituted the maritime component of Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, was occasionally used for
combating piracy activities in the Western Indian Ocean. However,
some of the coalition members – especially the US itself – felt that coun-
ter-piracy was not part of the mandate of CTF150 and was distracting
too much attention from the original goal of fighting terrorism in the
region. For that reason, in January 2009, Combined Task Force 151
(CTF151) was established with the specific aim of conducting counter-
piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and
Red Sea. Its mission is to ‘disrupt piracy and armed robbery at sea and
to engage with regional and other partners to build capacity and improve
relevant capabilities in order to protect global maritime commerce and
secure freedom of navigation’.13 CTF151 has been led by the US, Turkey,
South Korea and Singapore and is currently under the command of
Commodore Abdul Aleem of the Pakistan Navy. Twenty countries have
in one way or the other contributed to CMF’s taskforces, including the
United Kingdom (UK), France, the Netherlands and Denmark on the
European side, and South Korea, Pakistan, Singapore and Thailand on
the Asian side.14 CTF 151 deploys between two and five ships, while
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NATO and the EU generally maintain larger deployments: between 3-6
and 6-8, respectively, excluding air capacity (AIV 2010: 34-39).
Each of the three multinational counter-piracy groupings within
which European countries participate has a continuous presence in the
Gulf of Aden. Initially, coordination between the EU, NATO, CTF151
and other naval actors was limited. However, in February 2009 the EU
initiated the internationally recommended transit corridor (IRTC) for
commercial shipping, following the initiation of patrols in the broader
geographical area of the maritime security patrol area (MSPA) com-
menced in 2008 by CMF.15 The coordinates of the IRTC run east-west
through the northern part of the Gulf of Aden, south of Yemen. The
corridor is currently being guarded by CTF151, NATO and EU ships. It
is intended as a way to optimise the use of available maritime assets
present in the region. The IRTC has provided increased security for the
vessels that pass through it, although hijacks have occurred occasionally
within the IRTC.
The EU has been particularly proactive in furthering international co-
operation. It set up an internet-based system where ships can apply for
transit and assistance and have access to up-to-date threat information
on the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean. This maritime security
centre of the Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) coordinates all requests that
come in from commercial ships for assistance from CTF151, the EU
and NATO. While similar services are provided by the UK maritime
trade organisation (UKMTO) in Dubai and the US Navy’s maritime liai-
son office (MARLO) in Bahrain, the greater part of the applications are
currently redirected to MSCHOA.
Asian counter-piracy operations at sea
For many Asian navies involved in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf
of Aden, this is the first time they conduct long-lasting naval operations
outside of their own region. Only some East and Southeast Asian navies
had previously been active in the Western Indian Ocean. Singapore
joined CMF in 2004,16 while Japan took part in Operation Enduring
Freedom by dispatching successive naval refuelling missions from 2001
until 2010. Since 2009, various Asian countries such as China, Japan,
South Korea and India have maintained a continuous naval presence in
the Gulf of Aden, with ships being deployed on a rotating basis.
In the context of CTF151, several Asian countries have been working
side by side with European (and other) countries. South Korea, Paki-
stan, Singapore and Thailand participated in CTF151. South Korea
joined the taskforce in March 2009 with one destroyer, Singapore in
April 2009 with a landing ship tank, and Pakistan in July with one of
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its main warships.17 In September 2010, Thailand was the most recent
Asian country to join CTF151 with a patrol vessel and a supply ship.18
Other Asian countries have deployed individual missions instead of
contributing to a multinational naval task force. These countries operate
outside the formal organisation of the IRTC, although in practice they
are active in the same part of the Gulf of Aden. There have been nu-
merous instances when ships and aircraft that are part of the IRTC and
those that are not have responded jointly to piracy threats. In Septem-
ber 2008, the Malaysian navy deployed three vessels (one frigate and
two supply ships) to protect commercial shipping. This came in re-
sponse to several hijackings of Malaysian ships. The aim of this mis-
sion was not to undertake direct rescue operations but to provide pro-
tection for the Malaysian vessels once they were released.19 In 2009,
the Malaysian navy temporarily used a commercial tanker for military
supply and logistics to the region instead of a supply ship because of
the high costs of deploying naval assets. India, too, was among the first
Asian countries to respond to the surge in piracy attacks in 2008. In
October of that year, the Indian navy deployed one of its largest vessels
against piracy in the Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. Since
then, the Indian navy has continued its counter-piracy mission, with a
total of 21 Indian naval ships so far having been involved.20 The Indian
navy has organised individual and group transit escorts through the
Gulf of Aden for Indian-flagged ships as well as the merchant ships of
other countries along the entire length of the IRTC.
China’s counter-piracy operation, aimed at providing escorts for com-
mercial ships through the Gulf of Aden, became operational in January
2009.21 Since then, the Chinese navy has maintained a continued pre-
sence of two warships and one supply ship in the Gulf of Aden.22 In
part to support this operation, in the second half of 2010 China sent a
hospital ship to the Western Indian Ocean that visited the Gulf of Aden.
For the Chinese navy, its activities off the Somali coast constitute a ma-
jor new development. Previously it had very little experience with expe-
ditionary operations or with operating in an international environment.
As China lacks military bases in the Indian Ocean, it has so far relied
on Chinese commercial companies to resupply its navy ships via ports
in the region.
Japan initiated its counter-piracy operation in March 2009.23 The
Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force maintains two warships and two
maritime surveillance aircraft in the Gulf of Aden. In April 2010, Japan
and Djibouti signed an agreement according to which Japan will oper-
ate air and naval facilities in the African country to support counter-
piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden.24 While the Japanese government
maintains that these facilities do not constitute a military base since
they will be operated only for the duration of the counter-piracy mis-
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sion, the Djibouti arrangement nevertheless does constitute an impor-
tant new step in the development of the international profile of Japan’s
military and its contribution to international security at sea. In addition
to a large number of further naval actors, private security firms hired
by shipowners to provide onboard armed protection against pirates are
also involved in addressing the threat of Somali piracy.25
International cooperation and geopolitics
Piracy in Somali waters has accelerated international interaction in the
sphere of maritime security governance. Never before were so many
countries involved in fighting piracy in a single region. The Asian actors
have varying degrees of experience with international naval cooperation.
For example, India performs a joint naval exercise each year with the
US, called the MALABAR naval exercise. In 2009, Japan participated in
this exercise.26 Various other Asian countries also have a history of joint
exercises with the US navy. However, compared with the European
countries, most of which have been in NATO for many years, the Asian
countries are less accustomed to multinational naval operations.
Based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851 which ‘en-
courages all States and regional organizations fighting piracy and armed
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia to establish an international
cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact between
and among states, regional and international organizations on all as-
pects of combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off Somalia’s coast’,
the US initiated the formation of a multilateral Contact Group on Piracy
off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). This Contact Group was established
as a voluntary international forum of cooperation between countries,
organisations and industry groups with an interest in combating piracy,
which meets regularly at the United Nations in New York. The CGPCS
now consists of 49 countries, 7 international organisations27 and two
large industry representations (BIMCO and Intertanko). It has sent two
assessment missions to Somalia and other countries in the region that
form the basis of all initiatives. The activities of the CGPCS are funded
by its own international trust fund that was set up to support all initia-
tives.28
The Contact Group held its inaugural meeting in January 2009 and
identified several tasks:
– improving operational and information support to counter-piracy
operations;
– establishing a counter-piracy coordination mechanism;
– strengthening judicial frameworks for the arrest, prosecution and
detention of pirates;
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– strengthening commercial shipping self-awareness and other cap-
abilities;
– pursuing improved diplomatic and public information efforts; and
– tracking financial flows related to piracy.29
It has since then been subdivided into four working groups:
– Working group 1: military and operational coordination, information
sharing and capacity building, chaired by the UK;
– Working group 2: judicial issues, chaired by Denmark;
– Working group 3: strengthening shipping self-awareness and other
capabilities, chaired by the US; and
– Working group 4: public information, chaired by Egypt.
Next to the CGPCS, which is focused on the political and strategic
levels, there is also a forum for the actual coordination in the maritime
theatre of the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean. At the Shared
Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings in Bahrain which take
place approximately once in every six weeks, tactical and operational co-
ordination is discussed and agreements are made for a certain period
of time. The participating parties agree upon the division of tasks, opti-
misation of the use of available assets and coordination of the geo-
graphic presence. The SHADE meetings involve the multinational
forces (EU, CTF151, NATO) and all other countries operating in the
area, together with representatives from international organisations and
the shipping industry.30
Since its inception, SHADE has seen an increase in the number of
naval authorities present. In late 2009, China expressed the wish to fol-
low the example of the EU and the US in (co-)chairing the SHADE
meetings in Bahrain, and also to take part in the IRTC system (Weitz
2009: 10).31 In late January 2010, following a meeting of the SHADE
grouping, China, the US, the EU and NATO reached an agreement that
China would join them as co-chair of the SHADE meetings on a rotat-
ing basis (Gelfand 2010: 5). However, by mid-2010 China had not yet
acted as chair of SHADE or joined the IRTC. According to reports in
the Indian media, this was because the Indian government had objected
to China taking up this role.32
There are civilian as well as military systems through which commer-
cial ships and the naval authorities currently communicate. Two civilian
systems that are widely being used are the automatic identification sys-
tem and global maritime distress system, the latter being imposed on
the shipping industry by the International Maritime Organization
(IMO). These are systems that provide data on merchant ships, includ-
ing identification, position, course and speed. They are also used as a
means to communicate with ships and receive and react to emergency
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calls. The overall operational picture is disseminated via classified mili-
tary systems and is accessible only to most countries participating in
CTF151, NATO or Atalanta plus Japan and South Korea. A system that
is particularly relevant because all actors can communicate with it is the
Mercury system. Mercury is an EU-introduced online system that is
used to communicate with all naval forces and relevant shore-based or-
ganisations that do not have access to the classified systems of the
established naval forces, like Russia, China, the Seychelles, India and
UKMTO. Navies and shore-based organisations have to apply to be
admitted. All naval actors except Iran have joined this forum with possi-
bilities for chat, file exchange and unclassified information exchange
(Homan/Kamerling 2010: 88). Furthermore, work is in progress to im-
plement a near real-time unclassified operational picture in Mercury.
European and Asian actors are thus capable of communicating through
these systems, by which the opportunity to work together at the opera-
tional level in diverting piracy attacks and hijacks is being facilitated.
While many factors affect the level and form of cooperation that exist
between the various countries, geopolitical factors take up a special po-
sition, in particular in the context of naval cooperation. For those coun-
tries with sufficient naval capacity to deploy frigates or destroyers at a
long distance, geopolitical factors have a major impact on their decision
as to whether, when and how they actually make these very costly de-
ployments. While all governments involved in naval counter-piracy mis-
sions share a common interest in fighting Somali piracy, other interests
also play a role, and these are not always compatible among the various
nations. International naval cooperation in the Gulf of Aden is closely
related to geopolitics. On the one hand, the European navies involved
work closely together with each other and with the US, with whom they
share major strategic interests. The Asian navies tend to operate either
individually or in cooperation with the US. From the three leading
powers in Asia, Japan is a US ally, while India tends to guard its geopo-
litical independence, and China is a strategic rival of the US. Particu-
larly the US-China relationship is of key importance. In recent years,
China has emerged as a world power that is surpassed in terms of inter-
national influence only by the United States. No multilateral governance
system can address major security issues at a fundamental level without
the involvement of at least both the US and China. The fact that both
Japan and India regard China as their main strategic rival further com-
plicates the situation.
Against this background, it is not surprising to see that the EU,
NATO and the US work closely together in the IRTC. This multilateral
mechanism has not yet been expanded to also involve most of the Asian
actors. The apparent refusal by India to let China act as co-chair at
SHADE is a clear example of geopolitical considerations hampering clo-
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ser international cooperation. But the fact that China applied for the
role of co-chair and seemed willing to contribute, in one way or another,
to patrolling the IRTC shows that expanding the system to involve more
Asian countries does not need to be impossible.
A more effective and efficient use of the available military assets is of
great importance. The current naval deployments are very expensive. It
is unclear how long they can be sustained, while it is obvious that even
under present conditions only a part of the affected area can be covered
by the counter-piracy patrols. The number of piracy incidents remains
high, with the number for 2010 breaking all records, while the ransoms
being demanded are rising steeply.33 The problem of high insurance
fees and the physical risks for seafarers continue to exist as before.
More international cooperation is required, and for this it is necessary
to acknowledge the relevance of the geopolitical setting and to explore
where progress is possible and where it is not.
Conclusion
When taking into account the various naval missions and the relevance
of geopolitics, it is the EU in particular that seems strikingly well posi-
tioned to stimulate multilateral cooperation. On the one hand, the EU
is the actor with the most substantial naval presence in the Gulf of
Aden and is very active in counter-piracy. On the other hand, the EU is
not directly involved in the main geopolitical tensions in the Asian re-
gion. Unlike NATO, it operates independently from the US. The EU’s
active posture and yet low geopolitical rivalry are useful assets in mov-
ing ahead with closer operational integration in counter-piracy at sea.
The EU has the opportunity to launch new platforms and procedures
for interaction and coordination that take into account the limitations
and possibilities of the other actors. It can take the lead in exploring
ways to expand current mechanisms such as the IRTC and SHADE to
strengthen the involvement of non-Western actors. It can do so by med-
iating between the other naval actors and by helping to find solutions
that are acceptable to all.
In addition, there is a need to involve more countries in patrolling
and coordinating the IRTC, but there is also an urgent need to coordi-
nate protective actions east and south of the Gulf of Aden. While more
difficult to achieve – e.g. with regard to hunting for pirate ships, intelli-
gence and evidence gathering, dealing with arrested suspects, and
resupplying – any progress in terms of more coordination would be
highly useful. Asian countries but also the US and other actors, all of
whom share an interest in more stable maritime relations in the region,
can play an important role by supporting the EU when it launches such
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initiatives. The IRTC has shown that it is possible through international
cooperation to increase security for commercial ships at least in a part
of the affected area. A more effective and efficient use of military assets
and the expanding of relevant multinational mechanisms will improve
security at sea in the short run and will also contribute to a better sys-
tem of maritime security governance that can have a more lasting
impact.
In this context, ASEM can contribute to enhancing maritime security
governance by providing an informal platform for bilateral and inter-
regional dialogue on piracy at sea. A security dialogue in the ASEM con-
text would facilitate a more coordinated approach of the involved Eur-
opean and Asian interests with regard to their respective naval missions.
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ASEM Enlargement

11 Bridging Asia and Europe? Australia and New
Zealand Membership in ASEM
David Capie
One of the most significant developments at the ASEM 8 summit in
Brussels in October 2010 was the admission of three new members:
Australia, New Zealand and the Russian Federation. Their participation
marked not only a ‘third wave’ of expansion for the already unwieldy
grouping, but also the inclusion of three new members whose identities
were arguably not easily aligned with either Europe or Asia.
This chapter explores how Australia and New Zealand came to join
ASEM, the different ambitions and interests that propelled their appli-
cations, and the goals they are likely to pursue as new members. Draw-
ing on interviews with Australian and New Zealand government offi-
cials as well as documentary evidence, it sets out the process that led to
ASEM’s expansion to a trans-regional grouping of 48 members.
The chapter falls into three parts. The first section provides some his-
torical background about Australia and New Zealand’s interest in
ASEM, including their various efforts to join the ASEM process since
its first meeting in 1996. The second section outlines the drivers that
pushed them towards membership in 2009 and some of the complica-
tions that surrounded enlargement. The final section examines where
these new members will fit in relation to Europe and Asia and what, if
anything, the addition of the ‘Tasman Two’ might change for the Asia-
Europe Meeting in the future.
Background
Australia and New Zealand’s membership in ASEM needs to be seen
against the broader backdrop of their changing economies and relation-
ships with Asia and Europe. At first glance, the two antipodean (from a
European perspective) states have much in common: both are settler co-
lonies and, as such, their ties to the United Kingdom (UK) profoundly
affected their formative experiences as states. They are both parliamen-
tary democracies, whose dominant civil and political traditions have
their origins in Europe. Each acquired a greater willingness and capa-
city to act autonomously in international relations during the twentieth
century and became not only less connected economically to the UK
but also more closely connected to one another (Smith/Hempenstall/
Goldfinch 2008; Capie 2010).
But if New Zealand and Australia have similar colonial experiences
and identities, their differing size and self-image give them different
ambitions as states. Australia, with a population of more than 20 mil-
lion people, is the world’s 13th largest economy in terms of nominal
GDP and the fourth largest economy in Asia. Its rich natural resources
have seen it boom at a time when most of the world’s developed econo-
mies have suffered recession. It also has one of the most sophisticated
militaries in Asia. For more than two decades it has seen itself as a
‘middle power’ with the capability and right to play an active and influ-
ential role on the international stage.
By contrast, New Zealand’s smaller population and limited economic
and military power have meant that it has rather more limited ambi-
tions. While the country’s diplomats and political leaders like to repeat
the refrain that the country ‘punches above its weight’ in international
fora, they also have a keen sense of the limits imposed by resources
and the relative lack of hard power.
Since the 1970s, both New Zealand and Australia have recognised
that their economic destiny is increasingly tied to the Asia-Pacific re-
gion. The Hawke and Keating governments were closely associated with
a shift towards Asia in Australian foreign policy, with Prime Minister
Bob Hawke declaring his intention to ‘enmesh’ Australia in the Asia-Pa-
cific. In New Zealand, the shifting relative importance of Asia and Eur-
ope began to be understood in the early 1970s, brought about by the
shock of Britain’s decision to join the European Economic Community
(EEC). This led to a search for new markets, initially in the Middle East
but later focusing on Japan and East Asia. In the early 1990s, the Bol-
ger government declared it was time for New Zealand to make a ‘great
dramatic leap into Asia’ (Rolls 2008: 203-204).
As well as closer commercial ties, both countries have also seen a sig-
nificant change in migration patterns, with an increase in new migrants
from East Asia during the 1990s. In the 2006 census, 8.7 percent of
Australians identified themselves as of Asian ethnicity. Across the Tas-
man, Asian-New Zealanders comprise 9.2 percent of the total popula-
tion. They are also the fastest growing segment, and by 2020 it is esti-
mated they will represent some 15 percent of the New Zealand popula-
tion.1
These economic and demographic shifts have underpinned a greater
political engagement with the Asia-Pacific region. A key part of both
Australia and New Zealand’s strategy has been seeking membership in
multilateral economic and security institutions and through them help-
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ing to shape the emerging architecture of regional cooperation. Along
with Japan, Australia played a founding role in the creation of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), in which New Zealand is
also a member. Both are ASEAN dialogue partners and active partici-
pants in the ASEAN-centred regional architecture that has emerged
over the last two decades, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meet-
ing-Plus (ADMM-Plus). These multilateral institutions sit alongside an
increasingly complex ‘noodle bowl’ of bilateral preferential trade agree-
ments that connect Australia and New Zealand with East Asia. They are
signs of a growing sense of belonging to the East Asia region that helps
explain Australia and New Zealand’s interest in ASEM.
Australia and ASEM: third time lucky
Australia’s participation in ASEM 8 was the culmination of more than a
decade of lobbying. When ASEM was first proposed in 1995, Singapor-
ean officials apparently provided assurances to their Canberra counter-
parts that Australia would be a founding member. Strong support was
also forthcoming from the UK, Japan and Indonesia. However, Austra-
lia ran into opposition from Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Moha-
mad, who had previously attempted to create an ‘Asians only’ forum
with his 1990 proposal for an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) (Ais-
bett 1996). Mahathir’s vision of East Asia did not include Australia and
New Zealand; he saw Australia as too closely aligned with the United
States (US) and too focused on a free trade agenda. Rather, he sought
to create a regional economic grouping that would emphasise develop-
mental goals. Poor personal relations did not help. Mahathir had
crossed swords with Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating in APEC,
and the two countries had experienced fractious bilateral ties through-
out the early 1990s. While Mahathir’s EAEG proposal was eventually
thwarted by American pressure on Japan and South Korea, his strong
opposition to Australian participation in ASEM proved more effective
(Dobell 2009).
John Howard’s coalition government applied again at the 1998 ASEM
summit in London, but there was still opposition on the Asian side. A
decade would pass before the Australian government again raised the
issue of membership, this time successfully having its candidacy dis-
cussed at ASEM 7 in Beijing. In May 2009, the ninth meeting of ASEM
foreign ministers in Hanoi finally approved the application, paving the
way for the country’s full participation at ASEM 8 in Brussels.
Why, after a decade of inaction, did Australia resurrect its interest in
joining ASEM? The choice looks puzzling, especially given a growing
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view among analysts that ASEM was becoming less rather than more
effective as it expanded.2 Australia’s successful application was part of
an ambitious and highly personalised foreign policy agenda under New
Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd.3 Howard’s government had given
far greater emphasis to Australia’s bilateral alliance with the US and
was also sceptical about the value of multilateral institutions. Foreign
Minister Alexander Downer had been strongly critical of the effective-
ness of the United Nations (UN) in the run-up to the war in Iraq, and
there were debates in Canberra in 2005 about the utility of signing
ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) (McMillan 2005).
By way of contrast, Rudd (2008a) oversaw a renewed commitment to
multilateralism, including a significantly expanded Australian engage-
ment with regional organisations. In his first major foreign policy ad-
dress, he noted that ‘the challenges Australia faces will require a new
period of active, creative Australian middle-power diplomacy. (...) Austra-
lia has a deep, abiding national interest in the furtherance of a robust,
international rules-based order that underpins our long-term security,
economic and environmental interests. To maximise those interests, our
capacity to act effectively bilaterally, plurilaterally and multilaterally must
continue to be enhanced.’
This new stance led to a blizzard of activity on the international stage.
In the first months of the Rudd government, Australia applied for ob-
server status with the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC), launched a strategic dialogue with the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) and had foreign minister Stephen Smith attend the
2009 African Union (AU) Summit. Rudd himself suggested that the
Six-Party Talks addressing the North Korean nuclear issue could be
made permanent and expanded to bring in new members – including
Australia (ABC Radio Australia 2008).4 In June 2008, he called for the
formation of an “Asia Pacific Community”, a vague and ultimately con-
troversial initiative that sought to consolidate existing Asia-Pacific insti-
tutions by creating a single forum where leaders could address the key
political, economic and security challenges facing the region (Rudd
2008b). Rudd’s motives were multiple. As a former diplomat, he had a
natural interest in foreign policy and wanted to make an impact as a
statesman. The renewed interest in multilateralism drew on the tradi-
tion of internationalism that runs deep in the Australian Labor Party.
But these initiatives also served pragmatic ends, for example in helping
to raise Australia’s international profile at a time when it was seeking
election to a UN Security Council seat in 2013-14.
Although the Mandarin-speaking Rudd was seen as an Asia hand, he
also sought to re-energise Australian ties with Europe. As a group, the
27 EU member states are Australia’s largest export market and its lar-
gest source of inward investment. Two-way trade reached $ 91.3 billion
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in 2008, accounting for over 16 percent of Australia's total trade,
although the balance of trade is weighted heavily in the EU's favour.
Despite that, Australian diplomacy had been accused of focusing on its
differences with Europe, particularly around agriculture, rather than
common interests.5 The Howard government’s 1997 foreign policy
white paper, for example, barely mentioned the EU, referring to it as
one of ‘the major European organisations’ (Stats 2009: 9). Rudd was
determined to reverse this. He included a visit to the European Com-
mission (EC) in his first overseas trip, a first for an Australian prime
minister and a symbol of the determination to turn ‘a new page in Aus-
tralia’s relationship with Europe through the European Union, through
the European Commission because we think there are so many areas
where we can cooperate more effectively together’ (Rudd/Barroso
2008). In October 2008, Australia and the EU signed a new Partner-
ship Framework, which outlined a range of activities to enhance coop-
eration on issues such as climate change, energy, science and technol-
ogy, and security.6
But if Rudd wanted to re-energise regional links with Europe and
place Australia at the heart of debates about institutional cooperation in
Asia, his most ambitious goals were at the global level. Along with the
decision to seek a seat on the UN Security Council, Rudd was also
instrumental in pushing for Australian membership in the nascent
G20 process, an accomplishment that one commentator describes as
his greatest achievement as prime minister (Sheridan 2008). The G20
quickly became a key site for discussions on responses to the global fi-
nancial crisis, and it is here that a connection to ASEM becomes appar-
ent. The 2008 ASEM7 was one of the first meetings of international
leaders to be held after the scale of the global financial crisis began to
be appreciated. Its agenda focused on the crisis, and ASEM provided a
key forum for discussions between Asian and European leaders in the
run-up to the Pittsburgh G20 meeting. For a prime minister who
wanted to be a key player in the international response to the global fi-
nancial crisis, Australia’s absence from ASEM was a problem that
needed to be fixed.
New Zealand: a horse in every race
Like Australia, New Zealand has seen its relations with Europe and Asia
shift dramatically in the last few decades. Once overwhelmingly depen-
dent on the UK as an export market, New Zealand has repositioned its
economy so that in 2009 more than 54 percent of its trade was with
East Asia (including Australia). Eight of the country’s top twelve export
markets are in East Asia. Furthermore, at a time of global recession,
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trade with Asia is growing rapidly. Following the conclusion of the New
Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement in 2008, New Zealand exports to
China increased by almost 60 percent in a single year (Groser 2009).
This economic shift has been reflected in closer political ties with
East Asia. The country is an ASEAN dialogue partner, a member of
APEC and the ARF, and was a founding member of the EAS in 2005.
At the second track level, New Zealand has been an active member of
the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the Council for
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). Indeed, New Zealand
has pursued a strategy of seeking membership in almost all the politi-
cal, security and economic institutions that have arisen in the Asia-
Pacific region in the last two decades. This reflects a genuine and grow-
ing sense of connection, but it is also driven in part by a nagging feel-
ing of vulnerability. As an economy reliant on primary commodity
exports, New Zealand fears being shut out of any emerging exclusive
East Asian economic grouping. Its strategy has therefore been to have
‘a horse in every race’, to be part of almost every regional institution,
whether organised on an Asia-Pacific or East Asian basis.7 This gives it
a voice in political and economic discussions but more importantly
avoids the risk that it might be excluded if one of the groupings devel-
oped into a fully fledged free trade area.
The striking exception to this rule of seeking membership in almost
every East Asian or Asia-Pacific regional institution has been ASEM, in
which successive New Zealand governments have shown little interest.
The government’s 2007 Asia strategy document Our Future with Asia
trumpets New Zealand’s participation in a host of regional institutions,
but makes no mention of ASEM even in passing.
New Zealand considered joining ASEM when it was first established,
but after a careful cost-benefit analysis decided not to seek membership.
In part, this reflected a judgement that ASEM was not a core part of the
emerging regional governance structures in East Asia, as well as scepti-
cism about its effectiveness. But the decision also reflected limited
resources; officials and political leaders were already stretched in attend-
ing all the various regional meetings.
Australia’s application to join, however, fundamentally changed the
cost-benefit equation for New Zealand. If Australia were included in
ASEM, this would leave New Zealand as the only member of the EAS
outside.8 This might undermine its claims to be part of the region and
a constructive participant in the nascent regional architecture. ASEM
membership was therefore partly about gaining ‘access to our European
and Asian counterparts to discuss a broad range of issues’ as a foreign
ministry report noted, but far more importantly, it was a way for New
Zealand to reaffirm the country’s credentials as a ‘natural partner’ for
regional states and a legitimate member of Asian institutions.
164 DAVID CAPIE
New Zealand was caught off guard by the Australian and Russian de-
cision to apply for membership. It was not until after the Hanoi minis-
terial in May 2009 that New Zealand officials sought approval to begin
the process of applying to join. In a July 2009 note to the cabinet, the
foreign ministry outlined the costs and benefits of membership. ASEM,
it noted, would be an opportunity for the prime minister and foreign
minister to meet 43 international counterparts. Issues that could be ad-
vanced within ASEM might include ‘climate change, a more open inter-
national trading environment, pandemic preparedness, interfaith dialo-
gue and non-proliferation’. Against that, however, officials noted that
membership would have ‘resource implications’ above and beyond the
time and expense of sending leaders to regular summits. It cautioned
that ‘in the medium term, there might be expectations that [New Zea-
land should] contribute to technical cooperation’ (New Zealand Ministry
of Foreign Affairs 2009: 2).
The National Party-led government agreed to seek membership, and
officials applied to join as an Asian member of ASEM, sending letters
to the two Asian coordinators, Cambodia and India. New Zealand offi-
cials also informed the European coordinators. Although there was no
substantive opposition to New Zealand’s membership, there was heated
debate about procedural issues. Under ASEM rules, membership appli-
cations must be considered by the group’s foreign ministers’ meeting.
Although Australia and Russia had successfully had their applications
approved in principle at the Hanoi ministerial, New Zealand had not.
This created a dilemma, as New Zealand not only wanted to join ASEM
but also wanted to join at the same time as Australia and Russia. Offi-
cials worked closely with the ASEAN ASEM Coordinator, Cambodia, to
come up with a solution. Ultimately, the Cambodians were able to con-
vince other members of the Asian group that it was acceptable to solicit
foreign ministers’ approval outside the ministerial meeting. A collection
of individual approvals took place before a consensus was eventually
declared.
One final hurdle remained for Australia and New Zealand. The EC
had long encouraged the Asian group in ASEM to include Australia,
New Zealand and South Asian states. European states had already made
clear at the Hanoi foreign ministers’ meeting that they strongly sup-
ported enlargement. But uncertainty remained around some of the
norms and formal processes that were to guide enlargement.9 The
Hanoi ministerial had tasked senior officials to ‘discuss and propose cri-
teria, principles, and procedures on the basis of the Asia Europe Coop-
eration Framework of 2000 regarding the future enlargement of ASEM’
(Chairman’s Statement, Ninth ASEM FMM 2009: para. 29). In prepara-
tion for ASEM 8, senior officials met in Brussels from 13-15 July to dis-
cuss enlargement procedures. Although both Australia and New Zeal-
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and had sought to join as Asian members, their place in that group was
delayed due to complications arising from Russia’s status. The EU de-
clined to accept Russia as a member of the European group, which it re-
gards as exclusively for EU member states. Concerns were also ex-
pressed by some Asian ASEM members about Russia’s suitability as an
Asian member. While consideration had been given to the creation of a
third “Eurasian” group or a “non-EU” sub-category for Russia on the
European side, neither proved appealing. Ultimately, Singapore bro-
kered a compromise formula: the “temporary third category arrange-
ment” where Australia, New Zealand and Russia would be part of a
non-permanent third group that would allow them to participate at the
Brussels summit. This solved the immediate problem but left unclear
the larger questions of how the three countries will ultimately be cate-
gorised within ASEM and how future enlargement should be managed.
ASEM’s third wave
Given that Australia had actively sought ASEM membership for more
than a decade without success, why was it successful in 2009? What
had changed? Several factors seem to have helped. First, the case for an
expanded membership on the Asian side was aided by the growth of
ASEM’s European membership. The eastward expansion of the EU in
2004 had seen the concomitant growth in the European contingent to
ASEM by ten new states. The Asian group had already expanded in
2006 to bring in India, Pakistan, Mongolia and the ASEAN Secretariat,
but with ten new European members it still faced a numerical disadvan-
tage. Offering a place to Australia and New Zealand provided some way
to reduce that problem.
In addition, one persistent obstacle to Australian membership of the
Asia group – Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir – had moved on. Re-
lations had improved steadily under his successor Abdullah Badawi. In
2005, Badawi became the first Malaysian prime minister to visit Austra-
lia in 20 years, and Australian foreign minister Alexander Downer
praised the state of the bilateral relationship, saying relations were ‘as
strong as ever’ (Downer 2005). Although Badawi continued to raise
questions about whether Australia and New Zealand were really East
Asian, Malaysia no longer stood in the way of Australian membership
(Levett 2005).
But most importantly, their admission reflects a changing sense of
identity among the members of the Asian group and a growing accep-
tance of Australia and New Zealand as constructive participants in East
Asia’s regional architecture. There is a strong element of path depen-
dency in the evolution of the Asian group within ASEM, as there is
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within Asian regional institutions more generally (Capie 2011). By
2009, Australia and New Zealand had been participants in Asia-Pacific
institutions like the ARF for fifteen years. As Loewen argues, ‘“belong-
ing” or being a member of an existing regional institution in Asia [was]
a relevant factor’ when it came to the admission of India, Pakistan and
Mongolia (Loewen 2010: 30). Australian and New Zealand membership
in the EAS in particular, something neither Pakistan nor Mongolia
could claim, significantly added to the legitimacy of their claims. This
was only further supported by burgeoning links to ASEAN, such as the
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA),
which was concluded in August 2008.
ASEM and the Tasman Two
Having made it into ASEM, what then will the two new members do?
Not surprisingly, having struggled to be accepted into the club, Australia
and New Zealand were eager to be seen as active participants from the
outset. Both sent high-level delegations to the Brussels summit. For
new Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard, it was her first interna-
tional trip as prime minister. Critics noted that the new Australian for-
eign minister (and recently deposed prime minister) Kevin Rudd did
not attend with her, but the government shrugged this off. New Zealand
Prime Minister John Key was also scheduled to attend but cancelled his
participation at the last minute to deal with the aftermath of a major
earthquake that struck the city of Christchurch. In his place, Deputy
Prime Minister and Finance Minister Bill English led a delegation that
included Foreign Minister Murray McCully.
Both New Zealand and Australia see ASEM as primarily a forum for
dialogue and a way to build relationships with key leaders in Europe
and Asia. As the only organisation that directly links Europe and Asia,
ASEM’s open and flexible agenda provides a chance for leaders to talk
about the most important issues of the day. Beyond that, however, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand seem likely to pursue different levels of activity
within the group. Australia has signalled it wants to be an active mem-
ber across a broad range of functional and political issues. As of early
2011, Australian representatives had already attended meetings on im-
migration, trade and investment, and education, although no single is-
sue had emerged as an Australian priority. Canberra is currently identi-
fying areas where it believes Australia can add value, and a review is
planned in 2011 to consider areas for further involvement. Criteria for
participation include how ASEM activities will align with Australia’s
broader foreign policy objectives and avoiding duplicating cooperative
initiatives that are going on elsewhere.
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In contrast, the New Zealand government regards ASEM as primarily
a political institution and seems likely to focus its efforts primarily on
political interactions, particularly around the summits and ministerial
meetings. Individual government departments will be encouraged to
take part in ASEM-led functional initiatives, but they will need to make
the case for funding to participate on a national interest basis. Like their
Australian counterparts, New Zealand officials also say they will be care-
ful to avoid duplicating activities that are going on in other institutions
such as the ARF (Browne 2010).
A metaphor frequently invoked in the context of the most recent en-
largement is the idea that Australia and New Zealand might be able to
play the role of a ‘bridge’ between Europe and Asia. One observer has
suggested that New Zealand’s alleged lingering British connections
mean it could ‘act as a bridge between the two cultures and regions’
(Kelly 2010: 223). Foreign Minister McCully claimed membership ‘en-
hances our position as a natural link between Europe and Asia, two
parts of the world in which we move with familiarity and enjoy close,
long-standing relationships’ (McCully 2010). Others see a slightly differ-
ent role for Canberra. One Chinese observer comments that Australia
may play ‘a bridging role to strengthen ties between ASEM and the
United States’ (Guang 2010: 42).
While informally the two countries might be able to assist with con-
nections between Europe and Asia, claims that they could act as some
sort of ‘mediator’ should be viewed with more scepticism (Murray
2010: 69). Evidence of that came when European states sought Austra-
lian and New Zealand support for greater European participation in
East Asian institutions. As the head of the EU’s delegation to Australia,
David Daly, commented, ‘Europe very much supported Australian ambi-
tions with regard to ASEM, [its] shared values with Europe will bring a
strong complementary voice into ASEM. And so, we look forward to
Australia applying the same logic concerning Europe's outstanding am-
bitions, and to Australia facilitating, to the extent it can, our desire for
greater involvement in the EAS and with ASEAN’ (Daly 2010). This
seems to be a forlorn hope. Although Australia was a strong proponent
of an expanded EAS, including both the US and Russia, and is also a
supporter of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-
Plus) on an ASEAN-Plus-8 basis, both exclude European participation.
Admission to ASEM has not seen any greater Australian or New Zeal-
and support for European membership in East Asian institutions. In-
deed, as one senior Australian official bluntly told a track-two meeting
in Kuala Lumpur in November 2010, Canberra’s view on participation
in the EAS is that,having settled on eighteen members, ‘we should shut,
lock and bolt the door’.10
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Conclusion
The third wave of ASEM expansion was facilitated by an unusual con-
fluence of interests among Asian members and would-be participants
in Australia and New Zealand. After a decade of inattention, in 2008
ASEM got a fresh look in Canberra with the election of Kevin Rudd’s
Labor government. Rudd’s ambitious foreign policy agenda and his per-
sonal interest in actively shaping new regional and global institutions
like the G20 gave ASEM an appeal it had not had for the Howard gov-
ernment. This more positive assessment was not without an impact on
Wellington. Once Australia expressed its desire to join, ASEM suddenly
had a whole new importance for New Zealand. It did not want to be the
only EAS member left outside. New Zealand’s membership bid was
therefore an identity claim as much as it was an attempt to advance any
particular material interests.
Although some of ASEM’s Asian members had opposed admitting
Australia and New Zealand in the past, in 2009 the circumstances were
more favourable. The 2004 EU enlargement had left the Asian side of
ASEM at a considerable numerical disadvantage. By adding Mongolia,
India, Pakistan and the ASEAN Secretariat in 2008, ASEM’s Asian
group had improved the balance somewhat, but in doing so it had
moved away from a more exclusive notion of ‘Asia’, something that
made it harder to justify keeping out Australia and New Zealand. By
2009, the ‘Tasman Two’ were also able to point to their own improved
Asian credentials as founding members of the EAS and well-established
participants in a wide range of East Asian and Asia-Pacific economic
and security arrangements.
But if ASEM has grown and been added to the long list of global and
regional institutions to which Australia and New Zealand belong, the
2010 enlargement is otherwise unlikely to usher in any dramatic
changes. While the ‘Tasman Two’ will be keen to be seen as active and
constructive participants, few in Canberra or Wellington expect ASEM
to develop beyond its current role as a useful forum for dialogue. There
will be ongoing discussions about the future structure of ASEM’s
groups, and new challenges will doubtless need to be confronted, but
for the forseeable future ASEM’s value for Australia and New Zealand
will be in providing an opportunity to confer with other world leaders
on the issues of the day while symbolically reinforcing their growing
sense of connection to East Asia.
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12 ASEM’s Future Enlargement: The Way Forward
Bertrand de Crombrugghe*
One of the specific achievements of the eighth ASEM summit held in
Brussels on 4-5 October 2010 was that it admitted the Russian Federa-
tion, Australia and New Zealand as new members. It was not the fact
that ASEM enlarged that was so peculiar. New members had joined
ASEM before. At ASEM 5 in Hanoi in October 2004, ten new European
Union (EU) member states who had joined the EU earlier that year
were admitted together with three Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN) member states who were part of ASEAN since 1997
(Myanmar and Laos PDR) and 1999 (Cambodia). Two years later, at
ASEM6 in Helsinki in September 2006, two additional EU member
states (Bulgaria and Romania), three additional Asian states (India,
Pakistan and Mongolia) and the ASEAN Secretariat were welcomed into
ASEM. They would participate in their first ASEM summit when it met
for the seventh time in Beijing in October 2008.
What was peculiar in the case of ASEM 8 in Brussels was that it
resolved the longstanding request of two countries, the Russian Federa-
tion and Australia, who had been striving to join the ASEM process
since its very beginning in 1996. The participation of Russia, so it was
felt, would pose an identity problem to a cooperation framework based
on two distinct, geographically defined regions as ASEM had known
them since its inception: Europe and Asia. Russia, indeed, is part of
both. In the case of Australia, the long delay was rather the conse-
quence of the rocky relationship between the successive Australian gov-
ernments and their Asian counterparts, not the least with the Malaysian
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. New Zealand waited all that time
on the sidelines. Once Australia’s accession was a done deal, New Zea-
land’s quickly followed through. What this suggests is that the acces-
sions of the Russian Federation and of Australia simultaneously consti-
tute achievements and challenges. This chapter describes the process
that made this development possible. Against the background of ASEM
enlargement and taking into account the entry into force of the EU Lis-
bon Treaty, an analysis of a number of outstanding issues is provided as
well as a few suggestions on how ASEM could address them and move
forward.
ASEM’s enlargement procedure
ASEM is a framework for dialogue and cooperation. It prides itself on
the fact that it needs few rules so that it can operate with convenient
flexibility, including on issues such as an expansion of members. Never-
theless, when ASEM leaders met in the late 1990s, they took some care
to explain how the already discernable accession requests from third
parties would be addressed. These terms figure in the Asia-Europe Co-
operation Framework agreed at the third ASEM summit in Seoul in Oc-
tober 2000 (the AECF 2000). Because they are the only ascertained
rules with regard to ASEM’s enlargement procedures, they deserve to
be recalled in full here.
VI. ASEM participation
28. Building on the conclusions of ASEM 1 in Bangkok and ASEM 2
in London, the following principles should guide future enlargement of
the ASEM participation:
– the ASEM process, which is open and evolutionary, is intended to
reinforce the Asia-Europe partnership,
– enlargement should be conducted in progressive stages,
– each candidature should be examined on the basis of its own merits
and in the light of its potential contribution to the ASEM process,
– the two-key approach: a final decision on new participants will be
made by consensus among all partners only after a candidate has
first got the support of its partners within its region,
– any decision regarding the admission of new participants will be
taken by the Heads of State and Government on a consensus basis.
(Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework, § 28, adopted at the third
ASEM summit, Seoul, 20-21 October 2000)
This language basically pronounces enlargement to be an endemic fea-
ture of ASEM. Enlargement is said to be a good and desirable develop-
ment. The only condition is that it must fit the overall design of a rein-
forced Asia-Europe partnership, i.e. a partnership in which the two dis-
tinct regions remain clearly associated. This appears to be the reason
why a two-key approach was chosen and why the accession procedure is
organised in two stages. A candidate must first obtain the endorsement
of the geographical group to which it allegedly belongs. It is only after
this is obtained that the request can be considered in plenary by all the
ASEM heads of states and government. That procedure would normally
imply that the geographical footprint of Europe and Asia would be clear.
Yet nowhere in ASEM documents is there language that identifies the
two regions in great detail.
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Looking for guidance elsewhere, a possible reference could be the
composition of the voting groups in the United Nations (UN) General
Assembly. The Russian Federation there belongs to the Eastern Eur-
opean group, along with a number of EU member states, whereas Aus-
tralia and New Zealand belong to the Western European and Others
Group (WEOG), also along with a number of EU member states. An-
other possible reference could be the way the UN Statistical Division
defines Europe and Asia. Here, the Russian Federation belongs to Eur-
ope, while Australia and New Zealand belong to Oceania, which is a
region that is clearly distinguished from Asia. Though interesting, none
of these references appear authoritative, and still other classification
methods could be invoked. For instance, one could take recourse to a
straightforward concept of ‘east’ and ‘west’ which would place Australia
and New Zealand in the ‘east’ but would hardly be of help in the case
of Russia. Another method would be to use a matrix identifying histori-
cal, political, economic, social or cultural affinities. In this context it
may be noted that the Russian Federation, apart from being anchored
in European organisations such as the Council of Europe and the
OSCE, is also a long-time member of APEC, a founder and an active
member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and is also just
about to join the East Asia Summit (EAS).
In fact, there is no easy straightforward manner to place Russia or
for that matter Australia neatly in the Asian or the European region as
required by the ASEM procedure. Hence there is only one rational con-
clusion to draw: in such cases, politics are in command on how to ori-
ent candidates wishing to join.
The accession process of the Russian Federation and of Australia
As it happened, both the Russian Federation and Australia took their
latest initiative in advance of ASEM7 in Beijing in 2008. They filed
their requests to be admitted with the Asian group. For Australia, it was
the clear choice of Prime Minister Kevin Rudd who wanted to connect
his country more closely to the economies of Asia. For the Russian Fed-
eration, it was the consequence of an earlier enquiry about the possibi-
lity of being admitted as a member of the European group. The Eur-
opean side had replied that this could not be envisaged because the
Russian Federation was not a member of the EU. Straddling both re-
gions, the Russian Federation then thought it had a choice. It resolved
to apply on the Asian side.
This development caused anger with the Asian members of ASEM.
They viewed the European attitude as an indication that the European
group in ASEM would grow only with the expansion of the EU mem-
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bership itself. And that they considered to be tantamount to a denial of
the ‘open and evolutionary’ character of the joint cooperation frame-
work. The process of accession to the EU being beyond the proportions
of the needs of ASEM, one of the consequences would be that countries
such as Norway or Switzerland, should they wish to join, would have lit-
tle choice but to seek accession as Asian countries: a rather absurd pro-
position. The Asian side argued that the EU should form a sub-group
within a larger European group in much the same way that ASEAN
forms a subdivision within the larger Asian group. Yet as the procedure
stood, and with the Russian Federation and Australia having requested
accession on the Asian side, it fell upon the latter to first take a stance.
This was also strongly resented. From the Asian point of view, Russia is
a European country and the decision on whether or not to admit Russia
should not be incumbent on them. Also, there was a feeling that after
accession and for coordination purposes, Russia would not have its
place in the Asian regional group. To Australia, the Asians explained
that its candidature to the Asian group in itself did not create any diffi-
culty. However, under the circumstances, it was difficult to decouple the
two applications. Thus, the whole issue of the two applications was in
dispute. As a consequence, the Beijing ASEM summit of October 2008
did not act upon these accession requests.
It then came to a head in Hanoi at the ensuing foreign ministers’
meeting. Some ASEM members were very much in favour of Russia’s
and Australia’s accession, even as members of the Asian group, and
pushed hard for Russia and Australia to be admitted. The negotiations
came to a stalemate, which then triggered a daring move by Singapore:
it proposed the creation of a third grouping alongside the European and
Asian ones. It would provide a home to the Russian Federation and to
Australia, so it was said, and it would also – over time – be suitable to
include Central Asian states or other Pacific Ocean states, which one
day might show interest. The idea ran afoul of established features of
ASEM, not least its bi-regional structure and its corresponding ambition
to become the Europe-Asia leg in the triangle shaped further by the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) (which includes the
participation of the US) and the Transatlantic Partnership (between Eur-
ope and the US). It also put the accession procedure on its head, since
it implied the circumvention of the regional screening test written into
the AECF 2000. Furthermore, when the issue became the creation of a
third group, it became the responsibility not only of the Asian side but
also the European side to make a pronouncement on the Russian and
Australian candidatures.
Because of its revolutionary nature, the proposal – unsurprisingly –
did not take hold right away. Still, a step in its direction was made. The
exact language agreed by the ministers in Hanoi ran as follows:
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The Future of ASEM
29. Ministers welcomed the applications of Australia and Russia to
ASEM and mandated Senior Officials to work out modalities to en-
able both countries to formally join ASEM at the ASEM 8 Summit
in Brussels in 2010. In light of growing interest from other countries
to join ASEM, Ministers also mandated Senior Officials to discuss
and propose criteria, principles and procedures, on the basis of the
Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework of 2000, regarding the future
enlargement of ASEM.
(Chair’s statement of the ninth ASEM foreign ministers’ meeting,
Hanoi, 25-26 May 2009, § 29)
In essence, the compromise meant agreement on the accession of Rus-
sia and Australia at the Brussels summit, though the two candidates
failed to get initial support in either of the two regions. Asians and Eur-
opeans in fact took a joint decision, deliberately leaving the geographical
issue undecided. At first sight, it looked like an agreement not to apply
the agreed rules. Upon reflection, however, it represented an elegant so-
lution to a case in which the proper regional group to which a candida-
ture for accession had to be submitted was in dispute. As already seen,
the AECF 2000 provided little guidance on what to do in such a case.
The compromise now also meant that the discussion would shift to the
so-called modalities to be defined. If not as part of either of the two geo-
graphical groups, how then would Russia and Australia take part in the
ASEM meetings and activities? Modalities were clearly required to com-
plete the accession process of the two countries concerned and had to
be agreed by the time of the Brussels summit at the latest. Further-
more, in recognition of the deeper issue about geographical uncertainty,
ministers added a longer-term mandate to review the accession process
as a whole. However, on this precise mandate, they did not impose a
timeline. So, efforts were naturally focused on the urgent modalities is-
sue for Russia and Australia, which fortunately would not be side-
tracked by any other extraneous considerations. Both the Russian Fed-
eration and Australia helpfully signalled their readiness to accept what-
ever modalities could be agreed upon among existing ASEM members.
The next step was taken at the ASEM coordinators’ meeting in Stock-
holm on 1 October 2009. In the name of the entire Asian side, Cambo-
dia tabled a refined proposal. Instead of a third geographical group, a
third category of members with no geographical definition should be
created. Also, the category would be a temporary one, pending the reso-
lution of the ‘geographical belonging’ issue which according to the
Asian side remained open. To present the third category as a temporary
one, in particular, offered the advantage that the permanent rules of the
AECF 2000 would not require any immediate change. This was a clever
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proposal because it allowed everyone to maintain their standpoint.
Hence, the European side did not find it too difficult to accept. At the
end of October 2009, the Swedish rotating EU presidency wrote that
the European group in principle could agree, but that it would like to
stress the importance of carefully considering and jointly agreeing on
more detailed modalities ensuring the continued effectiveness of
ASEM’s work. There were, indeed, lingering questions on the European
side about how a temporary third category of members in ASEM would
work in practice.
The main issue appeared to be whether the new members, Australia
and Russia, would take part in the coordination mechanism. The AECF
2000 provides that ‘ASEM Coordinators appointed by their respective
regions shall facilitate the coordination of the ASEM process’ (AECF
2000, § 22). The third category not being defined as a region, the impli-
cation would be that they would not be represented in the coordination
mechanism. In that case, the concern existed that they would be less-
than-equal members. Inversely, if it were decided that they should parti-
cipate in the coordination mechanism, despite not forming a separate
region, the concern arose that this would be unequal, since all other
ASEM member countries – as a consequence of the large number of
members in their groups – would have to wait longer for their turn to
take part in the coordination mechanism.
Lesser concerns were further expressed. What about the Europe/Asia
alternation principle in hosting ASEM summits and ministerial meet-
ings or the Europe/Asia co-chairing practice in ASEM conferences and
seminars? Would third-category members take turns in these? Would
they be allowed to lead ASEM initiatives or host ASEM events? Also,
would the existing enlargement procedure be affected by the third cate-
gory? Because the third category is not a geographical group, it is not
qualified to receive applications and proceed with the geographical
screening test. ASEM candidates would as before have to apply either
through the European or through the Asian group. This would leave
members of the third category out of the decision process up until the
plenary stage of the procedure, i.e. when heads of state and government
give their formal consent to the accession of new members.
One area that was much less of an issue was the relationship be-
tween third-category members and the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF),
the ASEM Foundation established in Singapore with the mandate to sti-
mulate people-to-people contacts. Australia and Russia should simply
become members, contribute financially and in a meaningful way parti-
cipate in ASEF activities. There seemed to be no consequences here of
them belonging to a temporary third category.
By the time of the ASEM senior officials’ meeting (SOM) in Madrid
on 25 January 2010, the realisation had sunk in that most of these inter-
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rogations were not of a fundamental nature. In due time, third-category
members would of course be able to host and chair or co-chair ASEM
summits, ministerial meetings and other events, just like any other
ASEM member. As a rule, these are decided by consensus in plenary,
also when ‘regular’ members step forward with offers. Thus, third-cate-
gory members would always be able to leverage their way into these op-
portunities. As regards coordination, it was increasingly felt that the ap-
parent difference in status could be softened by raising the transparency
of coordination meetings to a new level, for instance through the prac-
tice of ‘open’ coordination meetings (where the full ASEM membership
is allowed to sit in as observers) or through ad hoc de-briefings of third-
category members. To make things easier, Moscow and Canberra sig-
nalled again that they were utterly flexible with regard to the modalities
being discussed. The impact of the third-category idea on the enlarge-
ment procedure did not have to be addressed urgently either. For one
thing, the ministers had given a longer-term mandate on the issue. For
another, there were no pending candidatures.
Thus, the Madrid meeting, chaired by the Spanish EU rotating presi-
dency, was able to close in on the ‘modalities’ issue. On the basis of
ideas handed in by Belgium, it agreed on the following lines. The text
is reproduced in full because it is not available in any publicly accessible
record.
1. We recall the decision of ASEM Foreign Ministers at their 9th
Meeting in Hanoi on 25-26 May 2009 to welcome the applica-
tions of Australia and Russia to ASEM and to mandate Senior
Officials to work out modalities to enable both countries to for-
mally join ASEM at the ASEM 8 Summit in Brussels in 2010.
2. In order to fulfil the mandate by the FMM, ASEM SOM agreed
to make a temporary third category arrangement for Australia
and Russia to participate in ASEM.
3. Prior to ASEM 8, representatives of Australia and Russia are in-
vited to attend plenary SOM meetings and other ASEM activities
as guests of the Chair.
4. ASEM will continue to maintain the current practice of having
four coordinators, two from Asia and two from Europe.
5. SOM will continue to work on the criteria, principles and proce-
dures for the future enlargement of ASEM on the basis of AECF
2000.
(Agreed text as of 25 January 2010, 1725hrs, ASEM senior official
meeting, Madrid, 25 January 2010)
Through this text, members accepted that no elaboration was needed
on how exactly the third category would operate. Indeed, the consensus
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principle in ASEM allowed the adoption of a very pragmatic approach
in this respect. Besides, and interestingly, the text reiterated that ASEM
would continue to operate with only two coordinators per region: from
Europe and Asia. This constituted a clear signal that no changes in
these numbers were being contemplated in connection with the crea-
tion of a temporary third category of members. Also, the reaffirmation
of the AECF 2000 as a basis for future consideration of the enlarge-
ment issue should be noted. It stands as evidence of the continuing
strong attachment to the inter-regional nature of the ASEM cooperation
framework as it presently exists.
The accession process of New Zealand
By comparison, the accession of New Zealand was a simple affair. Well-
ington presented its candidature to the Asian side in April 2010, shortly
after the Madrid formula was found. The Europeans were quick to sig-
nal that they were in favour, even though the procedure would normally
have had them wait until the Asian side expressed a coordinated posi-
tion. As it went, the Asian side readily proposed that New Zealand join
ASEM as a member of the third category, just like the Russian Federa-
tion and Australia. This was endorsed almost without discussion at the
ASEM senior officials’ meeting that took place in Phnom Penh on 5-6
May 2010.
The longer-term mandate of the Hanoi ministerial
Satisfactory modalities having been established to enable the accessions
of Australia and the Russian Federation and eventually also of New
Zealand, ASEM senior officials then turned to the longer-term mandate
of the Hanoi ministerial. The issue was addressed at the ASEM senior
officials’ meeting held in Phnom Penh on 5-6 May 2010. During this
meeting, a number of clarifications were sought from the European
side. One was whether a moratorium on new enlargements should be
instituted, the underlying consideration being that guidelines for grant-
ing membership status in ASEM were unsatisfactory. Also, the count in
ASEM having reached 48 members, it was suggested that consolidation
of the ongoing work was needed more than the consideration of addi-
tional applications. Another question was how long the temporary
third-category arrangement would be kept. Still another question was
how it could be ensured that non-EU European countries could accede
to ASEM. Or, put in other words, could the European group demon-
strate that it did not view ASEM as a bloc-to-bloc cooperation, i.e. as a
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cooperation driven by the EU bloc on the one side while there was evi-
dently no Asian bloc on the other side?
Driving further the last point, and keeping in mind the Madrid agree-
ment to stick to two coordinators on each side, an ultimate question
related to the possibility for the EU to give up one coordinator position.
That position would then go to a sub-group within the European group
that would comprise non-EU members. The Asian group, it was re-
called, comprises both ASEAN and non-ASEAN members and distri-
butes its coordinators over the two subgroups.
As could have been expected, a discussion based on these elements
did not yield substantive results. The European side evidently had diffi-
culties with a moratorium that could possibly delay the entry into
ASEM of member states acceding to the EU in the near future. Nor did
the idea of giving up a coordinator to a thus far undefined ‘other Eur-
opean’ subgroup appear very attractive. If anything, the discussion indi-
cated that there was continuing discontent on the Asian side about the
absence of any mechanism to accommodate potential non-EU European
members into ASEM. Also, it was made abundantly clear that a resolu-
tion of this issue would be necessary if one day the temporary third
category were to rejoin ASEM’s mainstream structures.
The ensuing ASEM senior officials’ meeting held in Brussels on 14-
15 July 2010 focused entirely on the preparations for ASEM 8. It de-
voted only a little time to the longer-term mandate of the Hanoi minis-
terial. It only agreed to strive to produce a report by the time of the next
ASEM meeting of foreign ministers in Hungary in 2011. Hence, the
Brussels ASEM summit confined itself to formalising the accession of
Russia, Australia and New Zealand. It meant that the temporary third
category of members had been launched. It deserves to be noted that
the longer-term issue was not even raised in any of the interventions of
the heads of state and government in the course of the summit.
The European group in ASEM, the EU and the Lisbon Treaty
The fundamental reason for the creation of a temporary third category
of members is not so hard to ascertain. It was the political impasse
regarding the ASEM geographical category to which one, or perhaps
both, of the 2008 applicants should eventually belong. No overriding
argument was found to solve it, either for Russia or for Australia.
Therefore, it should be no surprise that Australia’s candidature (and
New Zealand’s for that matter) was linked in the end to Russia’s and
that they were both referred to a newly created third category.
Throughout the two years of discussions, the arguments of the Asian
side had been persistent and consistent. They took aim at the refusal of
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the European group to even consider applications from non-EU mem-
ber states to the European group. Clearly, Asia feels that this is not in
line with the ‘open and evolutionary’ approach agreed upon as a basic
ASEM principle. Its view is that by acting this way, the European group
portrays itself as the EU and hence unfairly confronts the diversity of
Asian states with a united bloc, sidelining the Asian expectation of un-
prejudiced dialogue and cooperation among equals. The Asian side
talks of a ‘structural disadvantage’ or, as an Asian ambassador put it,
has the impression of ‘playing soccer as an amateur team against a well
trained and well directed professional club’. The use of the word
‘against’ in the context of ASEM is somewhat puzzling, but this is the
reality of international relations.
Unsurprisingly, the European view is different. The European group
claims it is only applying the two-key approach written into the AECF
2000 as it was designed. It claims sovereignty on this and, what is
more, has been applying it in a consistent manner. Prospective member
states of the EU, who in the recent past lobbied hard to join ASEM be-
fore time, were kept at bay until their accession to the EU was com-
pleted. Anyhow, it is not deemed proper for any side to pass judgment
on the way the other implements its leg of the two-key approach. More-
over, if the argument is about ‘turning down’ a prospective candidate,
would that not put Europe and Asian at par? After all, Russia and Aus-
tralia are presently members of neither group because each of the two
existing regional groups had taken similar negative attitudes. Another
more positive way to look at the third category development is that it
embodies a joint solution that was separately eluding both sides. Also,
the theological issue of whether the Russian Federation is a European
or an Asian country was aptly circumvented. There are doubts that this
issue can actually be solved. It is a question that could remain the ob-
ject of honest disagreement for ages to come.
As a matter of fact, the source of the whole issue can be traced back
all the way to 1995. At that time, the EU member states were discussing
a mandate for the Spanish rotating EU presidency for agreeing the
terms of the first ASEM summit scheduled in Bangkok in March 1996.
As the author personally remembers, the Spanish presidency at that
time duly explained that the Asian side objected to the ‘European Un-
ion’ figuring as a partner in the appellation and insisted on the vaguer
concept of ‘Europe’. In the opinion of the EU member states, this did
not matter much. There could be no doubt about who the partners in
the Europe-Asia Meetings actually were. On the European side, it clearly
was the EU since the negotiation was conducted by the EU presidency
on the basis of a mandate of the member states, and actual practice
would bear this out. The two European coordinators at all times have
been the European Commission (EC) – an EU institution – and the ro-
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tating EU presidency, another EU institution. The funding from the
European side during all the years of ASEM’s existence has come
mostly from an EU institution, the EC. The ASEM summits in Europe
in 1998 (London), 2002 (Copenhagen), 2006 (Helsinki) and 2010
(Brussels) were hosted each time by the rotating presidency of the EU.
The membership of the European group has always corresponded ex-
actly to the membership of the EU, not by coincidence but by rule.
On the European side, the dialogue and cooperation in ASEM are
viewed as an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) of the EU. To include non-EU members in a European group
would prematurely acquaint them with EU decision-making, something
that would be sensitive, especially considering the ongoing accession, as-
sociation, partnership, cooperation or neighbourhood negotiations that
the EU is conducting with all other countries of the European continent.
The consequence of all this is that the ‘open and evolutionary’ princi-
ple, as viewed by the Asian side, is likely to be left by the wayside for
the foreseeable future. On one occasion, it proved necessary to paper
over the lingering disagreement. This was at the Helsinki summit in
2006, where 10 new EU member states were admitted along with the
three latest ASEAN members. ASEM leaders strived to address appro-
priately the claim by the European side that the ongoing enlargement
of the EU would automatically entail the enlargement of the European
side of ASEM. Leaders eventually settled on the following language:
‘The Leaders, emphasizing the need to consolidate the ASEM process
after the enlargement, agreed to consider future enlargement, taking
into account the continued EU enlargement and important role of other
candidates’ (Chair’s statement of the fifth ASEM summit, Helsinki, 10-
11 September 2006, § 6.3).
With European integration moving steadily forward, the situation
over time may become even more acute. The Asian side is bound to
experience that the positions of the European members of ASEM, even
when they are expressed by national leaders, present increasing degrees
of commonality. In this sense, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty
on 1 December 2009 has added another layer to the lingering issue of
the profile of the EU within ASEM. It has changed the way the EU
organises its external representation. On issues of foreign policy, the
rotating EU presidency has been abolished. Now, the semi-permanent
President of the European Council and the High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy speak in the name of the
EU. For all other subjects of EU competence, the President of the EC is
the representative.
Well ahead of ASEM 8, host country Belgium had dutifully explained
that, with the Lisbon Treaty now into force, the President of the Eur-
opean Council rather than the Belgian prime minister would chair the
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summit. The Asian side did not hide its unease about this. At the se-
nior officials’ meeting in Phnom Penh (5-6 May 2010), the comments
were explicit and ran as follows. The chair arrangement proposed by
Belgium could not imply Asian acceptance of the ‘EU equals Europe’
view. Nor could it change ASEM, which was conceived as a dialogue be-
tween Asian and European states, not between Asia and the EU. Also,
the chairing by the President of the European Council should not set a
precedent for future summits hosted by European partners and should
not lead to the lowering of the level of the European representation.
The concerns were very clear. The impact within ASEM of the new
treaty obligations on the European side aggravated the feelings which
had incidentally just been tested by the issue of Russia’s accession to
ASEM. Also, there was major apprehension that, with the EU institu-
tions taking on a greater role, the individual member states of the EU
would gradually lose interest in direct dialogue with Asian partners in
ASEM.
On the face of it, the fears have proven premature. Overall, under the
chairmanship of European Council President Herman Van Rompuy,
the ASEM 8 summit in Brussels did not proceed differently from the
other summits before it. The European Council President did not act as
spokesman for the EU but as a chairman-facilitator of the dialogue,
much in the way rotating presidencies of the EU or Asian summit
chairs had done before him. The attendance was high. Of all Asian par-
ticipants, 13 out of the 17 were represented at the level of head of state
or government or vice-prime minister. The figures are 24 out of 28 for
the European participants (the President of the European Council not
included) and 2 out of 3 for third-category members. The engagement
by all sides was intense, demonstrating that the requirements of a high-
quality Asia-Europe dialogue in ASEM and the institutional develop-
ments within the EU need not be incompatible. The member states of
the EU displayed a sustained and high interest in taking part in ASEM,
thus reaffirming the strategic asset it represents in their relations with
Asian nations.
Alleviating concerns and moving forward
Overall, the discussions about the future enlargement of ASEM and the
related issue of the EU’s profile within ASEM produced no negative
consequences for the atmosphere and the work during the Brussels
summit. This should not, however, lead to the conclusion that the sensi-
tivities do not exist or that there is no need to address them.
As a first suggestion, ASEM should search for a better term than
‘third category’. These words have an unfortunate connotation implying
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a lower rank, which contradicts the desire expressed by all ASEM mem-
bers to fully integrate the new members and cooperate with them on
the basis of strict equality. For usage alongside ‘European’ and ‘Asian’
members, more neutral appellations such as ‘other members’ or ‘not
geographically bound members’ or ‘middle members’ would seem to
be better choices.
Secondly, utmost care should be taken to ensure that the Russian
Federation, Australia and New Zealand have the possibility to partake
fully and on par with others in the activities of ASEM. The Madrid com-
promise of January 2010 hinted at such pragmatism. Hence, the ASEM
plenary should welcome suggestions, ideas and initiatives coming from
the three new members, exactly as was the practice among ASEM
members before their accession. Also, the rule of Asian-European co-
chairmanship should not be a rigorous one. The new members should
not have to encounter any more difficulties to access co-chairmanship
than the older members. Co-sponsorship and balance in participation
would appear to matter much more. Similarly, geographic alternation in
the hosting of meetings should be interpreted broadly. At an
appropriate time in the future, new members will presumably offer to
organise a ministerial or even a summit meeting. The ASEM member-
ship should then display good will and decide, in the right proportions,
when and which more traditional Asian and European turns and
venues can be skipped over or postponed. None of these suggestions
would run against existing AECF 2000 rules.
As regards coordination, the Belgian host of ASEM 8 observed the
following practice. On the margins of the coordinators’ meetings of 13
July and 2 October 2010 in Brussels, it de-briefed the new members in
exclusivity so as to balance out the de-briefings that the coordinators
hold for their respective geographical groups. When coordinators’ meet-
ings were held detached from senior officials’ meetings such as the one
on 5-6 September 2010 in Seoul, an ‘open’ format was used, i.e. with
observers from the full ASEM membership present in the room, includ-
ing the – at that time – prospective new members. This format was
helpfully inaugurated by Sweden in Stockholm for the coordinators’
meeting of 1 October 2009. It sends out a signal of inclusiveness and
fosters transparency, in particular to the benefit of those members that
are not formally represented in the coordination body, such as the ‘mid-
dle members’. Further such practical measures could be devised. For
instance, when ‘middle members’ would need to raise an issue at a co-
ordinators’ meeting, they could be given the possibility to do so through
one of the existing coordinators on an ad hoc basis. Alternatively, they
could be assigned one of the existing coordinators to represent them
for a set period and take care of their possible specific interests. That
role could perhaps, in an even more neutral way, be entrusted to the
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host of the next summit, since leaders at ASEM 8 decided that the host
of the upcoming summit would henceforth be part of the coordination
mechanism. All this would not require any change in the AECF 2000.
The enlargement procedure, for its part, does not leave much room
for specific accommodation of the ‘middle members’, in particular as
regards the initial stage of geographical screening. That would require
either dissolving the temporary third category by letting its members
join existing groups, or promoting the third category to a fully fledged
group or else revamping the ASEM structure so as to redefine or maybe
even suppress geographical groups. All these alternatives touch upon
the essence of the inter-regional structure of ASEM and therefore are
not likely to happen soon. There is indeed no readiness to review that
feature of ASEM, as was demonstrated by the compromise reached at
the Madrid senior officials’ meeting of 25 January 2010. Incidentally, is
the present situation not a clear indication that members do not want
to re-engineer ASEM’s founding principles?
Naturally, members willing, forthcoming enlargements can still be
completed through the existing two-key approach. Under this proce-
dure, ‘middle members’ have a say, though not at the geographical
screening stage, when their agreement is required to achieve consensus
at the level of heads of state and government. It will be tested soon with
Bangladesh, which has been an applicant since August 2010. Its status
as an Asian country is not in dispute. Bangladesh should easily be
cleared by the Asian group and its joining of ASEM swiftly formalised
at the next ASEM summit in Vientiane in 2012. Thus, its accession
should not constitute a challenge to the existing enlargement procedure.
Things may be different when, say, Turkey or an East European, Cauca-
sian, West Asian or Central Asian state expresses its wish to join. And
of course, when the EU enlarges again and asks for admission of its
new member states, the Asian side might call for a new examination of
the whole issue.
Even more important, it seems, would be to develop the substance of
the cooperation with the new members. All three – the Russian Federa-
tion, Australia and New Zealand – bring new potential to the agenda of
dialogue and cooperation among ASEM members, and each in their
own way. Developing and articulating this potential and generating a
flow of useful, profitable and attractive activities would demonstrate the
added value of their participation for the whole membership. This
should have the effect of reducing the relevance of procedural issues
and spur, where necessary, practical, spontaneous and non-controversial
solutions.
Lastly, a connection may be seen with the development of the work-
ing methods of ASEM (see chapter 4). Today, the coordinators for Eur-
ope and Asia assume the important task of stimulating the agenda and
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of ensuring the transparency of the work being accomplished. Coordi-
nators do this with few means and therefore in a less than systematic
way. Establishing a technical support team or, more daringly, an ASEM
secretariat would go some distance to ensuring professional, neutral
and objective service to each and every ASEM member regardless of their
geographical or non-geographical classification. It would pre-empt linger-
ing questions about the representativeness of the present coordinators
and, at the same time, address a number of existing flaws in the flow of
information. Killing two birds with one stone, it would strengthen equal
treatment among ASEM members and mark a step towards streamlining
and building more consistency in ASEM’s work programmes to the
benefit of all partners, without geographical prejudice.
In the chair’s statement of their Brussels meeting, ASEM leaders
tasked senior officials to come up with relevant and practical proposals
in this respect. Recommendations are to be submitted to the ASEM for-
eign ministers for consideration at their forthcoming meeting in Hun-
gary in June 2011. This mandate may prove a good opportunity to ad-
dress some of the unease that has set in as a result of the creation of a
temporary third category of members. Also, it can be done without up-
setting the Asia-Europe binomial and the inter-regional identity that lies
at the foundation of ASEM and which ASEM members appear keen to
preserve.
* The opinions expressed in this article are the personal considerations of the author
and do not reflect official policy of the Belgian government nor can they be attributed
to it.
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Annex 1
CHAIR’S STATEMENT of the Eighth
Asia-Europe Meeting
Brussels, 4-5 October 2010
‘Greater well-being and more dignity for all citizens’
1. The Eighth Asia-Europe Meeting was hosted by Belgium in Brus-
sels on 4 and 5 October 2010. The meeting was attended by the Heads
of States and of Governments of forty-six Asian and European coun-
tries, the President of the European Council, the President of the Eur-
opean Commission and the Secretary-General of ASEAN.
2. The overarching theme of the Summit was “Quality of life, achiev-
ing greater well-being and more dignity for all citizens”. The President
of the European Council chaired the meeting.
3. A warm welcome was extended to Australia, New Zealand and the
Russian Federation, who attended an ASEM Summit for the first time
and, on this occasion, became ASEM members.
4. Leaders reaffirmed the strategic dialogue and cooperation between
Asia and Europe on the basis of equal partnership, mutual respect and
benefit. They noted with appreciation the results of the meetings of the
Education Ministers, the Foreign Ministers, the Energy Ministers, the
Transportation Ministers, the Finance Ministers and the Culture Minis-
ters held since the Seventh Asia-Europe Meeting and endorsed their
recommendations.
5. The meeting established common ground between Asia and Eur-
ope on topical issues of mutual interest to both regions as follows:
Towards More Effective Global Economic Governance
6. Leaders held a candid, open and fruitful discussion on the present
global economic situation. They issued a separate Declaration reflect-
ing their common views.
Advance on the path of sustainable development
7. Following up on the Beijing Declaration on Sustainable Develop-
ment adopted at their meeting in 2008, Leaders considered ways to
further advance the common objectives of economic development,
social cohesion and environmental protection, the three mutually rein-
forcing and interdependent pillars of sustainable development leading
to greater human well-being.
8. They reaffirmed their commitments to the internationally agreed
development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs). They underscored the importance of the UN High-Level Plen-
ary Meeting in New York on 20-22 September 2010 and the upcoming
UN Conference on Sustainable Development scheduled in Brazil in
2012 (Rio + 20).
9. Taking into consideration the rich variety of cultures represented
in Europe and in Asia, they agreed to the following:
Economic development
10. Leaders stressed that the reforms considered necessary in re-
sponse to the global economic crisis constituted an opportunity to lay
the basis for a more sustainable model of development.
11. As a first priority, the demand for goods and services as well as in-
vestments have to be encouraged since they are the drivers of economic
growth and job creation across countries. To this effect, the progressive
liberalization of domestic and international markets must be pursued.
Leaders reiterated their resolve to conclude the WTO Doha Develop-
ment Agenda promptly with an ambitious, comprehensive and
balanced outcome consistent with its mandate and based on progress
already made, as this would represent a single most important contri-
bution to the objective. Leaders further agreed that all forms of trade
protectionism should be rejected and that existing tariff and non-tariff
barriers should be rolled back without delay. In order to promote eco-
nomic growth and development, leaders also reaffirmed the need for a
fair and rule-based multilateral trading system under the WTO.
12. Leaders also supported the innovation of products, services and
production processes. Innovation, especially the introduction of envir-
onmentally friendly, resource-efficient and clean technologies, can help
economies restructure themselves in response to the crisis and achieve
more sustainable patterns of economic development.
13. Hence, Leaders resolved to foster policies that facilitate the disse-
mination of these types of technologies, especially to the benefit of de-
veloping countries. With this in mind, they tasked Senior Officials for
Trade and Investment to convene an informal meeting at an early op-
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portunity and to identify the scope and range of possible new activities.
Using the experience of ASEM partners in promoting sustainable de-
velopment, these should constitute a comprehensive dialogue with a
view to identifying and examining trade and investment barriers as
well as market distorting mechanisms that hamper the deployment of
new environmentally friendly, resource-efficient and clean products
and technologies. The dialogue should furthermore focus on possible
new incentives with a similar positive effect on the advancement of
sustainable development, just as ASEM governments face pressing is-
sues of regulation and public policy. Eventually, the dialogue should
help ensure that sustainable development policies, including environ-
mental measures, do not lead to arbitrary or disguised restrictions on
international trade. Leaders expressed their expectation that this work
would lead to a resumption of the meetings of the Economy and Trade
Ministers of ASEM. They also decided that the dialogue should be con-
ducted in close consultation and with the input from both the Asian
and European business communities.
14. Leaders took note of the constructive, ongoing activities under the
Trade Facilitation Action Plan and Investment Promotion Action Plan
and of the dialogue on Intellectual Property Rights. They welcomed in
particular the work achieved under the direction of the ASEM Customs
Director-Generals and stressed the desirability of further stepping up
this kind of cooperation.
15. Leaders emphasized the importance of financial stability and of the
availability of development finance for developing ASEM partners. They
stressed that the financial markets of Asia and Europe could be more
integrated and that considerable scope existed for expanding the offer of
services to potential traders and investors operating in the two regions.
In this context, they welcomed the recommendations of the Twelfth
Business Forum held in Brussels on the margin of the Summit.
16. Following up on the First ASEM Ministerial Meeting on Transpor-
tation in Vilnius in October 2009, Leaders agreed on the desirability of
cooperation to fill in missing links and eliminate bottlenecks, justifying
the establishment of an action plan that would also pursue the objec-
tive of sustainable development. The accession of the Russian Federa-
tion offers in this regard new and important perspectives. Leaders
thanked the People’s Republic of China for offering to host the Second
Transportation Ministers’ meeting in 2011.
17. Likewise, Leaders underscored the importance of information and
communication technologies, in particular broadband networks and
applications promoting socio-economic activities, as catalysts for globa-
lization and innovation and as positive agents of sustainable economic
development. They called for increased research and development co-
operation, for technical assistance, for transfers of technology and of
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know how, especially to developing countries, so as to help bridge the
digital divide among ASEM partners.
18. Leaders noted that these initiatives would enhance the connectivity
between Asia and Europe. In this context, they hailed the efforts to
promote ASEAN Connectivity as important intra-regional linkages,
opening opportunities for the sharing of experiences and for further
cooperation.
19. Leaders supported agricultural policies and programs that ensure
the realization of the right to food. They recognized the importance of
the Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition, of
which the FAO Committee on World Food Security is a central compo-
nent, in supporting sustainable, country-led food security policies and
international coordination. They specifically encouraged infrastructure
development, responsible investments and intensified scientific
research with a view to increasing sustainable agricultural production
and fostering rural development, recognized as essential in the fight
against hunger and poverty and in which the role of women must be
duly recognized. In the interest of ensuring sustainable forms of agri-
cultural production, Leaders stressed the need for well-functioning glo-
bal and domestic agricultural markets. They called on all partners to
phase out export subsidies, including through the WTO Doha Round
negotiations, and to improve market access while also jointly addres-
sing food supply and income enhancement issues as well as environ-
mental challenges.
20. Leaders noted that well-defined regional and sub-regional mechan-
isms and initiatives hold considerable potential for efficient, result-or-
iented cooperation on economic development and poverty reduction.
They stressed that the Greater Mekong Subregion, the Mekong River
Commission and the Ayeyawady – Chao Phraya – Mekong Economic
Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) constitute frameworks holding strong
potential for cooperation activities between Asia and Europe.
Social cohesion
21. Leaders stressed that social cohesion rests on the widest possible
participation of people in the creation of prosperity and on the equita-
ble distribution of income.
22. They agreed to promote decent work by spurring job creation and
labor participation. They reiterated their support for the Global Jobs
Pact of the ILO adopted in June 2009, which promotes practical mea-
sures to help recover from the crisis and stimulates ‘growth with em-
ployment’.
23. Leaders stressed that effective implementation of ILO fundamen-
tal principles and rights to work are of crucial importance. Violations
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cannot be invoked or otherwise used as a legitimate comparative advan-
tage, and labor standards should not be used for protectionist pur-
poses, as stipulated in the 2008 ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a
Fair Globalization. Leaders underlined the importance of strong labor
administrations and inspectorates to ensure proper implementation.
24. Leaders concurred that specific attention should be given to
migrant labor, including the respect of the human rights of migrant
workers, particularly of the most vulnerable ones. Recognizing the link
between development and migration, they called for the sharing of best
practices and the exploration of comprehensive approaches with a view
to developing shared benefits of legal migration among ASEM partners
and effectively addressing irregular migration, including enhanced
return policies. Leaders agreed that, when accorded the protection of
non-discriminatory rights to work according to domestic law and regu-
lations, migrants may effectively contribute to the development of their
communities in host countries and in their countries of origin.
25. Leaders stressed that effective dialogue between social partners
should be encouraged in order to promote mutual understanding on
issues of productivity, working conditions, remuneration and economic
change. Such dialogue also contributes to effective national policy
design and implementation. In times of crisis, schemes negotiated
through social dialogue such as cost-cutting measures reducing work-
ing hours have helped in limiting negative effects on overall employ-
ment levels.
26. Leaders supported the promotion and implementation of corpo-
rate social responsibility through national and international instru-
ments and voluntary initiatives. These help employers develop joint
ownership of core labor standards, social stability and social justice
with their employees. Alongside, skill development objectives can also
be served.
27. Leaders recalled how social safety nets operated in times of crisis
as an economic stabilizer and not just as a welfare or redistributive
mechanism. Social safety nets can foster equal opportunity, remove bar-
riers to social mobility and produce beneficial effects on the allocation
of resources, sustainable economic growth, alleviation of poverty and
overall macro-economic stability. They must be developed on a country
per country basis, in order to take account of national circumstances
and resources. Leaders also noted with interest the gradual
development of a global Social Protection Floor, one of the nine joint in-
itiatives of the UN Chief Executives Board for Coordination, led by the
International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO). Such a concept would seek to ensure livelihood security
for poor and vulnerable populations and provide access to essential ser-
vices, fighting persistent poverty effectively. Leaders called for further
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sharing of experiences and for technical assistance in implementing so-
cial welfare policies.
28. Leaders stressed that the inclusiveness of labor markets crucially
depends on education, job training and skill development strategies, in-
cluding vocational training. Partnerships with the private sector may,
where applicable, facilitate the preparation of the workforce for future
opportunities in strategic sectors such as low-carbon emission indus-
tries and green technologies, but also in growth sectors such as health
care and elderly care. As labor markets evolve over time, lifelong learn-
ing and career development tools, through investments in education
and training which government policies should encourage, will help
workers move into new opportunities.
29. Leaders further emphasized that access to basic education should
be guaranteed for its benefit to the development of the individual and
in fighting poverty. In this regard, they recognized the important chal-
lenge faced by some Asian ASEM partners with overwhelmingly young
populations. They agreed to enhance efforts for the effective abolition
of child labor, to share experiences and to provide, where possible, tech-
nical assistance with a view to supporting and strengthening education
services which prepare for the labor market.
30. Leaders recognized that a number of ASEM partners face the chal-
lenge of rapidly ageing populations. Existing old-age protection systems
face reforms that, depending on circumstances, may concern retire-
ment age, fiscal policies, labor markets or pension/provident fund gov-
ernance in order to preserve social and financial sustainability. Again,
social dialogue is of crucial importance in order to define reforms that
can be widely accepted.
31. Leaders instructed their Ministers of Labor, meeting in Leiden, the
Netherlands, in December 2010, to further develop common strategies
on these issues and to implement them, fostering cooperation among
governments, dialogue between social partners and involvement of civil
society organizations.
Environmental protection
32. Leaders underlined the necessity to address global climate change
and recognized in this regard the centrality and legitimacy of the
UNFCCC process. They shared the goal of reaching urgently a fair, ef-
fective and comprehensive, legally binding outcome under the mandate
of the Bali Roadmap agreed in 2007, noting that the first commitment
period of the Kyoto Protocol ends in 2012. They agreed that the
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol Conferences of Parties in Cancun, taking
into account the work done so far, should concretely address the re-
maining gaps on all major issues.
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33. Leaders agreed that deep cuts in global emissions are required,
recognizing the scientific view that the increase in global temperature
should be below two degrees Celsius, and to take action to meet this
objective consistent with science and the principles of the UNFCCC.
They also reaffirmed the basic principle that countries should contri-
bute to the collective effort on the basis of common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities, bearing in mind that social
and economic development and poverty eradication are the first and
overriding priorities of developing countries and that a low-emission
development strategy is indispensable for sustainable development.
34. Leaders welcomed the commitments of the EU partners, Japan,
Australia and New Zealand to provide fast-start financing with new
and additional resources over the 2010-2012 period and to transparent
reporting at the UNFCCC Conference in Cancun. They called on devel-
oped countries to follow up, in the context of meaningful mitigation ac-
tions and of transparency in implementation of these actions, on their
commitment to the goal of mobilizing jointly 100 billion US dollars
per year by 2020 in order to address the needs of developing countries.
35. Leaders stressed that energy efficiency and increased use of renew-
able energy across all sectors of the economy are major contributions
to addressing climate change while at the same time fostering security
in energy supplies. They called for making full use of international co-
operation, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the UNFCCC,
to exchange best practices between developed and developing ASEM
partners and stimulate the development, transfer, deployment, dissemi-
nation and adaptation of advanced, affordable, safe and environmen-
tally sound energy technologies and know how, including aspects of
policy and regulation.
36. Leaders stressed the challenge of ensuring sufficient, reliable and
environmentally responsible supplies of energy at prices reflecting eco-
nomic fundamentals as highlighted by the ASEM Ministerial Confer-
ence on Energy Security in Brussels in June 2009. They underlined
the benefits that can be derived in this respect from transparent, com-
petitive and environmentally sustainable markets, from consistent legal
frameworks at national and international levels and from diversifica-
tion of sources, routes and types of energy supplies as well as from
emergency mechanisms. The global nature of these challenges and the
growing interdependence between producing, consuming and transit
countries would require strengthened dialogue and partnership invol-
ving ASEM partners and other stakeholders.
37. Leaders stressed the importance of sustainable forest and water re-
sources management and the need to cooperate by exchanging scienti-
fic research and by pooling experiences and best practices. They
requested their Ministers to conduct a concrete and result-oriented dia-
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logue on these issues in the early part of 2011. They recalled that the
UN General Assembly proclaimed 2011 as the International Year of
Forests. Leaders expressed their support for the UN Collaborative In-
itiative on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degrada-
tion (REDD+) in developing countries. They noted the contribution of
the Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade Action Plan
(FLEGT) of the European Union and of parallel Asian initiatives, in co-
operation with partners, in addressing illegal logging and introducing
transparency in forestry operations. They noted China’s initiative to es-
tablish an ASEM Water Resources Research and Development Center
in Hunan Province.
38. Leaders welcomed the outcome of the UN High-Level Plenary
Meeting, held in New York on 22 September 2010, as a contribution to
the International Year of Biodiversity. They urged the 10th meeting of
the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
to be held in Nagoya on 18-29 October 2010, to reach agreement on an
international regime on access to and sharing of benefits of genetic re-
sources, achieving the third and essential objective of the Convention.
Expressing concern that the target of achieving by 2010 a significant
reduction of the current rate of biodiversity loss had not been met, they
stressed the urgency of adopting a new target to guide the action of the
international community in slowing, halting and ultimately reversing
the current rate of biodiversity loss.
39. Leaders emphasized that the participation of the private sector and
the involvement of civil society in the design and implementation of
environmental protection measures substantially contribute to chan-
ging people’s attitudes and bringing about sustainable production and
consumption patterns. They expressed their determination to encou-
rage these as established features of their policies.
40. Leaders recognized the importance of promoting sustainable
forms of production and consumption, among others through the pro-
motion of a green, low-carbon economy. It is needed because of the
limitations in available natural resources. It offers opportunities for it
brings about new markets, new investments and creates new employ-
ment. Yet, it also raises challenges as to the fair distribution of its costs
and benefits. Leaders noted the rising interest among ASEM partners
for developing carbon markets and, hence, supported the objective of
scaling up finance and investment through the development of the in-
ternational carbon market. Leaders committed to intensify ASEM coop-
eration in raising awareness, in exchanging information and best prac-
tices, in training experts in resource efficiency and in making technolo-
gies and know how more widely available. In this context, Leaders
noted the establishment of the Global Green Growth Institute in Seoul,
Korea, in June 2010, to support green growth in developing countries.
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Future Asia-Europe sustainable development cooperation
41. Leaders reaffirmed that the internationally agreed development
goals, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), guide
their cooperation on sustainable development. They recognized that,
despite ongoing efforts, progress towards timely implementation is
hampered, partly because of the economic and financial crisis. They
stressed the continued importance of narrowing the development gap
between developed and developing countries and therefore the need
for urgent remedial action.
42. Leaders emphasized the need for more result-oriented initiatives
to strengthen the comprehensive, equal and mutually beneficial Asia-
Europe strategic partnership for sustainable development, a partner-
ship that goes beyond aid. They tasked Senior Officials with the estab-
lishment of partnership programs with clear objectives, spurring peer
learning and stimulating networking among governments, administra-
tions, scientific and academic institutions, expert bodies and private
companies. They supported the use of triangular forms of cooperation
that combine resources and expertise from donor and recipient coun-
tries in the interest of efficient projects. They further supported taking
recourse to creative financing modalities, including the blending of
grants and loans, where it is possible, appropriate and achieves greater
leverage, due account being taken of debt sustainability.
43. Leaders emphasized that in view of the different socio-economic
situations of ASEM partners, cooperation should be tailored to the re-
spective needs and capabilities and should be based on the policies and
strategies defined by the countries concerned and under their responsi-
bility. In this context, Leaders also welcomed the reaffirmation of the
commitments in regard of development, in particular those under the
Monterey Consensus and under the Doha Declaration on Financing
for Development. They stressed that the adequacy, effectiveness and ef-
ficiency of development assistance must be pursued by applying the
principles of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action.
Global Issues In Focus
Piracy at sea
44. In the face of persistent piracy attacks, in particular off the coast
of Somalia, Leaders asserted their determination to ensure the contin-
ued freedom and security of the seas, vital to the trade between Asia
and Europe. Leaders underscored that the UN should continue to play
an important role in international efforts against piracy and guarantee
that the sovereignty of states and international law are respected.
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45. Leaders called for universal ratification of the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and of other relevant conventions. They
stressed the importance of implementing the UN Security Council
resolutions calling on states to criminalize piracy and armed robbery at
sea in their national legislation. Leaders stressed the importance of
effectively prosecuting suspected pirates and, to this effect, of ensuring
that evidence on pirates’ attacks and on their identity be collected. In
this context, they welcomed the Report of the UN Secretary General on
possible options to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning per-
sons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the
coast of Somalia. They urged members to cooperate with the Special
Advisor to the UN Secretary General on Legal Issues in order to
achieve agreement on the options to be pursued further. In this regard,
Leaders further called for increasing the sharing of intelligence among
ASEM partners with a view to tracking down and interdicting the
financial means which fund piracy operations.
46. Leaders discussed specifically the security of seafarers and the fu-
ture of their profession. The preservation of lives, bringing persons on
board of vessels to safety or ensuring their rapid release, should at all
times be the overriding concern. Unilateral measures from third coun-
tries which hamper such efforts are not acceptable. Leaders stressed
the added value of exchanges of best practices on anti-piracy training
of crews and on ways to support the victims of piracy acts and their fa-
milies. They also supported efforts to facilitate the presence of seafarers
at the trial of pirates.
47. Leaders commended the work done by the shipping industry in
conjunction with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in de-
veloping Best Management Practices for ship owners and ship opera-
tors. They stressed the importance for vessels travelling through dan-
ger zones to report through agreed mechanisms. They noted that
where these recommendations were followed, cases of successful at-
tacks were reduced.
48. Leaders further believed that regional initiatives such as the Regio-
nal Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), the Djibouti Code of Conduct con-
cerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in
the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden with the IMO Djibouti
Code Trust Fund, and the Malacca and Singapore Straits patrols are ef-
fective and deserve further support.
49. Leaders welcomed the strong cooperation within the Contact
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) and through the
CGPCS Trust Fund. They also commended the ongoing naval and air
counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia as important short-
term responses to deter and repress acts of piracy and as outstanding
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examples of Europe and Asia working together on an issue of common
interest. They stressed the need to continue to provide adequate mili-
tary resources. Leaders were however of the view that a long-term ap-
proach is also required and should consist of multifaceted actions, in-
cluding local and regional capacity building. Major resolve must
further be shown in addressing the root causes of piracy off the coast
of Somalia, in particular by restoring political stability in Somalia.
Fighting terrorism and combating transnational organized crime
50. Leaders reasserted the UN’s leading role in the fight against ter-
rorism and reaffirmed their commitment to take strong measures in
the fight against terrorism in line with the UN Charter, the UN Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the relevant UN Security Council Re-
solutions. They underlined the need to adhere to the UN conventions
and protocols dealing with terrorism and to observe obligations under
international law, including international human rights law, refugee
law and humanitarian law. They requested specific attention for the vic-
tims of acts of terrorism. They urged all UN Member states to move to-
wards the adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International
Terrorism. Leaders decided that ASEM should continue to disseminate
best practices in support of the implementation of the UN Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy through annual ASEM Conferences.
51. Leaders underscored their deep concerns over the negative effects
that transnational organized crime and corruption carry for trade, de-
velopment, intellectual property rights, peace, security and respect for
human rights. They expressed their determination to combat the threat
to international peace and security coming from illicit drug trafficking.
They expressed particular resolve in combating people smuggling and
trafficking in persons. They acknowledged the importance of consistent
regional approaches in deterring irregular migration. This year marks
the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the United Nations Conven-
tion against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols. Leaders
pledged to strengthen their cooperation in the implementation of these
commitments as well as of the United Nations Convention against Cor-
ruption.
Disaster prevention and disaster relief
52. Leaders underscored the humanitarian principles of disaster relief
– humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence – and considered
these principles to be the foundation for humanitarian action. They
also considered the challenge of financing disaster relief.
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53. Leaders referred to the succession of natural disasters, including
those at sea, over the last years and their tragic consequences, hamper-
ing the attainment of internationally agreed development goals in the
affected developing countries. Leaders stressed the importance of disas-
ter risk reduction through decreased exposure to risk, reduced vulner-
ability of humans and their property, sound environmental manage-
ment, local capacity building and improved readiness in case of disas-
ters in line with the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 and other
relevant UN Resolutions. Leaders called for accelerated implementation
of the measures defined therein. They also called for intensified coop-
eration within ASEM, in particular on risk assessment, risk reduction
strategies with particular attention to gender-inclusive approaches,
early warning mechanisms, management capacities, search and rescue
capacities, infrastructure development associated with relief and post-
disaster recovery, and other response activities. They welcomed
capacity-building activities conducted so far and encouraged their conti-
nuation, especially in high-risk countries. They supported strengthened
cooperation between the ASEAN Secretariat and the European Com-
mission’s Directorate-General on Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection
(ECHO).
Human security
54. Leaders stressed the need to continue to discuss issues relating to
human security at the UN General Assembly and in appropriate fora
in accordance with the 2005 World Summit Outcome and the relevant
UN General Assembly Resolution.
Human rights and democracy
55. Leaders reaffirmed the commitments to human rights in accor-
dance with the UN Charter and international law and their adherence
to democratic governance. They expressed their satisfaction with the
dialogue carried out by partners through the informal ASEM Seminars
on Human Rights held annually since 1998. They underlined their
commitment to increase cooperation on issues related to the promo-
tion and protection of human rights, on the basis of universality, equal-
ity and mutual respect. They encouraged cooperation with civil society
given its important role in promoting human rights and in maintain-
ing a functioning democratic society. They expressed their wish to ex-
tend cooperation in fora such as the Human Rights Council and the
UN General Assembly Third Committee.
56. Leaders welcomed the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovern-
mental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), which provides the
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overarching framework for human rights cooperation and for the pro-
motion and protection of human rights in the ASEAN region. They
agreed to strengthen mutual cooperation in promoting and protecting
human rights in line with AICHR’s purpose, and tasked their Senior
Officials to pursue this in the near future.
Dialogue of cultures and civilizations
57. Leaders stressed the importance of encouraging dialogue among
cultures and civilizations and recalled the importance of interfaith and
intercultural dialogues to the maintenance of international peace and
security. Ongoing ASEM initiatives constitute significant contributions
to the enrichment of Asian and European cultures and faiths and to
the deepening of Asia-Europe relations. Leaders expressed their sup-
port for the UN Alliance of Civilizations initiative and welcomed the
results of the III Forum held last May in Rio de Janeiro, including the
announcement of new National Plans for Intercultural Dialogue, new
Partnership Agreements and Regional Strategies by governments and
international organizations and the implementation of concrete multi-
stakeholders projects in the fields of education, youth, migration and
media.
Reform of the UN system
58. Leaders shared the view that a comprehensive reform of the
United Nations remains a priority in order for the organization to ef-
fectively address today’s global challenges and ensure effective support
for its members, particularly in addressing the needs of developing
countries. Leaders called upon all members to work in partnership in
order to achieve a more representative, more efficient and more effec-
tive UN Security Council. They called further for a revitalized General
Assembly, a strengthened ECOSOC, a well-managed Secretariat and
effective, streamlined specialized agencies in the interest of system-
wide coherence and increased sense of ownership on the part of the
world community.
Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
59. Leaders agreed that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, and their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international
peace and security and is a common concern of the ASEM community
and of the world at large. They reaffirmed their commitment to the
long-term objective of a world free of nuclear weapons and of other
weapons of mass destruction. They also recognized the importance of
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advancing the mutually reinforcing objectives of nuclear disarmament
and nuclear non-proliferation.
60. Leaders agreed on the importance of international cooperation
and national measures in addressing nuclear proliferation concerns.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of interna-
tional efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and also
serves to uphold the rights of states to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Leaders urged all States Parties to the Treaty to implement the Action
Plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty.
61. Leaders recognized the important role of the IAEA and its safe-
guards system in upholding the international nuclear non-proliferation
regime and in defining peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and called for
full cooperation on all matters within its mandate. Leaders in particular
supported early adoption of the Additional Protocol to the Comprehen-
sive Safeguard Agreement.
62. Leaders recognized the importance of continuing the work under
the auspices of the IAEA on the development of multilateral ap-
proaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibility of assur-
ances of fuel supply and schemes addressing the back-end of the fuel
cycle.
63. Leaders welcomed the efforts launched at the 2010 Nuclear Secur-
ity Summit to counter effectively the threat of nuclear terrorism includ-
ing by securing all vulnerable nuclear material within the next four
years. They encouraged the continuation of efforts, which will be re-
viewed at the next Summit scheduled in 2012 in Seoul. Leaders simul-
taneously called for universal ratification of the Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and of the amended 1980
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
64. Leaders also welcomed the recent conclusion of the New START
Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States as it con-
tains provisions for substantial and verifiable reductions of strategic of-
fensive nuclear weapons and called for its early entry into force. Lead-
ers reaffirmed their strong support for the early entry into force of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), warmly welcoming
the renewed political momentum towards CTBT ratification within
some remaining Annex 2 states.
Regional Issues
65. Leaders agreed that regional cooperative mechanisms are a force
for peace, stability, prosperity, social development and cohesion. They
stressed the importance of effective regional architectures of security
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and cooperation in Asia and Europe based on mutual respect, on con-
sideration for the legitimate interests of all states and on partnership
among various regional organizations and fora. The entry into force of
the Lisbon Treaty marked a major step forward in European integration
and will strengthen the European Union as a reliable and efficient part-
ner in developing relations and cooperation with others, including part-
ners in Asia. Leaders likewise welcomed the entry into force of the
ASEAN Charter in December 2008 and the recent steps taken to accel-
erate ASEAN integration as milestones in the establishment of a resili-
ent, dynamic and sustained ASEAN Community by 2015 and of deep-
ened relations with its partners. They also welcomed the many sub-
stantial developments and initiatives purporting inclusive regional
dialogue and cooperation in different parts of Asia. These develop-
ments serve both regions well.
66. Leaders recognized the centrality of ASEAN in regional coopera-
tion in Asia. They also recognized that such regional cooperation is
mutually beneficial and reinforcing. They supported the widening of
its role, stressing the desirability of enhanced contacts and cooperation
through the existing dialogue partnerships between ASEAN and its
partners. They encouraged additional efforts to share experiences and
lessons learned.
67. Leaders welcomed the support for the cooperation processes tak-
ing place in each other’s region and also, in this spirit, the European
Union’s confirmed commitment to accede to the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in South-East Asia (TAC). To this effect, they agreed to
work for early entry into force of the Third Protocol amending the
TAC.
68. Leaders underlined the importance of finding an early negotiated
solution to Iran’s nuclear program. They expressed their determination
in pursuing the objective of reaching a comprehensive negotiated solu-
tion to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nat-
ure of Iran’s nuclear program, while respecting Iran’s legitimate rights
to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. They reaffirmed their commit-
ment to fully implement UN Security Council Resolution 1929. They
confirmed the need for Iran to comply fully with the UN Security
Council and IAEA Board of Governors requirements. They called for
an early resumption of the dialogue between Iran and China, France,
Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States and en-
couraged Iran’s positive and constructive participation in this dialogue.
69. Leaders commended Afghanistan on the holding of elections not-
withstanding the challenging security environment. These were the
second parliamentary elections since 2001 and the first ones to be or-
ganized by the Afghans themselves. They constituted an important and
visible sign of Afghan sovereignty and underlined the will of the
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Afghan people to shape the future of their country. In this context,
Leaders reiterated the importance of continued international support
for the Afghan government’s efforts to achieve peace and stability for
its people and to strengthen the governance of the country, including
the electoral process, in the context set out at the Kabul Conference in
July 2010. Leaders emphasized the importance of the objective set at
the Kabul conference in regard of transition, reconciliation and reinte-
gration and that Afghan ownership is key to long-term stability and
peace. Leaders emphasized that the international community should
pursue its assistance to Afghanistan and continue to provide technical
cooperation in areas such as governance and rule of law, healthcare,
agriculture, education and poverty reduction. Assistance should also be
continued for the suppression and control of narcotics by the imple-
mentation of a comprehensive anti-narcotics strategy, including explor-
ing ways to eradicate poppy fields, cutting precursor deliveries and
promoting alternative sustainable livelihood development. Leaders reaf-
firmed their commitment to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming
a base for international terrorist activity, and welcomed efforts by the
Afghan Government to strengthen the capacity of the Afghan security
forces to help meet this challenge.
70. Leaders were encouraged by the launch of direct talks between
Israel and the Palestinian Authority in Washington on 2 September
2010 and by their continuation since. They commended U.S. President
Barack Obama and his administration, the Quartet, the Arab partners
and other international partners for their support and contribution to
this process. They supported a solution negotiated on the basis of the
principle of “land for peace”, consistent with the relevant UN resolu-
tions, the Middle East Roadmap for Peace, and the Arab Peace Initia-
tive. They reiterated the ultimate goal of establishing an independent,
sovereign, democratic, contiguous and viable Palestinian State, living
side by side in peace and security with Israel, both in a peaceful and
stable region. Leaders regretted the Israeli decision not to extend the
moratorium on settlements and called on both parties to act responsi-
bly and choose the path of peace. They recalled that settlements are il-
legal under international law and inconsistent with Israel’s obligation
under the Roadmap for Middle East Peace. The parties must now en-
gage with determination to overcome the obstacles and to find a satis-
factory way for the negotiations to continue and gather momentum.
The parties must also keep working intensively on final status issues
consistent with the Quartet’s call for a negotiated settlement within an
agreed timeframe. Meanwhile, it is also very important that all relevant
parties avoid provocative actions and violence which could undermine
the success of the talks. Leaders welcomed the readiness of a number
202 THE ASIA-EUROPE MEETING
of partners to contribute substantially to post-conflict arrangements
aimed at fostering enduring peace.
71. Leaders considered that the current situation in Gaza is unsustain-
able. They called for a solution that ensures the unimpeded flow of hu-
manitarian aid, commercial goods and persons to and from Gaza, and
addresses Israelis’ and Palestinians’ legitimate security concerns, con-
sistent with United Nations Security Council resolution 1860 (2009).
The recent measures announced by the Israeli government are impor-
tant steps. Yet full implementation and complementary measures are
needed in order to achieve a fundamental change of policy that would
allow for the reconstruction and economic recovery of Gaza.
72. Leaders stressed the importance of promoting, in parallel, the set-
tlement of the issues between Syria and Israel and between Lebanon
and Israel, through dialogue and negotiation, to promote the Middle
East Peace Process comprehensively.
73. Leaders exchanged views on recent developments in Myanmar.
They took note of the announcement of national elections on 7 Novem-
ber 2010. They encouraged the government of Myanmar to take the
necessary measures to ensure that these elections would be free, fair
and inclusive, and would mark a step towards a legitimate, constitu-
tional, civilian system of government. The timely release of those un-
der detention would contribute to these elections being more inclusive,
participatory and transparent. They supported the continuation of the
Good Offices Mission of the UN Secretary General and called upon
Myanmar to engage and cooperate more closely with the UN and the
international community. They stressed the need for the government
of Myanmar to engage in dialogue with all parties concerned in an in-
clusive national reconciliation process. They also touched upon the is-
sue of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. They stated their readiness to remain
constructively engaged in achieving the aims of national reconciliation
and of improving the economic and social conditions of the people of
Myanmar. They reiterated their commitment to the sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity of Myanmar and their view that the future of Myan-
mar lies in the hands of its people.
74. Leaders exchanged views on the situation in the Korean Peninsula
and stressed the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the
Korean Peninsula and in the region. Leaders reiterated their condo-
lences to the Government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) for the loss
of lives suffered in the sinking of the Republic of Korea’s naval ship
Cheonan. They expressed their deep concern and reaffirmed their sup-
port for the 9 July 2010 UN Security Council Presidential Statement.
They stressed the importance of preventing further such attacks. Lead-
ers acknowledged the efforts to provide humanitarian aid to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). They took note of the
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recent steps undertaken in inter-Korean relations, including the discus-
sion of family reunions, and encouraged the resumption of such family
reunions on a regular basis. They expressed their hope that such steps
will lead to genuine dialogue and cooperation between the ROK and
the DPRK. Leaders urged all parties to fulfill their commitments under
the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 and under relevant UN
Security Council resolutions, which provide the framework for the
DPRK to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs
in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. They reaffirmed sup-
port for the diplomatic efforts made within the Six-Party Talks aiming
at achieving a comprehensive resolution of the issue. They called for
joint efforts to create circumstances to resume the Six-Party Talks. They
emphasized the importance of the full implementation of all relevant
UN Security Council resolutions. They also emphasized the impor-
tance of addressing the humanitarian concerns of the international
community.
People-to-People, Visibility & Future of ASEM
75. Leaders encouraged further progress in the overarching goal of
stimulating further people-to-people contacts and interaction between
businesses, merchants, academics, students, opinion makers, media
representatives, culture professionals, civil society representatives and
local and regional leaders. The multiplication of interactions as well as
the promotion of tourism raises the inter-connectivity between Europe
and Asia.
76. Leaders reaffirmed that the parallel dialogues conducted within
the Parliamentary partnership, the People’s Forum and the Business
Forum play a valuable role in reaching ASEM’s objectives. A number
of Leaders addressed these parallel dialogues. Leaders took note of their
recommendations and resolutions. They expressed their appreciation
for the work achieved and tasked Senior Officials to take it into consid-
eration and, where relevant, make suggestions for appropriate action.
77. Leaders welcomed the expansion of academic cooperation follow-
ing the Second ASEM Meeting of Education Ministers in Hanoi in
May 2009. They applauded the holding of Bologna Policy fora which
stimulate dialogue on mobility, quality assurance, credit recognition
and credit transfer, building on the success of programs such as the
Erasmus Mundus and the ASEM-DUO fellowship programs. They
strongly supported the establishment of the ASEM Education Secretar-
iat in Bonn, Germany, which will coordinate ASEM educational activ-
ities. Leaders thanked Denmark for offering to host the Third ASEM
Education Ministerial Meeting in 2011.
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78. Leaders emphasized that joint science and technology initiatives
play a central role in achieving scientific, technological and social ad-
vances in the face of common challenges, in particular the one of ad-
vancing sustainable development.
79. Leaders recognized the important role played by the Trans-Eura-
sian Information Network (TEIN) project in increasing direct internet
connectivity among research and education in Asia and between Asia
and Europe. They welcomed the planned launch of its 4th phase and
the establishment of a Cooperation Center hosted by the Republic of
Korea with financial contributions from participating ASEM partners.
80. Leaders welcomed the outcome of the Fourth ASEM Culture Min-
isters’ Meeting in Poznan last September. They stressed that raising
awareness about cultural heritage and about treasures of the past con-
stituted a key step towards overcoming ignorance and prejudice and
towards promoting mutual understanding and cooperation. Hence,
they encouraged intensification of work in these areas, involving gov-
ernment and civil society at all levels. Leaders thanked Indonesia for
offering to host the Fifth ASEM Culture Ministers’ Meeting in 2012.
81. Leaders hailed the exhibition titled “A Passage to Asia” which Bel-
gium and the Asian ASEM partners produced as a cultural backdrop to
their meeting. The exhibit illustrates how during twenty-five centuries,
commercial and political networks carried back and forth human
science and philosophy between Asia and Europe. It provides a rich
historical background to the present day dialogue and people-to-people
contacts.
82. Leaders expressed their appreciation for the important work per-
formed by the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF), ASEM’s only estab-
lished institution, which acts as a networking node of activities for pro-
moting mutual understanding between Asia and Europe. Leaders re-
cognized the value of ASEF’s flagship programs in furthering the
priorities and enhancing the visibility of ASEM. They called on ASEM
members to ensure, through the regularity of their contributions, that
the long-term financial sustainability of its programs would be assured.
They invited the new ASEM members to also make their contributions
and encouraged their active participation in ASEF activities.
83. Leaders noted with satisfaction the significant increase in ASEM’s
internal and external visibility. They commended Belgium for using
ASEM’s logo as a basis for the ASEM 8 logo and invited future Sum-
mit hosts to adopt the same approach. They recognized that as a mem-
ber-driven gathering, ASEM crucially depends for its visibility on the
initiatives, actions and communication policies of the partners them-
selves. The Leaders therefore called on all ASEM partners to increase
their efforts and promote public awareness of ASEM through visibility
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work plans and policies, choice channels of communication and fo-
cused cultural activities.
84. While reaffirming the continued validity of the existing coopera-
tion framework, Leaders agreed on the desirability of improving the
working methods of an enlarged ASEM. They endorsed the Senior Of-
ficials’ recommendation that the host of an upcoming ASEM summit
should henceforth be part of the coordination mechanism “from sum-
mit to summit”. They further tasked Senior Officials to come up with
relevant and practical proposals with a view to providing the kind of
light, cost-effective technical support that would enhance the efficiency,
coherence, continuity and visibility of the work of ASEM. They also
asked Senior Officials to seek improvements in the various existing
mechanisms of cooperation among ASEM partners. In this regard,
they instructed Senior Officials to submit recommendations to the
ASEM Foreign Ministers for consideration at their forthcoming meet-
ing in 2011.
Closing
85. Leaders approved the List of new initiatives figuring in Annex I
and the ASEM Work Program for 2010-2012 figuring in Annex II.
86. Leaders thanked the Host Country for the successful arrange-
ments for their Eighth Meeting and accepted with gratitude the offer
of the Laos People’s Democratic Republic to host the Ninth Asia-Eur-
ope Meeting and looked forward to meeting again in Vientiane in Octo-
ber 2012.
Annex I List of new initiatives
Annex II ASEM Work Program for 2010-2012
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Annex I
List of New Initiatives Submitted to ASEM 8
Austria
United Nations / ASEM UN-Spider Expert Meeting: The Contribu-
tion of Space-based Solutions to Sustainable Communities
Belgium
9th ASEM Conference of Directors General of Immigration
PR China
2nd Transportation Ministers’ Meeting & Transport Development
Forum
ASEM Symposium on Sustainable Forest Management to Address
Climate Change
Establishment of an ASEM Water Resources Research and Develop-
ment Center
ASEM Symposium on Technical and Vocational Education
Czech Republic
11th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights
Indonesia
5th ASEM Culture Ministers’ Meeting
Republic of Korea
12th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights
Trans Eurasian Information Network Cooperation Center TEIN*
Extension of the ASEM DUO Fellowship Program (Third Phase)
ASEM SMEs Eco Innovation Center (ASEIC)
Malaysia
Asia-Europe Seminar on Conservation of Timber and Lime Buildings
Philippines
ASEM Seminar on Harmonization of Biofuels Standards and Appli-
cation to Vehicle Technologies
Thailand
ASEM Food Security Conference
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Vietnam
ASEM Forum on Social Safety Nets for All ASEM Green Growth
Forum
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Annex 2
ASEM Work Program for 2010-2012
2010
PROGRAM VENUE DATE
ASEM Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) Madrid, Spain 25 January
Brussels Briefing “Europe-Asia: Working for More
Effec. Global Gov.”
Brussels, Belgium 24 March
2nd ASEM Social Partners’ Forum Brussels, Belgium 29 March
High-Level Forum on Employment & Social Issues Brussels, Belgium 29-31 March
Seminar: Asia - Europe Learning Mutually; Asia
Europe Cooperation in the 21st Century – Towards
the Success of ASEM 8
Tokyo, Japan 30 March
6th ASEM Interfaith Dialogue Madrid & Toledo,
Spain
07-09 April
2nd Preparatory Meeting for the 4th ASEM Culture
Ministers’ Meeting
Solo, Indonesia 15-17 April
Finance Deputies’ Meeting Madrid, Spain 17 April
ASEM Outlook Workshop Brussels, Belgium 15-16 April
9th ASEM Finance Ministers’ Meeting Madrid, Spain 17-18 April
Overcoming the Financial Crisis - Shaping
Sustainable Development in the New Context
Nha Trang, Vietnam 26-27 April
Workshop on Coordinating Cultural Activities for




ASEM Seminar on Piracy at Sea Brussels, Belgium 04-05 May
ASEM Conference on Forests, Forest Governance
and Forest Products’ Trade: Scenarios and




ASEM Customs Trade Day Hanoi, Vietnam 05 May
ASEM Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) Phnom Penh,
Cambodia
05-06 May
4th Meeting of the ASEM Working Group on
Customs Matters (AWC)
Hanoi, Vietnam 06-07 May
ASEM Forum 2010 on Green Growth & SMEs Seoul, Korea 06-08 May





2nd ASEM Development Conference Yogyakarta,
Indonesia
26-27 May
8th ASEM Conference on Counter-Terrorism Brussels, Belgium 10-11 June
Employment High-Level Forum ILO - Geneva 14 June
Brussels Briefing on Sustainable Development Brussels, Belgium 16 June
Preparatory Event on Sustainable Development Brussels, Belgium 23-24 June
Preparatory Event on Piracy at Sea Brussels, Belgium 24-25 June
ASEM Forum on Sustainable Food Security Ho Chi Minh City,
VN
05-07 July
10th Informal Seminar on Human Rights
“Gender Equality“
Manila, Philippines 07-09 July
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Public Conference on EU Asia Inter-Regional
Relations
Brussels, Belgium 12-13 July
ASEM Senior Officials’ Meeting ( SOM ) Brussels, Belgium 13-15 July
ASEM Coordinators’ Meeting Seoul, Korea 06-07 September
1st ASEM Climate Change Forum Ha Long City,
Vietnam
06-07 September
4th ASEM Culture Ministers’ Meeting Poznan, Poland 09-10 September
Brussels Briefing “Curtain Raiser on ASEM 8” Brussels, Belgium 16-17 September
Asia - Europe Parliamentary Meeting (ASEP) Brussels, Belgium 26-28 September
Workshop Social Protection Floor & Informal
Economy
Nice, France 27-28 September





ASEM People’s Forum - Trade Unions’ Day Brussels, Belgium 01 October
Asia - Europe People’s Forum (AEPF) Brussels, Belgium 02-05 October
ASEM Coordinators’ Meeting Brussels, Belgium 02 October
ASEF Connecting Civil Societies of Asia and
Europe
Brussels, Belgium 02-03 October
ASEF Editors’ Roundtable Brussels, Belgium 03 October
ASEM Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) Brussels, Belgium 03 October
Asia - Europe Business Forum (AEBF) Brussels, Belgium 04 October
ASEM 8 SUMMIT Brussels, Belgium 04-05 October
Professionalization of Adult Teachers &
Educators in ASEM Countries
Hanoi, Vietnam 11-12 October
2nd ASEM Rectors’ Conference Seoul, Korea 25-28 October
1st ASEM Meeting for Governors and Mayors Jakarta, Indonesia 27-29 October
9th ASEM Conference of Directors-General of
Immigration on Management of Migratory
Flows between Asia and Europe
Terhulpen, Belgium 21-23 November
2nd ASEM ICT Senior Officials’ Meeting Brussels, Belgium November-
December
3rd ASEM Labor Ministers’ Meeting Leiden,
The Netherlands
12-14 December
ASEM Conference on Quality Assurance in
Education “Quality Assurance and Recognition:
Challenges and Prospects”
Cyprus December
Conference on Investment and its Financing India December
1st Preparatory Meeting for the 2nd Transport
Ministers’ Meeting
PR China End 2010
2011
PROGRAM VENUE DATE





ASEM Education Senior Officials’ Meeting Copenhagen,
Denmark
24-25 January
ASEM Food Security Conference Bangkok, Thailand February





3rd ASEM Education Ministers’ Meeting Denmark 09-10 May
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United Nations / ASEM UN-Spider Expert
Meeting: The Contribution of Space-based
Solutions to Sustainable Communities - Austria
Singapore May
ASEM Symposium on Sustainable Forest




1st Preparatory Senior Officials’ Meeting for
the 5th Culture Ministers’ Meeting
Indonesia Mid 2011
2nd Transport Ministers’ Meeting and Transport
Development Forum
PR China October
10th ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Hungary Spring 2011
11th Informal Seminar on Human Rights Prague,
Czech Republic
Autumn 2011
9th ASEM Customs Directors-General/
Commissioners’ Meeting
Thailand Autumn 2011
ASEM Seminar on the Harmonization of





Seminar on Quality Enhancement in Higher
Education
Brussels, Belgium 2011
ASEM Water Resources Research Centre PR China 2011
ASEM SMEs Eco Innovation Centre Korea 2011
TEIN* Cooperation Centre Korea 2011
ASEM Forum on Social Safety Nets for All Vietnam 2011
ASEM Green Growth Forum Vietnam 2011
2012
PROGRAM VENUE DATE
Asia - Europe Parliamentary Meeting (ASEP) Laos October
Asia - Europe People’s Forum (AEPF) Laos October
Asia - Europe Business Forum (AEBF) Laos October
ASEM 9 SUMMIT Laos October
5th ASEM Culture Ministers’ Meeting Indonesia 2012
12th Informal Seminar Human Rights Korea 2012
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Annex 2
Brussels Declaration on More Effective
Global Economic Governance
Towards more effective global economic governance
We, the Heads of State and of Government of Asia and Europe, the Pre-
sident of the European Commission and the Secretary General of
ASEAN, meeting in Brussels on 4-5 October 2010 under the Chairman-
ship of the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy,
having discussed the current economic and financial situation, declare
as follows:
1. We recognize that the economic crisis has exposed the weaknesses
in the global economic and financial system and has highlighted the
interdependence among the world’s economies. Following up on the
Statement of the Seventh Asia-Europe Meeting on the International Fi-
nancial Situation and the Ninth ASEM Finance Ministers Meeting held
in Madrid in 2010, we resolve to give new momentum to the coopera-
tion between Europe and Asia with a view to promoting strong, sus-
tainable, balanced and inclusive growth, restoring market confidence,
strengthening the resilience and the transparency of the financial sys-
tem, reforming the financial sector, contributing to the reform of the
international financial institutions and spurring economic growth in
developing countries.
2. We stress that in order to ensure strong, sustainable and balanced
growth and inclusive economies in Asia and in Europe, all ASEM part-
ners have to play a part in addressing economic distortions and weak-
nesses in policy responses. With this objective in mind, we pledge to
strengthen the sources of growth and to conduct structural reforms,
moving away from the patterns that created fragilities in the pre-crisis
period, including excessive public deficits, non-sustainable debts and
development gaps. In the interest of greater stability, we intend to
move together. We agree that policy actions must take account of possi-
ble spill-over effects and imbalances, and demonstrate a shared respon-
sibility for the global economy, taking into account the different levels
of development of countries.
3. We note that, as a result of the extraordinary and well coordinated
stimulus packages, the global economic recovery continues. We agree
that priority should be given to restoring market confidence and preser-
ving recovery momentum. We welcome the actions taken in Asia to
sustain a robust recovery and maintain the momentum towards eco-
nomic growth while containing inflationary pressures. We note the
connection between large fiscal deficits and rising debt levels inherited
from government interventions in the midst of the financial crisis and
the continued fragility of the financial markets and uncertainty in the
world economy. For this reason, we welcome the measures taken by
European members to ensure a proper functioning of the market for
sovereign debt and their readiness to go further if warranted. We en-
courage the pursuit of credible clearly communicated plans for fiscal
consolidation, delivering fiscal sustainability while also protecting eco-
nomic growth, duly differentiating the speed and timing of consolida-
tion for national circumstances. We emphasize that increasing the po-
tential for economic growth, including through appropriate structural
adjustment, should be seen as paramount to ease fiscal adjustments in
the longer run.
4. We recognize the need for financial safety nets to help countries
cope with financial volatility and reduce the economic disruptions from
sudden swings in capital flows. We welcome in this regard the IMF’s
recent decision to improve its approach to crisis prevention. We also re-
cognize both the multilateralisation of the Chiang Mai Initiative in Asia
and the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism as valuable regio-
nal instruments. We agree however that sound macroeconomic and fi-
nancial policies should continue to be the first line of defense against
macroeconomic shocks. Further, we encourage the G-20, in close coop-
eration with the Financial Stability Board (FSB), to make as announced
rapid progress with strengthening the resilience and the transparency
of the financial system.
5. We reaffirm the need to deliver on the projected reforms in the
field of financial regulation and supervision. The lessons from the past
have to be learnt and a more efficient, resilient and reliable financial
environment must be created. The importance of stronger capital ade-
quacy and liquidity rules is highlighted by the recent agreement
reached by regulators and we look forward to its formal adoption. We
emphasize the need to eliminate excessive leverage practices. We also
emphasize the need to improve supervisory and crisis management
processes with specific attention for the moral hazard associated with
systemically important financial institutions. We agree to strengthen
over-the-counter derivatives regulation and to improve regulatory over-
sight of financial firms, hedge funds and credit-rating agencies in order
to reduce systemic risks and improve market efficiency, transparency
and integrity. Good governance in the financial sector should further be
promoted through the conclusion of agreements purporting informa-
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tion exchange and cooperation amongst supervisors for regulatory pur-
poses. We fully support the work of the Financial Action Task Force and
Financial Action Task Force-Style Regional Bodies in their fight against
money laundering, terrorist financing and information exchange on jur-
isdictions with strategic deficiencies. We agree that the financial sector
should bear a fair share of the cost incurred by governments in condi-
tions of crisis, something that can be achieved through a number of
possible policy approaches suitable for different national situations. We
also emphasize the importance of agreeing internationally a single set
of high-quality accounting standards, applicable globally.
6. We emphasize that our collective efforts depend on well-functioning,
responsive and adequately funded International Financial Institutions.
7. We confirm our ambition to modernize the governance of the
IMF, to improve its credibility, legitimacy and effectiveness and call for
resolve to ensure the IMF has the resources it needs to fulfill its man-
date. In this regard, we support the Fund’s efforts to update its man-
date and to clarify its role and responsibilities in overall surveillance
and preservation of the stability of the international monetary and fi-
nancial system.
8. In view of the strong growth in dynamic emerging markets and
developing countries, we express support for the implementation of
the IMF quota reform, by the G-20 Summit of November this year, to
adequately reflect the relative weight and responsibilities of the IMF
members in the world economy. As decided at the October 2009 meet-
ing of the International Monetary and Financial Committee in Istan-
bul, we reaffirm that IMF quota shares must be shifted to dynamic
emerging markets and developing countries by at least 5% from overre-
presented to underrepresented countries using the current quota for-
mula as the basis to work from, while protecting the voting power of
the poorest countries. We recognize that, in parallel, wider governance
issues should be addressed. These include an open, transparent and
merit-based process for the appointment of heads and senior leader-
ship of international institutions, Fund Governor’s involvement in the
strategic oversight of the IMF, staff diversity at senior and mid-level po-
sitions, voting modalities, and a representative and inclusive size of the
IMF’s Executive Board. We look forward to a constructive dialogue be-
tween Ministers and Governors at the upcoming Annual Meetings of
the IMF and World Bank.
9. We welcome the decision by the Development Committee of the
World Bank on the World Bank’s voice reform, which will increase the
voting power of developing and transition countries by 4.59% com-
pared to 2008 and look forward to its timely approval by the Board of
Governors. We underline our commitment to continue moving over
time towards equitable voting power distribution, while protecting the
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smallest poor countries, on the basis of a dynamic formula which pri-
marily reflects countries’ evolving economic weight and the World
Bank’s development mission.
10. We call specifically for actions that encourage more sustainable
models of development, benefit developing countries and reduce pov-
erty. We believe that these should include market access, cross-border
investments, international assistance, actions on debts and technology
transfers. In this regard, we welcome the initiative announced by the
G-20 to focus on economic growth in developing countries, narrowing
the development gap and reducing poverty, and its stated intention to
elaborate a development agenda and multiyear action plans.
11. We reiterate our resolve to conclude the WTO Doha Development
Agenda promptly because a successful conclusion would provide a
powerful economic stimulus for global sustained recovery. We reaffirm
our commitment to reject protectionism, refrain from raising new bar-
riers to trade and investments and keep markets open. We also under-
line the importance of deepening economic integration within and be-
tween both regions as a means to global recovery. We recognize the
high expectations placed on us to help strengthen worldwide economic
and financial policy coordination.
12. We reiterate the importance of inclusive consultation and coordi-
nation among ASEM partners to achieve sustainable recovery. We ex-
press full readiness to work with the G-20 in order to strengthen the
world economy and achieve, in the appropriate multilateral fora, the re-
quired higher standards and necessary regulatory reforms. We call for
full cooperation to ensure the successful outcome of the forthcoming
G-20 Seoul Summit.
Brussels, 5 October 2010
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Annex 3
Hanoi Declaration on Closer ASEM
Economic Partnership
1. At the fifth Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) held in Hanoi on 8-9
October 2004, Leaders had an in-depth discussion on closer ASEM
economic partnership and agreed to issue the following declaration:
2. Reiterating the principles of ASEM economic cooperation which
include commitment to the market economy, closer cooperation be-
tween governments and businesses, non-discriminatory liberalization
and regionalism, compliance with the WTO rules, mutual respect and
equal partnership, with recognition of the economic diversity within
and between Asia and Europe;
3. Recognising the economic potential of the two regions, the value
of synergy between them and the importance of ASEM economic coop-
eration for achieving this potential; and commending the contributions
that the ASEM Trade Facilitation and Investment Promotion Action
Plans have made towards this since 1998;
4. Encouraged by the steady improvement of the Asian economy
from the setback caused by the financial crisis in 1997 and the enlarge-
ment of the European Union, which will provide broader opportunities
to further deepen economic partnership between Asia and Europe in
an enlarged ASEM;
5. Determined to work together in facing challenges to our economy,
such as the uncertain oil prices, gap between rich and poor, digital di-
vide, HIV/AIDS, and population ageing;
6. Expressing our gratitude for the reports submitted by the ASEM
Taskforce and Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF);
And hereby declare as follows:
7. The ASEM partners will renew efforts to foster a closer ASEM eco-
nomic partnership in order to bring into full play the potential and sy-
nergy of the two regions, to accelerate the process of regional coopera-
tion and integration, to reinforce the sustainability and effectiveness of
the partnership and to increase the role of ASEM in the process of eco-
nomic globalisation. This work is to be carried forward in line with the
overall objectives of reinforcing ASEM economic cooperation, namely
sustainable economic growth, improved business environment and op-
portunities, facilitated trade in goods and services and investment
flows, contribution to the global economic dialogue, responses to the
impact of globalisation and increased living standards of our people.
8. We declare a firm commitment to pursue closer economic coop-
eration between our two regions through closer economic partnership,
aimed at expansion of trade in goods and services and investment. We
aim to move the partnership forward on an equal and fair basis, mak-
ing use of informal policy dialogues, sharing of information and ex-
perience, and joint working on practical and project-oriented objectives.
We are committed to work for greater efficiency and effectiveness of
the ASEM process, following the guidelines below.
Strengthening trade and investment flows between the two
regions
9. We commit ourselves to carry forward ASEM economic activities,
taking into account the Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP), Invest-
ment Promotion Action Plan (IPAP), and other forms of economic co-
operation. The economic activities of ASEM in the period ahead will in-
clude efforts on trade and investment facilitation and promotion, redu-
cing trade barriers, thus stimulating trade and investment flows
between the two regions, strengthening Public-Private Partnership
(PPP), and enhancing dialogues on coordination in areas of mutual in-
terest, important trade and investment themes such as capacity build-
ing, policy transparency and joint investment promotion.
10. We call on our Economic Ministers with their Senior Officials to
further identify and pursue new initiatives relating to trade and invest-
ment facilitation and promotion, to exchange information on trade and
investment opportunities in the new ASEM partner countries, and to
explore complementarities and scope for synergy between existing in-
itiatives of ASEAN, ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan and Korea) and the EU
with the aim of maximising the effectiveness of trade and investment
between regions.
Cooperation in finance
11. Financial cooperation under closer ASEM economic partnership
will be strengthened through information sharing, cooperation and dia-
logue. Areas for attention include: monetary and fiscal policies, finan-
cial market development and surveillance, debt management, structural
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reforms, the actions against money laundering and the funding of
terrorism as well as the challenges posed by ageing populations and
poverty. The overall aim of our cooperation is a sound, sustainable and
resilient financial architecture in order to cope with potential financial
shocks, and to support broad-based and sustainable growth in Asia and
Europe in the future.
12. In such a spirit, with reference to the report of the ASEM Task
Force for Closer Economic Partnership, we call on Finance Ministers
to further explore the recommendations and other ways to strengthen
this partnership within their responsibilities.
Cooperation in other sectors
13. We firmly believe that the ASEM process plays or could play a con-
structive and complementary role to the course of cooperation in speci-
fic fields including energy, transport, IPR protection enforcement, tour-
ism, E-commerce, and SME facilitation in and between the two re-
gions. We wish to see cooperation in these sectors strengthened
through sharing of information, experiences and best practices, and
where appropriate practically oriented cooperation and coordination
activities.
14. Taking into account the current oil market situation, we are will-
ing to find a common approach and possibilities for cooperation on a
voluntary and commercial basis in areas of mutual interests and con-
cerns on energy-related issues.
Complementing support for the multilateral trading system with
regionalism
15. We reaffirm the importance of the multilateral rule-based trading
system under the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This will remain
the most effective and legitimate means of managing and expanding
trade relations between ASEM partners.
16. We welcome the recent breakthrough in the Doha global trade
round with the adoption of negotiating frameworks for agreed areas,
and we urge WTO members to undertake the remaining work aimed
at achieving sustained progress in the Doha Development Agenda
(DDA) negotiations. We express our determination to cooperate in
pushing forward the Doha negotiation to an ambitious and balanced
conclusion as the first priority on our trade agenda, so as to strengthen
and improve the multilateral trading system, to the benefit of all.
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17. We recognise the importance of integration into the multilateral,
rule-based trading system, and extend strong support for the early ac-
cession of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Laos People’s Demo-
cratic Republic to the WTO.
18. We note the increasing momentum in Europe to attain deeper
and broader economic integration, as well as the creation of a broader
network of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) in East and South-east Asia.
We agree that regionalism that complements the multilateral trade sys-
tem and in combination with an outward-looking approach to trading
relations with partners in other regions can contribute to greater liber-
alisation over time and prove a great benefit to the global economy. We
therefore welcome ASEM partners’ initiatives for closer economic coop-
eration, but emphasize the essential importance of carrying coopera-
tion forward in ways which are consistent with WTO rules, and which
do not undermine the multilateral trading system. We commit our-
selves to respect this principle in developing the closer economic part-
nership within ASEM.
Interaction with business community
19. We recognise the role of the business community as a driving
force, and regard the AEBF as an important bridge linking business
communities and governments as well as individual business, includ-
ing SMEs in the two regions. We encourage the AEBF to explore ways
to enhance linkages between small and large firms and to promote co-
operation among SMEs, including intermediary agencies.
20. We emphasise the need to improve business involvement in the
ASEM process and make it more responsive, relevant and substantially
interactive with the business community. In this context we take note
of the recommendations made by the AEBF. Consultations within the
business community and beyond should be enhanced to ensure that
any new steps have full backing from, and support of, those whom
they are intended to benefit.
21. We encourage deeper involvement of national and regional busi-
ness organizations and networks such as Chambers of Commerce, Em-
ployers’ Federations and eminent business people in cooperation activ-
ities under the ASEM Economic Pillar. We call on Economic and
Finance Ministers and the next AEBF Chair further to improve ways of
interaction between businesses and governments.
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Conclusion
22. We express our strong belief that the closer ASEM economic part-
nership developed in line with this Declaration will promote sustain-
able growth and shared prosperity in our Asia and Europe continents.
We call on our Economic and Finance Ministers to meet at the earliest
opportunity to take action forward under these guidelines and coordi-
nate with their fellow-Ministers with specific responsibilities as appro-
priate, taking account of proposals recently put forward, including the
recommendations submitted by the ASEM Taskforce and AEBF.
Hanoi, Vietnam
9 October 2004
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Annex 4
Non-Paper
On 4th and 5th of October 2010, the European and Asian participants in
ASEM representing about 58% of the world population and 60% of
world trade, will hold their Eighth Summit. This meeting, at Head of
State and of Government level, provides an outstanding opportunity to
promote international peace and security in equal partnership and to
pursue the dialogue on issues of common concern. This non-paper is
meant as a first step in the identification and preparation of issues,
while keeping in mind that ongoing events may eventually influence
the actual content of the Summit discussions. Partners are invited to
help prioritize among the wide range of subjects suggested or to contri-
bute with their own expectations for the Summit.
Supporting events such as the Parliamentary meeting, the People’s
Forum and the Business Forum are not the subject of this paper. The
issue of enlargement of ASEM to new participants is not addressed
either.
The proposed starting point in the process of issue identification is
the intervention at the end of the Beijing ASEM 7 Summit of then
Prime Minister of Belgium Yves Leterme. Stating that what is at stake
is ‘the future of the one human family we all belong to’, he emphasized
‘the common dream of achieving greater wellbeing and more dignity
for all the citizens’. Captured under the title Quality of Life, this early in-
dication of the general theme for the Brussels Summit was well re-
ceived, in particular at the Hanoi Foreign Minister’s Meeting of May
25th last.
Recent experience in Europe and in Asia teaches that wellbeing cannot
be conceived exclusively in quantitative terms, i.e. in terms of average
income figures. Income distribution, social harmony, environmental
quality, equal opportunity, human security, public health, fundamental
human rights, cultural identity and overall stability, to name but a few,
are equally important in providing the sense of a balanced development
path. In Europe and in Asia, consciousness of this has increased over
the last years all the while globalization and country-specific policies
achieved remarkable economic success. Today, societies in both regions
face an identical challenge in devising the kind of policies which help
adapt to the pace of modernization. In both regions, the traditional so-
cial fabric is strained by the fast developing world economy and by the
unprecedented movement of people coming with it. This may be a first
substantial subject on which Heads of State and of Governments could
usefully share experiences.
Then Prime Minister of Belgium Yves Leterme further identified
three main challenges to be picked up at the Brussels ASEM Summit:
the financial and economic crisis, the Millennium Development Goals
and the Post-Kyoto process.
In Beijing, ASEM leaders addressed the international financial crisis
and the severe challenge it posed to the economic development of coun-
tries in Asia and in Europe. The ASEM 8 Summit provides an opportu-
nity to pursue the cooperation initiated there. Issues such as the
oversight of financial markets and the adequacy of growth-stimulating
policies, including policies aiming at innovation of products and
services, all appear relevant. Some of them are being discussed within
the G-20, but ASEM partners can weigh in and help give direction to
this forum. In addition, the reversal of protectionism and the encour-
agement of trade-friendly policies through the conclusion of the Doha
Development Agenda would contribute to the resolution of the econom-
ic crisis. Actually, trade facilitation and investment promotion were
among the key initial objectives of the ASEM process. A case can be
made that they should be in focus to help emerge from the economic
crisis. At ASEM 8, leaders might wish to re-energize efforts aimed at
stimulating bilateral trade and investments between the two regions.
In September 2010, an Intermediate UN Summit is planned on the
implementation of the Millennium Development Goals while the deadline
to achieve them is set for the year 2015. The Millennium Development
Goals constitute a joint undertaking of major importance for all ASEM
partners collectively. Building on the Beijing Declaration on Sustainable
Development, the partnership could address the factors that influence
their implementation. The specific issue of food security has since also
been raised, in particular at the last G-8 meeting in Aquila. It might re-
quire specific attention. High prices and relatively low production levels
while world demography steadily expands have drawn world attention
to the challenge of ensuring availability of food to everyone.
In December 2009, the 15th Conference of Parties of the United Na-
tions Climate Change Convention in Copenhagen is expected to con-
clude on a comprehensive global approach in the fight against rising
world temperatures. ASEM partners are keenly aware of the potentially
disastrous consequences of these for the daily life of millions of citi-
zens. Some partners have identified a connection between climate
change and their security as a nation. Hence, it would make perfect
sense for ASEM partners who represent more than half of the world’s
222 THE ASIA-EUROPE MEETING
population to lead in formulating adequate responses and thereby stim-
ulating cooperation with the rest of the world community.
In the context of climate change, the kinds of energy resources being
exploited and the way in which they are being used constitute specific
subjects for discussion. However, other issues are clearly also of con-
cern. They include equitable access to energy resources, transparency of
energy pricing and non-discriminatory operation of energy markets.
These issues concern ASEM partners specifically all the while they are
of interest to the world community at large.
Besides, there may be other subjects for meaningful dialogue.
Cross-border phenomena such as organized crime, drug trafficking, hu-
man trafficking, illegal migration, pandemics, corruption, terrorism and
environmental issues not related to climate change, to name but a few,
are of an equal pressing concern to ASEM partners. While useful work
has been done on these issues, including on border security and man-
agement, there is a feeling that more could be done. One example is
the exchange of judiciary and police experience, which, if agreed, could
be expanded further.
The foreign policy issues to be discussed at the Summit are likely to
be dependent on the international political situation at that time. A few
however can already be identified.
Developments in Afghanistan are part of the recurrent agenda of
ASEM partners. Coordination of international efforts is indeed of es-
sence for the country and for the stability of the whole region.
Other developments, whether they occur in Europe or in Asia, can of
course also be addressed within the political dialogue with a view to ex-
ert the collective influence of ASEM partners. At ASEM 7 in Beijing
and at the last Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Hanoi, specific attention
was devoted to Myanmar, the Korean Peninsula, and the Iranian nuclear
issue.
The present situation in the Horn of Africa is a cause for specific con-
cern for European and Asian partners in ASEM alike. Persistent piracy
in the area, feeding on the fragility of the states in the region, disrupts
strategic sea lanes that connect the economies of both. Terrorism might
breed on such ground, further aggravating unstable regional conditions.
At present, both Asian and European ASEM Partners are contributing
to UN efforts to address them, including through peacekeeping re-
sources. This seems to reflect a unity of mind and of purpose.
Increasing contacts between people from Asia and Europe has been a
mainstay for ASEM. Leaders could consider measures to build and ex-
pand on the useful work performed by ASEF, ASEM’s only established
institution. The goal is to bring an ever growing number of business
travelers, tourists, academicians, students, opinion makers, civil society
representatives and local and regional leaders to visit each other.
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In addition, ways and means could be developed to advance the offer
of academic exchanges under the care of the Ministers of Education and
the Rector’s Conferences. Similarly, progress could be encouraged in
cultural cooperation and exchanges, at the behest of the Ministers for Cul-
ture now meeting regularly. Interfaith and interreligious dialogue has
contributed much to bring Europeans and Asians closer together on an
agenda of tolerance and mutual understanding. How to carry it further
and how to increase its beneficial impact deserve specific attention. The
same applies to the dialogue between civilizations in conjunction with
the UN initiative of Alliance of Civilizations.
As has become customary, the Heads of States and of Governments
will likely want to address the future of the ASEM process. Under this
heading, issues relating to the functioning of the dialogue may be dis-
cussed, including the general coordination of the dialogue, the manage-
ment of the ‘issue-based leadership’, and the efficiency of the work
achieved within ASEM, based on proposals to be developed.
Finally, ways and means should be further developed to increase the
visibility of the dialogue.
Belgium, 6 October 2009
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Annex 5
Concept Paper
The ASEM 8 Summit will take place in Brussels on 4th and 5th of Octo-
ber 2010. A non-paper was circulated last October to which partners
have abundantly reacted. This concept paper is a follow-up. Taking into
account the comments received, it makes a first attempt at the identifi-
cation of issues of common concern, organizing them in a streamlined
structure.
Again, this concept paper is only one more intermediate step de-
signed to help ASEM partners move forward on the prepared agenda of
the Summit. It contains substantial and procedural elements. As stated
before, this process does not preempt the actual content of the discus-
sions among ASEM leaders at the Summit. Leaders naturally will want
to address the issues of the day at the time of their gathering. Support-
ing events such as the Parliamentary meeting, the People’s Forum and
the Business Forum will be addressed separately.
Begin
“Achieving greater wellbeing and more dignity for all citizens” stands
as the general theme of ASEM 8. Captured in short by “Quality of Life”
as announced at the Hanoi Foreign Minister’ Meeting in May 2009, it
is proposed to develop the theme under two subheadings as follows:
MORE EFFECTIVE WORLD GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
The world is being transformed by the latest economic and financial cri-
sis. Financial markets and companies are gradually adjusting, but new
supervisory arrangements are still to be defined. Also, coordinated stim-
ulus packages presently sustain economic activity, but the significant
public deficits they produce are still to be addressed. An ASEM Finance
Ministerial meeting is going to be dedicated to these themes in Madrid,
Spain, in April 2010. In fact, there is a general sense that economic re-
lationships are shifting and so are corresponding responsibilities.
Therefore, the world’s governance structures have to adapt. More and
better coordination of policies is needed to resolve the new economic
imbalances and avoid a recurrence of the kind of crisis and of social
consequences the world is seeing. At their last Summit, ASEM Leaders
led the international debate on these issues. They are well placed to take
it forward and to consider how multilateral institutions, the bodies
which hold the legitimacy in the eyes of the members of the world com-
munity, large and small, could be further modernized, rendered more
effective and more responsive to current needs.
ADVANCE ON THE PATH OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
ASEM leaders should pursue the work of ASEM 7 and consider ways to
move further ahead on the path of sustainable development in support
of the Millenium Development Goals. A balanced approach would re-
quire simultaneous progress on:
Economic development
Private sources of demand must be reestablished as the main drivers of
growth across countries. Structural adjustment to achieve this must be
encouraged by governmental authorities, including through market lib-
eralization and innovation of products, services and production pro-
cesses. Open and free international trade is supportive of this objective.
Hence, protectionist measures must be rolled back, the Doha Develop-
ment Agenda must be concluded, and new trade and investment flows
should be stimulated. Special attention needs to go to the production
and trade in foodstuffs, ensuring food security for all, in particular for
the neediest. Cooperation on economic development should be
strengthened. That was the subject of the 1st High Level ASEM Confer-
ence in Manila, Philippines, in April 2009. A follow-up Conference is
planned in Indonesia in spring 2010. Specific opportunities in the sec-
tor of transportation were examined at the 1st ASEM Transportation
Ministerial in Vilnius, Lithuania, last October, and could be pursued at
the projected Land Bridge Seminar in Pakistan. An Economic Minister-
ial meeting is still in project for early 2010.
Social development
In June 2009 and in response to the crisis, the ILO adopted a ‘Global
Jobs Pact’ supported by Asian and European ASEM members alike. It
aims at creating jobs, protecting workers and stimulating economic re-
covery. It should be implemented. More generally, social development
is dependent upon the promotion of decent working conditions and re-
spect for ILO labor standards. Effective dialogue between social partners
and open consultative labor relations should be encouraged for they
generate mutual understanding on issues such as productivity, working
conditions, remuneration and economic change. Also, care must be ta-
ken of the protection of workers, particularly in times of crisis, through
sustainable social security schemes. Furthermore, it is of structural im-
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portance to ensure the long-term inclusiveness of labor markets. This
would require sustained action to promote education, lifelong skill de-
velopment, career development tools and specific measures for the
most vulnerable. To examine these issues, an ASEM Labor Ministerial
meeting is planned in Leiden, the Netherlands, in December 2010. In
addition, ASEM members face the challenge of ageing populations.
This must also be addressed within the general goal of creating socie-
ties that are both equitable and inclusive.
Environmental protection
Climate change is the most pressing threat. ASEM partners share a
mutual commitment to finding a long-term multilateral solution. In the
light of the Copenhagen Conference, the issue has taken on a new
urgency, which should be addressed when the UNFCC Conference next
meets in Mexico. There is no other way but for members of the world
community to implement proactively a mixture of reduction, mitigation
and adaptation measures, each acting under a common though differen-
tiated responsibility and according to his respective capability. Energy
consumption patterns matter in this respect. Energy saving, energy effi-
ciency and conversion to renewable, carbon-free, sources of energy must
be pursued. They can be supported by market policies which should
however at the same time preserve the energy security of the respective
countries. These issues were examined at the 1st ASEM Energy Minister-
ial in Brussels, Belgium, last June. They could receive further considera-
tion at a follow-up meeting in Singapore in the first half of 2010 and at
other climate-related events. This being said, human activities such as
urbanization, industrialization, building of transportation networks or
tourism affect the environment as well. The impact of these also needs
to be addressed. In practice, the involvement of civil society in the
design and implementation of protection measures goes a long way in
changing people’s attitudes and bringing about sustainable production
and consumption patterns. It therefore deserves to be encouraged. A
more widespread availability and adoption of green technologies would
likewise help preserve the earth’s resources and environment for future
generations. It in turn could open an era of new ‘green growth’ opportu-
nities with positive effect on economic development.
Belgium, as the Host Country of the next Summit, proposes to devote
a specific preparatory event involving all ASEM partners to the subjects
encompassed in this section with a view to thoroughly prepare the
Summit messages relating to sustainable development.
Other themes will require the attention of ASEM Leaders as well.
The following are being suggested:
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ONE GLOBAL ISSUE IN FOCUS
Among the many global challenges faced by the ASEM community, one
might lend itself to more specific work. Piracy at sea is threatening the
maritime routes linking Europe and Asia. As the phenomenon takes on
disturbing proportions, more energetic multidisciplinary approaches
may be required, including better coordination of law and order forces
of ASEM states and resolution of the complex legal issues involved.
Asian ASEM members have considerable experience in fighting piracy
and so do European ASEM members. Jointly, they could help promote
policies that would set efficient world standards for the fight against
this scourge.
Belgium, as the Host Country of the next Summit, proposes to hold
a seminar involving non-governmental and governmental human re-
sources on the issue. It could be followed by a specific preparatory
event involving the ASEM partners’ governments in order to thoroughly
prepare a possible Summit message on the subject.
REGIONAL ISSUES
Naturally, ASEM leaders will want to discuss political and regional is-
sues in Europe and in Asia as they have done in the past. Since pre-
sumably developments at the time of the Summit will have to be taken
into account, it would appear premature to suggest details at this stage.
PEOPLE TO PEOPLE
Leaders should consider measures to build and expand on the useful
work performed by ASEF, ASEM’s only established institution. The goal
is to stimulate further contacts and interaction between academicians,
students, opinion makers, culture professionals, civil society representa-
tives and local and regional leaders. Tourism also deserves to be encour-
aged.
In addition, ways and means could be developed to advance the offer
of academic exchanges under the care of the Ministers of Education
and the Rector’s Conferences. The establishment under their aegis of
the ASEM Education Secretariat in Bonn, Germany, may open up new
avenues for intensifying cooperation in the area of education and voca-
tional training.
Similarly, progress could be encouraged in cultural cooperation and
exchanges, at the behest of the Ministers for Culture who now meet
regularly. An ASEM Culture Ministerial meeting is projected in Poznan,
Poland, in September 2010. Besides, interfaith and interreligious dialo-
gue has contributed much to bringing Europeans and Asian closer
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together on an agenda of tolerance and mutual understanding, as exem-
plified by the 5th ASEM Interfaith dialogue organized in Seoul, Korea,
last September. The 6th ASEM Interfaith dialogue is to be held in Tole-
do/Madrid, Spain, in May next year. How to carry it further and how to
increase its beneficial impact would deserve specific attention.
VISIBILITY & FUTURE OF ASEM
The visibility of ASEM, a member-driven gathering, depends on the in-
itiatives and actions of ASEM governments themselves. Leaders should
examine how they could better integrate and reflect the work achieved
within ASEM in their public communication. They could entrust speci-
fic tasks to relevant national bodies and institutions with a view to in-
crease efforts or define new approaches. As Host Country of ASEM 8
and with visibility in mind, Belgium has purposely decided not to create
a new logo but to use the existing ASEM logo instead, with only the dis-
crete addition of a reference to the location and the year of the Summit.
With 45 members and still expanding, working methods matter more
and more to preserve and further advance the ASEM process and ensure
its future. Each Summit has devoted attention to this and so will ASEM
8, in the interest of ASEM itself. Taking due account of past discussions
and learning from the informal coordination mechanism related to the
preparation of ASEM 8 set up by the European Commission, Belgium,
as the Host Country of the next Summit, will make proposals to further
improve coordination and ensure that ‘issue-based leadership’, a most
vibrant part of ASEM, continues with higher benefits for all members of
ASEM and with higher inside and outside visibility.
ENLARGEMENT
In accordance with the tasking from the ASEM Foreign Ministers in
Hanoi, arrangements must be made so that Australia and Russia can
formally join ASEM at the Brussels Summit.
At the same time, ASEM Foreign Ministers also mandated Senior Of-
ficials to discuss and propose criteria, principles, and procedures, on
the basis of the Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework of 2000, regard-
ing the future enlargement of ASEM. This is understood to mean enlar-
gement of ASEM to other countries than Australia and Russia. ASEM
partners have to reflect on how to honor this mandate.
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Annex 6
ASEM 8. Revised Annotated Agenda
The ASEM 8 Summit will take place in Brussels on 4 and 5 October
2010. A non-paper was circulated in October 2009 to which partners
have abundantly reacted. A concept paper then followed in January
2010 and likewise produced very useful feedback. This revised version
of the Annotated Agenda takes into account the observations collected
at the ASEM Senior Officials’ Meeting in Phnom Penh of 5 and 6 May
2010. It remains only a tool to help the ASEM community converge to-
wards common objectives.
As stated before, this process does not preempt the actual content of
the discussions among ASEM leaders at the Summit. Leaders will natu-
rally want to address the issues of the day at the time of their gathering.
They might wish the Summit to express specific key messages not an-
ticipated in this prepared agenda.
4 October 2010
16:15-16:45 Opening Ceremony
Based on the consensus reached on enlargement, the Chair of the Sum-
mit will begin by welcoming the new members of ASEM, the Russian
Federation, Australia and New Zealand, whose participation in the pro-
ceedings will be in all respects on par with the existing members of
ASEM.
The Host Country of the former Summit (People’s Republic of China)
will make the first opening statement.
It will be followed by the Host Country of the present Summit (Bel-
gium) which will introduce the general theme of the Summit: ‘Achiev-
ing greater wellbeing and more dignity for all citizens’, captured in
short as ‘Quality of Life’.
Further opening statements are then expected from the first Asian co-
ordinator [Kingdom of Cambodia], from the remaining European coor-
dinator (the European Commission) and from the other Asian coordina-
tor [Republic of Korea].
17:00-19:00 (Closed) Session One
TOPIC 1 MORE EFFECTIVE GLOBAL FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
The world is being transformed by the recent economic and financial cri-
sis. Financial firms are gradually adjusting to evolving market condi-
tions. Yet, new supervisory arrangements are being defined which will
influence their regulatory environment and impose further adaptations.
Also, coordinated stimulus packages that have supported the recovery
now still sustain economic activity and employment in various coun-
tries. At the same time, these packages have engendered significant
public deficits with consequences for the world economy as a whole.
Which policies are now needed? How to schedule, formulate and
communicate credible exit strategies and consolidation paths? Is it pos-
sible or necessary to influence the relative parts of internal and external
sources of growth? How intrusively should governments and regulators
henceforth act on the economy? As it happens, discussions have
emerged about exchange rate management and about the present re-
serve currency system in the context of bringing about greater stability.
In addition, attention has been called on the major objective to foster a
more sustainable model of development, with a beneficial impact in
particular for the development of developing countries.
In fact, the crisis has brought about a significant shift in economic
and social realities. A new economic and financial architecture that is
fair, just, inclusive and well-managed may be called for. International fi-
nancial institutions might have to take better account of the actual
weight of countries in the world’s economy, trade and finances. More
coherent strategies, more robust financial systems and more effective
international cooperation may be needed. Spillovers might increasingly
have to be considered when deciding national policies that have an im-
pact on partners worldwide. Existing international consultation mechan-
isms might be up for review.
Such kind of cooperation involving macroeconomic policies could be
essential to resolve present imbalances, promote strong, sustainable
and balanced growth within and across nations and avoid a recurrence
of the kind of crisis and of social consequences the world is faced with.
At their last Summit, ASEM Leaders led the international debate on
these issues. ASEM 8 offers an opportunity to show unity and to en-
hance the role of ASEM in global policy-making and in restructuring
the economic order, including by weighing in on G-20 activities. ASEM
Leaders representing developed as well as developing countries are well
placed to consider how multilateral institutions, the bodies which hold
the legitimacy in the eyes of the members of the world community,
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large and small, could be further modernized, rendered more effective
and more responsive to current needs.
Relevant meetings:
– ASEM Finance Ministers’ Meeting, Madrid, Spain, 17-18.4.2010
– G20 Toronto, Canada, 26-27.6.2010
– G20 Seoul, Korea, 11-12.11.2010
19:45-21:00 Working Dinner
The discussion initiated under Closed Session One is expected to con-
tinue.
5 October 2010
9:30-11:00 (Closed) Session Two
TOPIC 2 ADVANCE ON THE PATH OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
ASEM leaders should pursue the work of ASEM 7. They should consid-
er ways to move further ahead on the path of sustainable development
in support of the Millennium Development Goals and of other interna-
tionally agreed development goals, including the Johannesburg Plan of
Implementation. On the one hand, policies adopted in response to the
crisis should be consistent with these objectives. On the other, a ba-
lanced approach to sustainable development would require further and
simultaneous progress in the following three areas which mutually sup-
port each other:
Economic development
Private sources of demand have to be reinvigorated as the main drivers
of growth across countries. Structural adjustment to achieve this has to
be encouraged by governmental authorities, including through market
liberalization and incentives in the innovation of products, services and
production processes. Open and free international trade is needed to
reach this objective. The conclusion of the Doha Development Agenda
would represent in this respect the single most important contribution.
It must be achieved as promised by the end of 2010. Also, protectionist
measures that run counter to the rules are to be rejected and, when in-
troduced, are to be rolled back without delay.
In the same spirit, new trade and investment flows should be stimu-
lated between Asia and Europe. New efforts at regulatory reforms could
be undertaken, addressing ‘behind-the-border barriers’. This could be
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pursued through dialogue and with the involvement of private business
communities. The revival of the Trade Facilitation Action Plan and the
Investment Promotion Action Plan established by ASEM ten years ago
could be considered. Transportation offers specific opportunities to ex-
pand economic relations. It is an economic sector suffering from speci-
fic choking points. Remedies may include the development of infra-
structure, the simplification of procedures, the promotion of multimo-
dal schemes and further liberalization. Transportation stands as a major
factor of connectivity between the economies of Asia and Europe and
within these regions. Likewise, information and communication technolo-
gies, as catalysts for globalization and innovation, act as positive agents
on economic development. A resumption of the Economic Ministers’
Meeting is called for.
Special attention needs to go to ensuring food security for all and in
particular for the neediest. The focus should be on sustainable agricul-
tural production and on rural development, assisted by scientific
research. Well-functioning markets are equally required, aided by ade-
quate post-harvest, storage and food-processing technologies. Barriers
that confront producers with wrong incentives should be eliminated
while rules must take into account the specificities of trade in agricul-
tural goods.
Cooperation on economic development between Asia and Europe
should be strengthened, including through well-defined sub-regional
mechanisms. It is in the interest of the fight against poverty. A perti-
nent example is the joint European and Asian effort in narrowing
economic disparities and promoting social progress and sustainable
development in the Mekong sub-region.
Social development
In response to the crisis, the ILO adopted in June 2009 a ‘Global Jobs
Pact’ supported by Asian and European ASEM members alike. The Pact
aims at creating jobs, protecting workers and stimulating economic
recovery. It should be implemented so as to neutralize the risk of
‘growth without employment’ with adverse effects on economic stimu-
lus and growth.
More generally, promotion of decent working conditions and respect
for ILO labor standards are of crucial importance for social develop-
ment. Effective dialogue between social partners and open consultative
labor relations should be encouraged for they generate mutual under-
standing on issues such as productivity, working conditions, remunera-
tion and economic change. Specific attention should go to migrant
labor as a particularly vulnerable sector, yet an important contributor to
global prosperity.
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Also, care must be taken of the protection of workers, particularly in
times of crisis. The need for effective social safety nets is recognized, as
part of – or leading towards – sustainable social security schemes. As a
matter of fact, the existence of social protection has a bearing on the be-
havior of people in regard of accumulation of savings, with potential
beneficial effects on allocation of resources, economic growth, allevia-
tion of poverty and overall macro-economic stability.
Furthermore, it is of structural importance to ensure the long-term
inclusiveness of labor markets. Sustained action to promote education,
lifelong skill development, career development tools and specific mea-
sures for the most vulnerable seems to be called for.
In addition, ASEM members face the challenge of ageing popula-
tions. This must also be addressed within the general goal of creating
societies that are both equitable and inclusive. The promotion of corpo-
rate social responsibility is further recognized as a possible, important
contribution to this objective.
Environmental protection
Climate change is the most pressing threat. ASEM partners share the
commitment to find a long-term multilateral solution. The centrality of
the UNFCCC process is recognized. The negotiations on the two tracks
defined in the Bali Roadmap will be continued, building on the
outcome of the Copenhagen Conference and with the goal of a strong
and ambitious outcome through the UNFCCC conferences in Bonn
and in Cancun. The ultimate goal is an all-encompassing binding legal
agreement.
There is no other way but for members of the world community to
implement proactively a mixture of mitigation and adaptation mea-
sures, each acting in accordance with the principle of common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and taking into
account social and economic conditions. Understandably, calls have
been made for financial assistance and technology transfers.
Energy consumption patterns also matter. Energy saving, energy effi-
ciency and conversion to renewable, low carbon or when possible car-
bon-free sources of energy are all worth pursuing. Sharing of good prac-
tices can play a role, and so can market policies which should nonethe-
less preserve the energy security of the respective countries.
Human activities such as urbanization, industrialization, building of
transportation networks or tourism affect the environment as well.
Their impact needs to be addressed. Particular attention is being drawn
to the management of water and forestry resources, also because of the
obvious relationship to the issue of climate change. Similarly, the
further conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in the world
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should be a priority for action, including in the context of the United
Nations Year for Biodiversity (2010).
In practice, the involvement of civil society in the design and imple-
mentation of environmental protection measures goes a long way in
changing people’s attitudes and bringing about sustainable production
and consumption patterns. Such involvement deserves to be encour-
aged.
Equally, a more widespread availability and adoption of green technol-
ogies, which e.g. save energy, would help preserve the earth’s resources
and the environment for future generations. It may in addition open
the way to new economic and employment opportunities, generating
what is labeled green growth and advancing sustainability. Besides, en-
ergy security could improve as a consequence of reduced energy con-
sumption levels. The combat against climate change could likewise
make important strides.
Relevant meetings:
– 1st ASEM Energy Ministerial in Brussels, Belgium, 18.6.2009
– 1st ASEM Transportation Ministerial in Vilnius, Lithuania, 19-
20.10.2009
– UNFCCC Ministerial Conference in Bonn, Germany, 2-4.5.2010
– 2nd High Level ASEM Conference in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 26-
27.5.2010
– ASEM Employment High-Level Forum, Geneva, Switzerland,
14.6.2010
– United Nations High-Level Plenary Meeting on the Millennium De-
velopment Goals, New York, USA, 20-22.9.2010
– United Nations High-Level Plenary Meeting on Biodiversity, New
York, USA, 22.9.2010
– Convention on Biological Diversity, COPs 10, Nagoya, Japan, 24-
26.10.2010
– UNFCCC COPs 16, Cancun, Mexico, 29.11-10.12.2010
– ASEM Labor Ministerial Meeting, Leiden, the Netherlands, 12-
14.12.2010
– UN Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
2012 (Rio + 20)
It is in consideration of the vast array of issues encompassed under the
agenda item ‘Sustainable Development’ that Belgium has planned a
specific preparatory event on 23-24.6.2010 in Brussels, involving all
ASEM partners with a view to thoroughly preparing the Summit mes-
sage relating to it.
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11:30-12:30 (Closed) Session Three
The discussion initiated under Session Two might have to be continued
into this session.
TOPIC 3 GLOBAL ISSUES IN FOCUS
Global issues suggested for discussion include the fight against terror-
ism and the combat against organized crime. At this stage, no concrete
language has been suggested. A succession of concrete experiences
would call for increased cooperation among ASEM members in regard
of disaster prevention and disaster relief. Similarly, it is being suggested to
address human security in general, since it places the people at the
center and calls for collaboration between governments, international
organizations, non-governmental organizations, civil society and the
private sector.
Concrete work has started on one specific challenge. Piracy at sea is
threatening the maritime routes linking Europe and Asia. As the phe-
nomenon takes on disturbing proportions, more energetic multidisci-
plinary approaches may be required, including better coordination of ef-
forts of ASEM states and resolution of the complex legal issues in-
volved. Asian ASEM members have considerable experience in fighting
piracy and so do European ASEM members. Jointly, they could help
promote policies that would set efficient world standards for the fight
against this scourge.
Belgium, as the Host Country of the next Summit, has organized a
seminar (4-5 May, Brussels) on the issue involving non-governmental
and governmental representatives. Now, a specific preparatory event for
ASEM governmental negotiators is scheduled in Brussels on 24-25 June
in order to prepare a possible Summit message.
Also, ongoing discussions on the reform of the UN system could be
evoked. Meanwhile, the issue of non-proliferation has been signaled as a
common concern of the ASEM community.
Relevant meetings:
– Nuclear Security Summit, Washington, USA, 12-13.4.2010
– NPT Review Conference New York, USA, 3-28.5.2010
13:30-14:45 Working Lunch
TOPIC 4 REGIONAL ISSUES
ASEM leaders will want to discuss concrete political and regional issues
in Europe and in Asia as they have done in the past. Since develop-
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ments at the time of the Summit will have to be taken into account, it
would appear premature to suggest details at this stage.
More generally, there may be an interest to discuss the evolution of
the respective regional architectures of multilateral institutions and dialo-
gue fora. In order to enhance mutual understanding, European Leaders
could explain the developments in the European integration process,
and Asian Leaders could explain the various initiatives for deepening
and widening Asian regional institutions and arrangements.
15:15-16:15 (Closed) Session Four
TOPIC 5 PEOPLE TO PEOPLE, VISIBILITY & FUTURE OF ASEM
Leaders could encourage further progress in the overarching goal of
stimulating further people to people contacts and interaction between aca-
demicians, students, opinion makers, culture professionals, civil society
representatives and local and regional leaders. These raise the inter-con-
nectivity between Europe and Asia. Tourism also deserves to be encour-
aged.
They could take a moment to review the recommendations and reso-
lutions worked out by the Parliamentary partnership, the People’s For-
um and the Business Forum. These are the respective parallel dialogues
that are part and parcel of the ASEM process.
They could take note of the efforts to expand the offer of academic ex-
changes under the care of the Ministers of Education and the Rector’s
Conferences. The establishment, under their aegis, of the ASEM Educa-
tion Secretariat in Bonn, Germany, may open up new avenues for inten-
sifying cooperation in the area of education and vocational training. It
would support strengthening education systems throughout the ASEM
region. Further tools are the ASEM Duo Fellowship program and the es-
tablishment of a Trans-Eurasian Information Network (TEIN) Cooperation
Center.
Similarly, progress could be encouraged in cultural cooperation and
exchanges, at the behest of the Ministers for Culture who now meet
regularly.
Besides, interfaith and interreligious dialogue has contributed much to
bring Europeans and Asians closer together on an agenda of tolerance
and mutual understanding. How to carry it further and how to increase
its beneficial impact deserve specific attention.
Leaders should consider measures to build and expand on the useful
work performed by ASEF, ASEM’s only established institution. Attention
is drawn to the need to provide it with long-term financial sustainability.
Leaders could encourage further work on the visibility of ASEM. As a
member-driven gathering, ASEM crucially depends on the initiatives,
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actions and communication policies of Partners themselves. National
bodies and institutions could take on new specific tasks to achieve bet-
ter results.
With 48 participants and still expanding, working methods are ever
more important to preserve and further advance the ASEM process and
ensure its future. Taking due account of past discussions and learning
from the informal coordination mechanism related to the preparation
of ASEM 8 set up by the European Commission, a discussion paper
has been tabled by Belgium, the Host Country of the Summit. ASEM
members may wish to consider recommendations for endorsement by
the Leaders. The goal is to improve the coordination and to ensure that
“issue-based leadership”, a remarkably vibrant part of ASEM, continues
with higher benefits for all members of ASEM and with higher inside
and outside visibility.
Relevant meetings:
– 5th ASEM Interfaith dialogue, Seoul, Korea, 23-25.9.2009
– ASEM Outlook Seminar (ASEF), Brussels, Belgium, April 15-
16.4.2010
– 6th ASEM Interfaith dialogue, Toledo/Madrid, Spain, 6-9.4.2010
– Senior Officials’ Meeting, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 5-6.5.2010
– 3d Global Forum of the Alliance of Civilization, Rio de Janeiro, Bra-
zil, 27-29.5.2010
– 4th ASEM Culture Ministerial meeting, Poznan, Poland, 9-
10.9.2010
16:45-17:15 Closing Ceremony
The Chair will present the texts for approval by the Leaders and formu-
late any additional appropriate conclusions.
The Host Country of the Next Summit in 2012 (to be determined)
will take the floor last.
Final Remarks
– ASEM members’ preference for one Chair’s Statement combined
with one or two specific Declarations on a delimited subject or
theme has been duly registered. The suggestion that Leaders might
take note of reports or endorse recommendations has also been
recorded. Calendar-wise, the aim is to produce texts – without preju-
dice to structure – by early July with a view to discuss them at the
Senior Officials’ Meeting of 14 July in Brussels.
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– The Chair is preparing proposals to honor ASEM’s goal of “develop-
ing direct and personal contacts between Asian and European lead-
ers” while respecting the requirements of overall predictability and
coherence. The Chair will strive to ensure that every member par-
takes equally. With 48 participants, interventions will need to be
strictly limited in time.
Source: Belgium, 2 June, 2010
ANNEX 6 239
Annex 7




The first ASEM in Bangkok (1996) agreed to develop a common vision
of the future, to foster political dialogue, to reinforce economic coopera-
tion, and to promote cooperation in other areas.
The principles for this cooperation are detailed in the Asia-Europe
Cooperation Framework 2000 (AECF). They have guided ASEM coop-
eration for fourteen years now.
In the meantime, ASEM has grown from 26 members to 47, the Eur-
opean Commission and the ASEAN Secretariat being fully fledged
members. The diversity of subjects of interest has increased accord-
ingly. Also, the world in which the cooperation takes place has evolved,
moving priorities and confronting ASEM with new challenges.
In this context, many suggest taking a look at the working methods
of ASEM. The issue is not whether the principles are still valid. They
are. They have carried the cooperation all this time, and there is no in-
dication that they have lost relevance or that ASEM members are taking
distance from them. The issue rather is how to uphold the principles in
the face of changed circumstances. Equality of partnership, open pro-
cess, dialogue leading to cooperation and to concerted action, informal-
ity all come under threat if methods are not adjusted to the new ampli-
tude and complexity of the tasks.
The Hanoi Recommendations for ASEM Working Methods (2004)
constituted a first important step in this direction. The Helsinki Dec-
laration on the Future of ASEM (2006) confirmed the importance of
improved working methods and institutional mechanisms. Also, the fol-
lowing Summit in Beijing (2008) and the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting
in Hanoi (2009) called for this effort to be pursued, the latter with the
establishment of an ad-hoc one-year ASEM 8 Coordinating Office. In-
deed, more can still be done. The positive momentum must be seized
to further enhance the quality of ASEM mechanisms.
Guidelines
In the quest for more efficient cooperation among ASEM partners, the
following guidelines, actually extrapolations from the principles of the
AECF, appear relevant:
– Continuity of process: when objectives are to be reached over time, it
is necessary to remain focused. The subject matter must undergo
sustained attention, long enough to make a difference.
– Transparency: circulation of information at various steps is a neces-
sary requirement to establish trust, provide predictability, ensure
commitment and stimulate engagement.
– Inclusiveness: every ASEM member is an essential constituting part
of the Asia-Europe relationship and therefore a necessary participant
in the region-to-region cooperation.
– Prioritization: to confine oneself to one topic at a time would admit-
tedly be too restrictive but to attempt to pursue all topics all the time
would clearly be illusory. A balance must be striven for, implying se-
quencing of efforts and choices along the way.
– Proportionality of resources: adequacy of human, financial and other
resources for the goals pursued is one of the keys to a healthy coop-
eration process.
Suggestions
Taking a lead from the guidelines, the following indicate the direction
in which to possibly take the existing mechanisms while reaffirming
the AECF 2000 and the measures agreed since then. Detailed proposals
would have to be worked out in a second stage.
Coordination
Throughout the past, the spontaneous action of the 4 existing coordina-
tors has proven an important factor in facilitating the ASEM process. A
better definition of their role would smoothen the cooperation in-be-
tween Senior Official Meetings and ensure a better circulation of useful
information among ASEM members. It could reinforce the structure of
ASEM and bring more stability.
Technical Support Team
The positive experience from the European Commission’s temporary
ASEM 8 Coordination Team shows that ASEM could really benefit from
additional support to keep records, centralize official information and
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secure information flows among ASEM members. To ensure reliability
and continuity, it would appear necessary to base the Technical Support
Team on an agreement among ASEM members. It could comprise two
persons, financed and audited on a voluntary basis. Maximum use
should be made of electronic means of communications in order to
keep costs down.
Senior Officials’ Meeting
The Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) is presently the choice mechanism
which ensures continuity in-between summits and ministerial meet-
ings. In order to develop its potential as a body capable of generating
consensus, the number and duration of meetings could be raised. In
addition, ASEM members should look at issues of structure, discipline,
responsibility and transparency. Records should be held so that next
steps are more clearly defined. Also, SOM should ensure that the priori-
ties established by Leaders at their Summit meetings are respected.
They should keep an overview of all activities organized under ASEM.
SOMs might have to report more formally to the Ministers and to the
Summit.
Upcoming Summit Host role
The Upcoming Summit Host is one of the main stakeholders in the
ASEM process. Having the responsibility for organizing the next Sum-
mit of ASEM Leaders, it can be relied upon to contribute attention,
means and efforts to help drive the cooperation process forward. Hence
the idea is being tabled to invite the Upcoming Summit Host to be-
come a part of the coordination mechanism “from summit to summit”
by right. That would not only constitute a recognition of the peculiar po-
sition in which the ASEM member concerned is placed but would also
bring to the ASEM process the dynamism of a committed partner.
Issue-based Leadership
Issue-based leadership was intended to be different from the launch of
“one-off” activities. It should revolve around a number of co-sponsoring
countries willing to drive projects and initiatives in a certain policy area
with a view to produce tangible benefits for all. It holds major potential
if smooth steering, coordination and management mechanisms can be
defined. A fixed “summit to summit” duration could help clarify the re-
sponsibility undertaken. Issue-based leadership would benefit from
more clearly articulated and consistent procedures.
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Networks
Electronic means of communication can serve two objectives. They can
ensure the visibility and accessibility of ASEM for the general public.
They can also constitute a tool for the exchange of internal, non-public
documents among ASEM members. Technically, the ASEM Infoboard
can be designed in such a way as to meet the two objectives. The infor-
mation destined for the public would be available as before, though it
could be expanded and rendered more dynamic, while a confidential
log-in would give access to a secure sharepoint/intranet component, ac-
cessible only to ASEM officials and contact points. The Technical Sup-
port Team would be entrusted with the task of maintaining the system.
Relationship with ASEF
Since its inception, the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) has played an
invaluable role in implementing ASEM’s priority to expand people-to-
people exchanges between Asia and Europe. The work of ASEF repre-
sents a major contribution to the visibility of ASEM among the wider
public. This focus should be preserved. A look should be taken at how
to ensure the financial sustainability of ASEF.
Involvement of AExx partners
The people to people contacts are an integral part of the ASEM process.
The Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF), the Asia-Europe People’s For-
um (AEPF) and the Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership (AEPP), in
short AExx, are recognized as important contributors to objectives laid
out by the ASEM Leaders at the outset. Good practices of political con-
tacts with the AExx partners ahead of relevant Senior official, Minister-
ial and Summit meetings could be devised to create a more sustained
and visible connection between the intergovernmental process.
Procedural remark
In order to achieve concrete progress on these issues, the Leaders at the
ASEM8 Summit, October 4th and 5th, 2010, in Brussels could possibly
approve conclusions on the working methods of ASEM. These conclu-
sions could:
– contain concrete decisions of the kind suggested here,
– contain a tasking to the Senior Officials to work out and endorse
more detailed proposals addressing the issues raised here,
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– invite the Ministers to take the appropriate decisions upon proposal
of the Senior Officials.
They could also combine these different approaches.
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Contributors
Tanja Bauer is a PhD student at the Universität der Bundeswehr in Mu-
nich, conducting a comparative study of Asia-Europe perceptions. She
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